Military Operations with Strategic Impact. The Battle of Berlin (April – May 1945)*

Throughout the entirety of military operations carried aut during the Second World War, the Battle of Berlin (April 16 – May 2, 1945) provided a special meaning for all combatants: for the United Nations (Western Allies and the Soviet Union) it was the ultimate price for a costly and, until then, highly desired victory, while for the German Reich, it marked the end of an illusion. Furthermore, the conquest of Berlin, despite the inter-ally agreements regarding the postwar management of the German territory, could influence a behavioral review from one or several of the Allies. The capture of a bridge across the Rhine, in Remagen, on March 7, 1945, by the soldiers of the 9th American Tank Division, caused a poignant response within the Soviet General Headquarters (STAVKA) and amplified the concerns of generalissimo Stalin regarding the honesty of Western Allies. The manner in which the Red Army decided to take Berlin, as well as its temporary abandonment by the Western Allies, represents one of the most distressing episodes of inter-allied history and, furthermore, it would alter the evolution of relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union in the perspective of what was to be the Cold War.

Inter-allied Duplicity

During the course of inter-allied relations, the suspicion regarding the possibility of carrying out separate peace treaties with Hitler’s Reich, in secret, despite official declarations from the leaders of the United Nations Coalition on the unconditional surrender, would significantly influence political and military decisions. The historiography of the Second World War saw a prolonged assessment of a possible separate peace between Germany and the USSR. On December 14, 1943 took place a first meeting between German diplomat Peter Kleist[1], a close friend of Minister von Ribbentrop, and Edgar Klauss[2], who had excellent relations with the Soviet embassy in Sweden. On August 31, 1943, French intelligence services analysts noted: „There is a fracture between the general staff (above else eager to establish a compromise with the Anglo-Saxon powers) and the party advocating for a rapprochement with the USSR. The reinforcement created by the party may be one day used for a Russian – German rapprochement”[3]. Despite numerous meetings between Edgar Klauss and the Soviet diplomats, with consent from the Germans, Hitler would prohibit Peter Kleist from meeting with the Soviet Foreign Deputy Minister, Dekanozov, who was to be in Stockholm during the 12 – 16 September period of 1943.

On November 12, 1943, V. M. Molotov provided the American ambassador in Moscow with a Memorandum regarding the talks held between the Soviets and Dr. Peter Kleist and Edgar Klauss in Stockholm. The Soviet Foreign Ministry presented the events as a German initiative. After Hitler categorically refused to further negotiate with the Soviet Union, the Kremlin informed the United States government with the intention of impressing Western Allies. In a note dated November 1943, the French Intelligence Service concluded: „The talks held in Sweden between the Germans and Russians have reached an impasse. The conditions put forward by the Russians as a basis for negotiation was the collapse of the Nazi party and the immediate return to the borders of 1939. German circles seem to be concerned by the establishment in Russia of a German army commanded by General Seydiltz and comprising of former fighters of Stalingrad, violent anti-Nazi advocates”[4]. The meetings between Dr. Peter Kleist and Edgar Klauss would continue in the autumn of 1944, respectively on October 3 and 5. On October 8, 1944, Peter Kleist was recalled to Berlin by von Ribbentrop who informed the former of refusing to continue negotiations if the Soviets were to send formal negotiators. Given the developments of political and military events, Dr. Peter Kleist left Stockholm on October 9, 1944, and provided a report to Ernst Kaltenbrunner , the head of the Reichssicherheithauptampt (RSHA).

Moreover, the Kremlin was informed that Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, „the most dangerous man in Europe” according to the Soviets, developed a series of discrete connections with the heads of secret services, especially from Hungary and the Baltic States, who were members of secret societies prohibited in Hitler’s Germany. With the help of such „friends”, the head of the Abwehr maintained open communication lines with the Western Allies, especially the British[5]. The head of the Abwehr also maintained secret contacts with the head of the American OSS, in Switzerland and Turkey, given the American envoy Allen Dulles favored a compromise peace which would have preserved the integrity of the German state, would have maintained the Anschluss and would have installed a sanitary belt around the USSR[6].

The betrayal of Erich Vermehren, an officer for the Abwehr in Istanbul, and his fleeing to the United Kingdom would represent a devastating blow for the entire secret service relations system established throughout Europe by Admiral Canaris. Erich Vermehren remained in hiding in the apartment belonging to the mother of Kim Philby[7], a Soviet agent infiltrated within the Intelligence Service (MI6), former correspondent of the Times in Spain during the Civil War, who would provide the list of the most important personalities from the world of Catholic anti-Nazi Germany. The Soviet „intelligence” services thus managed to dissipate the backbone of a future Christian-conservative oriented postwar German government. After the war, the Western Allies’ intelligence officers failed to find many of these people alive. Kim Philby had done everything to prevent a political agreement and a separate peace between Berlin and London[8]. Kim Philby constantly vilified the OSS reports, concluded based on the information provided by German diplomat Fritz Kolbe (codenamed George Wood), and on those regarding the anti-Nazi resistance put forward by Allen Dulles, the OSS resident in Switzerland. Fritz Kolbe supplied over 1.600 copies of telegrams, letters and summaries of messages exchanged between the German Foreign Ministry and its embassies worldwide. The consequences of a truce or a separate peace on the Western Front are difficult to assess given the prospect of the time, but no doubt the three month Soviet-British agreement concerning spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, signed on June 12, 1944, would not have been observe as the Western Allies would have gained a military advantage which could have tipped the balance of power in their favor and thus would have constituted a political trump during the pending Peace Conference.

In an interview with the Ria Novosti Agency from May 2005, Russian historian and diplomat Valentin Falin, the author of The Second Front, supported the idea that aside from preparing the landing in France (June 6, 1944), Western political leaders had asked General Dwight D. Eisenhower not to lose sight of the RANKIN plan, which provided the implementation of an Anglo-American control over the whole of Germany, over all the states of Eastern Europe, so as to prohibit a Soviet advance within Central and Eastern Europe[9]. „The war was not only fought on two fronts, East and West, but also for two fronts. Formally speaking, The Allies have undeniably carried out important war operations and immobilized considerable parts of the German forces on our behalf. Yet, their essential purpose was to stop the Soviet Union, to the extent possible, as Churchill put it, and «to stop the descendants of Ghenghis-Khan», to use the phrasing of certain American generals.  Eventually, Churchil formulated the following idea, in coarse anti-Soviet terms, in October 1942, prior to the beginning of our counter-offensive for the defense of Stalingrad on November 19: «These barbarians must be stopped as far from the East as possible». When speaking about our allies, I would under no circumstances diminish the merits of soldiers and officers of allied troops, who fought as we did, without being aware of the political intrigues and machinations of their leaders. (…) We tried to conquer evil together and together we strived to create a better world. Unfortunately, our second endeavor was unsuccessful”[10], said Valentin Falin, former ambassador of the USSR and FRG.

Aside from the physical liquidation of the Chancellor, the members of the conspiracy against Hitler („Schwarze Kapelle”/The Black Orchestra), wanted to seal a separate cease-fire and peace with the Anglo-Americans, in the hope that the Anglo-American forces would help the Germans defeat the Soviets. These intentions would reflect on the military decisions on the Western Front, made after the act of July 20, 1944, which aimed at retreating the German troops without disarming, followed by a subsequent consolidation of the Eastern Front. Historians recorded the fact that on August 12, 1944, Field Marshal von Kluge, a follower of the „Schwarze Kapelle” ideas, but lacking the courage to implement such ideas, would try to make amends by negotiating a cease-fire and a subsequent peace with the Anglo-Americans on the Western Front, as commander of Army Group „B”.

On June 25, 1945, the Time magazine published the following: „The road to Avranches – Last year, one day in August, (Kluge) left unexpectedly from his headquarters on the Western Front…Kluge and several officers of his general staff headed by car to an isolated point on the road, neighboring the town of Avranches, in northwestern France. Here they waited for hours on end for the arrival of a group of officers from the 3^rd US Army group, with which they had secretively arranged to discuss the terms of surrender. The latter failed to show up to the meeting. Fearing an act of treason, Kluge returned hastily to his headquarters. On the day set for the meeting, the Allies air strikes blocked the movement of the officers of the 3^rd Army group to Avranches [actually, the town of Falaise – n. n.]. By the time the American negotiators arrived, Kluge had already left”[11]. Allen Dulles, the resident of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS)[12] in Berna, recalled that Field Marshal von Kluge had made „a futile attempt to surrender to the army led by General Patton somewhere in the Falaise gap”[13]. Doctor Udo Esch, of the Wehrmacht’s Medical Corps, von Kluge’s son in law, further enforces this hypothesis through a statement made, after the war, to an official of the Allies: „This failure determined by father in law to consider that it was his duty to negotiate the surrender before the Allies on the Western Front, in the hope of overthrowing the Nazi regime with their help. At first, he discussed his plan with me and I think not even general Speidel, his chief of staff, was privy to it”[14]. On august 31, 1944, Hitler confessed to his entourage: „Field Marshal von Kluge was planning to cause the surrender of the entire Western Army and to join the enemy himself. It seems his plan failed because of an enemy air strike. He had send his staff officer elsewhere. The British and US patrols continued their advance, however, it appears that the contact failed to materialize…Yet, the British reported they were in touch with a German general”[15].

Historian Anthony Cave Brown noted that around the allied landing in Normandy, the command of the German army stationed in France was not „only riddled with a defeatist attitude, it was downright ineffective to a degree that makes you ponder betrayal”[16]. Within the military operations plan, we shall record the fact that, on the night from August 12 to 13, 1944, the 5^th US Armored Division, under the leadership of General Oliver, permeated the outskirts of Argentan, while units of the 2^nd French Armored Division, commanded by General Jacques Leclerc, supported by those of 79 and 90 US Infantry Divisions, had reached 25 km to the south of Argentan and continued their advance, facing very little resistance. On the evening of August 12, 1944, the armored vehicle division of General George S. Patton stopped, thus creating the Falaise Gap. Who gave the order and for what reasons? Political or military? „Suddenly – wrote General Wallace of the general staff of the 3^rd American Army – we were ordered to stop our advance north. A border was set and we were not to go beyond it. The reason invoked was to let the German forces leave through the gap, while we destroyed them with our air forces”[17]. Regarding this strange order, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to clarify that „hubbubs started to form and there was no way to resolve them, maybe except through a complete halt of the troops, even with the price of a few Germans fleeing”[18]. Regarding this strange order, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to clarify that „hubbubs started to form and there was no way to resolve them, maybe except through a complete halt of the troops, even with the price of a few Germans fleeing”[19]. The Gap of Falaise was closed on August 20, 1944, after approximately 200,000 German soldiers managed to break-out from the encirclement, taking with them tanks, all kinds of vehicles and a large amount of war materials. Moreover, surprisingly so, the General Staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) issued a document entitled The Surrender of German Forces. The writing thereof began on August 13, 1944, when the Western Allies opened the Falaise Gap.

The rising in Warsaw breaking out on August 1, 1944 represented another delicate moment in the history of inter-allied relations where Stalin’s[20] strategy was put in jeopardy. Referring to the manner in which the political and military leaders of the Western Allies understood the evolution of events on the Eastern Front during 1944, historian Norman Davies concluded, however, that, „In the later stages of the war, the Eastern Front did not arouse many major anxieties in the strategic circulation of the Western powers. it had been assigned by mutual consent as an undefined sphere of Soviet influence”[21], yet „In Western eyes, the most worrying concern arose from the possibility that Stalin, having driven the Germans from Soviet territory, might be tempted to make a separate peace, or still worse, to conquer a large slice of Central Europe”[22].

 A Memorable April 1^st

As a result of experiences with the Western Allies in the summer – autumn of 1944 and the difficulties[23] arising from the execution of his strategic plans[24], Stalin became increasingly concerned that the Western Allies held a beachhead across the Rhine on the evening of March 7, 1945. On March 8, 1945, Stalin summoned Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov to Moscow, the commander of the 1^st Belorussian Front, in order to draft together with General Alexei Antonov, the head of the general staff of STAVKA, the plans of his strategic operation for the conquest of Berlin. „Stalin, always eager to encourage the rivalry between the two soldiers, was aware that the operational border between the two fronts, as drawn by STAVKA, was heading from the south of Guben, along the river Neisse, through Michendorf, and all the way to Schönebeck, on the Elba river. Stalin subtly erased the line drawn beyond Lübben, on the Spree river, hinting that, from that point on, whatever happened next was solely up to the commanders – whomever got there first would have had the best chance of conquering Berlin”[25], noted historian Peter Antill.

Marshal G. K. Zhukov admitted in his memoirs that Stalin was deeply concerned by the fact that the British were still dreaming of conquering Berlin. In October 1944, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke had told Stalin that, after the encirclement of Ruhr, „the main axis of Allies’ advance would be directed towards Berlin”[26]. Furthermore, it should also be noted that by an error of German bureaucracy, a shipment of uranium oxide had been sent to Dahlem, a suburb in southwest Berlin, where the „Kaiser Wilhelm” Physics Institute operated, and managed the German atomic research[27]. This episode would significantly influence the plans to conquer Berlin, given that the USA had refused to sell an amount of eight tons of uranium oxide to be used for Soviet atomic research[28] to the USSR. The Soviet Intelligence Services knew that the „Kaiser Wilhelm” Physics Institute continued Germany’s atomic research, yet the depth and reliability of such research would remain an unelucidated mystery for some time. The necessities of the Soviet atomic program would influence Stalin’s political and military decisions in April 1945.

The operational plans of the two senior military Soviet officers were completely different. Marshal G. K. Zhukov, the commander of the 1^st Belorussian Front, whose troops were stationed 80 kilometers east of Berlin and which held a small bridgehead across the Oder River, from Küstrin, wanted to use over 140 huge projectors so as to blind the enemy and 10,000 pieces of artillery, in a short 30 minute barrage. The units of the 1^st Belorussian Front were facing issues in terms of camouflage, as they were caught by a late spring, the trees were leafless and the earth was damp. Marshal Ivan S. Konev, the commander of the 1^st Ukrainian Front, was preparing for an assault under cover of darkness, supported by a 145 minute artillery barrage.

The military leaders of the Western Allies underwent numerous controversies regarding the strategic objective of the Allies after crossing the Rhine, at Remagen: either towards Berlin or to the south of Germany, in Bavaria and north-west Austria? In his Memoirs[29], general Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that „A natural objective beyond the Ruhr was Berlin. It was politically and psychologically important as a symbol of remaining German power”[30], yet „it was not the logical or the most desirable objective for the forces of the Western Allies”[31]. The SHAEF headquarters considered that an encirclement and capture of Berlin by the Western Allies, stationed 300 miles from Berlin, while the Soviets were stationed at a beachhead 80 miles from the Reich capital „would have meant the practical immobilization of units along the remainder of the front”[32], which was, in General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s opinion, „more than unwise; it was stupid”[33]. General Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted his troops in central and southern Germany to link up with the Red Army as soon as possible, „thus to divide the country and eventually prevent any possibility of German forces acting as a unit”[34]. On March 30, 1945, the decisions of the SHAEF Headquarters shattered the dreams of the British political and military leaders, and of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, Commander of the 21^st Army Group, to attack Berlin. The strategic mission of the 21^st Army Group had become clear: north-east bound, towards the Baltic Sea coast.

Moreover, to the dismay of British generals, General Dwight D. Eisenhower informed Kremlin, through telegram SCAF-252, on the plans of SHAEF which began to be executed after the forcing of the Rhine by Montgomery’s 21^st Army Group. Meanwhile, the USA refused Soviet participation in negotiations regarding the surrender of German troops in Northern Italy, and the American fighter aviation took down eight soviet planes, on March 18, 1945, in the airspace between Berlin and Küstrin. A telegram of March 27, 1945, of the Reuters correspondent by the 21^st Army Group stated that British and American troops advancing towards the heart of Germany faced no resistance from the Wehrmacht. STAVKA went on alert. A series of information received from the Soviet Secret Service confirmed that the Western Allies were negotiating in secret with the representatives of Nazi Germany, and that the possibility of Germans leaving the way open to Berlin for Western Allies was a very likely possibility. Marshal G. K. Zhukov was informed by Stalin that upon a closer analysis of the operational maps, he observed that the Germans were strengthening their battle groups on the main axes, against the Red Army.

On the evening of March 31, 1945, at 20:00, the US ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, and the ambassador of the United Kingdom, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, accompanied by American General John Russell Deane, met with Stalin and his main advisors. The western diplomats handed Stalin a message, in both Russian and English, which reiterated the information of telegram SCAF-252. General John R. Deane described the operative status of the Western Allied troops and he operational plans of SHAEF. Stalin was extremely pleased and supported the Western Allies’ intent to liquidate the final bastion of Nazi resistance in the south of Germany. Stalin would inform the Western diplomats and military agents that the STAVKA was in accord with the military intentions of the Western Allies and would insist on the fact that the Red Army and its Western Allies had to merge on the Erfurt – Leipzig – Dresden line. Moreover, Stalin would inform them that Berlin had lost its strategic importance for the Soviets and that it was to be occupied by a series of secondary forces during at a late stage. The main assault of the Soviet forces was bound to begin in the second half of May 1945. The Soviets were also stating that the Germans had consolidated the Eastern Front with the 6^th SS Panzer Army Corps as well as three divisions from Italy and one from Norway. STAVKA representatives provided no information about the preparations made for the conquest of Berlin.

Marshals Zhukov and Konev were later notified by Stalin, on the morning of April 1, 1945, on information provided by the Soviet informer by the SHAEF, that Field Marshal Montgomery would actually advance on Berlin, and the 3^rd American Army, under Patton, would diverge from its route towards Leipzig and Dresden in order to attack Berlin from the south. Moreover, Allied paratrooper divisions[35] were ready to converge on Berlin. It remains questionable whether the perceptions of the Soviet liaison officer were real or if Stalin was trying to motivate the two Soviet marshals.

And yet…during April 2, 1945, the 9^th American army was instructed to „exploit every opportunity to gain a foothold across Elba and to be prepared to continue its advance towards Berlin from the north-east”[36]. Despite the fact that the US 2^nd and 5^th tank divisions and 84 and 102 infantry divisions were ready to begin the assault on Berlin, using the highway going to berlin, the SHAEF commander refused to give the order to attack[37]. General Dwight D. Eisenhower had been informed by STAVKA, during April 1, 1945, that Berlin „had lost its past strategic importance”[38], and that the Red Army would unleash a new offensive in the second half of May, towards the south, with the purpose of joining up with the Western Allied troops. Consequently, with support from General George C. Marshall, General Dwight D. Eisenhower informed Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery that Berlin had become „a mere geographical location”[39]. The SHAEF commander remained convinced that the Leipzig – Dresden axis, which split Germany in half, was much more important than the capital of the Reich, and he was convinced that Stalin thought the same.

Yet Stalin continued to fear a possible double play by the head of SHAEF and on April 7, 1945, wrote to the US president to protest against the fact that crucial cities in the heart of Germany, respectively Osnabruck, Mannheim and Kassel, had surrendered without resistance. „Do you agree that such a behavior is more than peculiar and incomprehensible?”[40], asked Stalin. Unfortunately, president F. D. Roosevelt never answered as he was already dying, and …the Information Committee of SHAEF admitted on April 10, 1945 that there was no reliable information showing that OKW and OKH were preparing for a resistance in the so-called „National Redoubt”. Moreover, Soviet military counter-intelligence (SMERSH) reported to Stalin, on April 14, 1945, that soldiers from the 1^st and 2^nd Polish armies were prepared to join the Anglo-American troops in case of a link up, given the rapid advance of Western Allies on the Western Front and the fact that Elba had been crossed south of Dessau on April 11. The Allied headquarters had estimated that a breach of Berlin was possible within 48 hours. The Wehrmacht units seemed willing to surrender to the Anglo-Americans and only a few SS defense units were stationed on the western side of Berlin. Despite the excellent morale of allied troops holding a beachhead on the Elba, and on the realistic estimates of the US 9^th Army commanders in terms of tactical status and strategic perspectives, general Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the 9^th American Army to stop on the Elba on the morning of April 15, 1945.

During April 11, 1945, a radio station belonging to the French government that was broadcasting from Köln made the following announcement on air: „Germany, your vital space is not a space of death!”[41]. The Germans were horror-struck. On the same day, Ilia Ehrenburg published an article in the Krasnaia Zvezda, entitled Hvatit (Enough!), where he wrote that „Germany is dying a miserable death, scant of pathos and dignity”[42] and that „Germany is no more: all that remains is a huge mob of criminals”[43]. Ilia Ehrenburg was part of the Soviet propaganda group instructed to transform the enemy’s will to fight into indecision and vacillation, „by promising immunity to everyone who had done nothing else than follow Hitler’s orders”[44]. According to the NKVD and SMERSH reports, which concluded that Ilia Ehrenburg’s articles are nevertheless „harmful” from a political standpoint, given the current context, Stalin instructed Georgi Aleksandrov, a leading ideologist of the CC and PCPSU, and head of the Soviet propaganda, to reply to Ehrenburg. On April 14, 1945, Georgi Aleksandrov would write in Pravda: „Comrade Ehrenburg oversimplifies matters”[45], as well as the fact that „People like Hitler come and go, but Germany and its German people shall remain”[46]. Referring to this aspect of the Red Army’s offensive preparations to overtake Berlin, historian Antony Beevor recorded the following: „Changing a policy, even before a great offensive, had occurred too late for the soldiers rife with personal hatred and filled with the hated induce propaganda of the past three years. (…) After the Nazi propaganda had dehumanized the Slavic people, calling them Untermenschen, the Soviet propaganda had convinced its people, in retaliation, that al Germans were rapacious beasts”[47].

On 14 and 15 April 1945, the Red Army launched a series of research by combat missions, in preparation of a greater offensive against Berlin. „Scouting by fighting on the whole front was executed on April 14. On this day, at 7:40, following a hammer strike of assault fire which lasted for 10 minutes, the scouting battalions simultaneously descended on the first position of the enemy and conquered it on the offensive sector of the 8^th Army Guard, advancing over a distance of 2-4 kilometers. The same situation occurred to the neighbor’s right – with the 5^th Strike Army. Taken by surprise, the enemy suffered numerous casualties and withdrew to the second position”[48], noted V. I. Chuikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and commander of the 8^Th Soviet Army Guard in the Battle for Berlin. On the morning of April 16, 1945, 2.5 million soldiers forming the 1^st Belorussian Front (Marshal G. K. Zhukov) and the 1^st Ukrainian Front (Marshal I.S. Konev), supported by 41.600 guns and heavy mortars, 6.250 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as four airborne armies (7.500 planes), unleashed the Battle of Berlin. The conquest of Berlin by the Red Army would influence the development of relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, as well as achieving the strategic and geopolitical interests of Kremlin in view of what was to become the Cold War.

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*Article published in the Valahian Journal of Historical Studies no. 22 (2014), p. 58 – 73.

[1] Dr. Peter Kleist, Head of the Eastern Department within the Foreign Ministry in Berlin

[2] Edgar Klauss was a Jew working for the Red Cross in Stockholm and for Abwehr, under the control of Werner Boening, in the guise of a Baltic businessman. Admiral Canaris had ordered that Edgar Klauss maintain the ties to the Soviet embassy in Sweden open, specifically with Alexandra Kollontay, an old friend of Vladimir I. Lenin, whom the Baltic businessman had met through a common Slovenian acquaintance. The French Information Service recorded the following in a Note of June 12, 1943: „The Führer and his entourage sought to end the hostilities on the Russian front by concluding an agreement with the Soviets. Stalin might be tempted by such a solution due to the political disagreements with his Allies. The Reich believes that a favorable opinion revival in Russia is possible, the fact underlying such an opinion being that the German commandment managed to recruit three divisions from the prisoners and populations of occupied Russian countries and that these units are putting up a good fight. A German personality recently stated that «The deed isn’t done yet, but everything seems to lead to the idea of being possible»” (Apud Thierry Wolton, Roşu – Brun. Răul Secolului, (Red – Brown. The Evil of the Century) Editura Fundaţia Academia Civică, Bucharest, 2001, p. 375).

[3] Ibidem.

[4] Ibidem, p. 378.

[5] In February 1939, Winston S. Churchill as informed by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a person who possessed the „hidden leverages” of history, in the presence of Julian Amery (future coordinator of SOE in the Balkans), that Hitler and Stalin were on the verge of concluding a strategic alliance. The information was obtained via the Vatican channels. The wife of the former Polish attaché in Berlin, Colonel Szymarski, would become one of the Admiral Canaris’ trusted people during the operation of maintaining contact with London, via the Free Polish Mission in Berna. „Canaris knew that whatever he told this Polish lady would be passed forward, given that she was a Polish patriot, faithful to the Polish intelligence services, which in turn would deliver such information to us”, confessed Nicholas Elliot, a young officer of the Intelligence Service involved in the discrete and perilous connections with the German Abwehr (Apud Richard Bassett, Spionul-şef al lui Hitler. Misterul Wilhelm Canaris, Editura RAO, București, 2008, p. 203). Admiral Canaris was involved in leaking information to Great Britain on the German plans for the invasion of the British Empire (Operation „Sea Lion”). Whether or not Canaris and Sir Stewart Menzies met during the war, in December 1942, at Algeciras in Spain, remains a mystery.

[6] Prince Max Hohenlohe and Reinhard Spitzy, Germany’s secret agents in the dialogue with the OSS remained under the impression that „while London was attempting to achieve a balance of power in Europe, between the various spheres of influence, Dulles wanted Europe to become a single entity, to represent a broad outlet for US commercial interests” (Ibidem, p. 299 – 300).

[7] Kim Philby was involved in the liquidation of the Dutch Resistance which collaborated with the SOE SOE (Operation „North Pole”), the objective being a severance of ties between Canaris and Sir Stewart Menzies, the Director of the Intelligence Service, which were carried out through the Netherlands.

[8] The case of Otto John, former head of the West German counterintelligence (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz – BfV) during the 1950-1954 period, is indicative for the influence exerted by Moscow’s secret agents over the relations between the Western Allies and the German anti-Nazi resistance. Otto John was counted among the secret emissaries of „Schwarze Kapelle” in the Iberian area where he worked since 1939, at Lufthansa. According to reports by NKVD residents in Berlin, Otto John fostered cordial relations with American journalist Louis Lochner, who was seen by German antagonists as a possible connection channel to President Roosevelt. Otto John’s file from the KGB Archives in Moscow contains numerous reports from Kim Philby regarding the information provided to the Intelligence Service via John, by the Schwarze Kapelle. Otto John’s visits to Lisbon, in December 1942 and later in 1943, when he described in detail the plans and issues faced by the anti-Nazi resistance, were reported to the Moscow Headquarters. The enlistment of Otto John by the KGB, after his flight to the United Kingdom, via Portugal, as a result of the coup failure in July 20, 1944, originated in these reports drawn up by Kim Philby on his discontent towards the national-socialist regime, and respectively towards the Nazis who, after the war, would infiltrate the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The infiltrations of NKGB agents within the OSS were coordinated by „Colonel Alexandr P. Osipov”, alias Haig Badalovici Ovakimian, NKVD resident in New York during the 1933-1941 period and known to the FBI as „the clever Armenian”. The Soviets had a series of extremely valuable agents infiltrated in the OSS, extremely well placed within operation codenamed „IZBA” (The Hut). General Donovan’s (the Director of OSS) personal assistant, respectively Duncan Chaplin Lee, codename „KOCH”, was among the NKGB agents. Colonel „Alexandr P. Osipov” would lead the discussions of December 1943 held with the OSS Director in Moscow, regarding the possible cooperation between the NKGB and the OSS on the fronts of the Second World War. On January 16, 1944, the Turkish press, citing a „source” in Budapest, published the first pieces of information on the launch and capture of agents who were part of the „Autonomus” group, as well as a series of information that was intended to disrupt relations between London and Moscow. The Turkish media wrote that the British secret agents allegedly handed Marshal Ion Antonescu a photographic copy of the proposals made by the Germans to the Russians, according to which the Germans would leave the Romanian territory up to the Siret River to the Russians. It was an eloquent manifestation of inter-allied misunderstandings. On January 17, 1944, the Pravda newspaper published a correspondence received by the Cairo collaborator who spoke, based on „trustworthy information” about a secret meeting between two major British characters and von Ribbentrop in a city on the coast of the Iberian Peninsula, and the purpose of the meeting was to clarify the terms of a separate peace with Germany. The Soviet journalist implied that „meeting was not fruitless”. General George Hill, SOE’s representative in Moscow was authorized on January 28, 1944 to inform the soviets on the goals of his mission as Chastelain in Romania, as well as on the fact that with the exception of personal ciphers, the members of the mission transported no „German-Soviet” whatsoever.

[9] The articles published in the Foreign Affairs magazine, the news agency for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the American branch of the Institute of International Affairs – constituted on May 30, 1919, would provide solutions which, in perspective, were bound to lead to globalism. CFR played a major role in developing, after September 12, 1939, of certain foreign affairs analyses and forecasts, which allowed for the post-war establishment of US hegemony throughout the world. Until the end of the war, the partnership between CFR and the State Department generated 682 confidential notes partly funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. CFR’s analysts and planners anticipated that the capitulation of Germany and Japan and the destruction in Europe following the devastation of war would perch the United States in an unquestionable position of dominance over post-war economy. The more such economy was open to foreign trade and investment, the faster the US would be able to dominate. The plans concluded by the State Department and CFR planners were mainly focused on creating an institutional framework, necessary for building an open world economy. Note EB 34 issued on July 24, 1941, regarding the long term issues of war and the plans for peace, would lay out the concept of „a Great Area”, which the US would have to dominate economically and militarily, thus ensuring the raw materials needed by the American industries, facing the „smallest inconveniences possible” (See: Internal Note EB 34 of July 24, 1941, Council on Foreign Relations, War-Peace Studies, NUL, in the study of Laurence H.Shoup and William Winter, Shaping a New World Order: The Council on Foreign Relations Blueprint for World Hegemony, in the volume Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Planning for World Management, editor Holly Sklar, Boston, South End Press, 1980, p. 157). Regarding the influence exercised by the CFR on the development of international Relations during the 20^th and 21^st centuries, one may read Dinu Moraru, Foreign Affairs – laboratorul Casei Albe, în Lumea Magazin, Anul IX, nr. 9 (101), 2001, p. 39 şi Idem, Un laborator de idei, în Lumea, Anul XI, nr. 10 (126), 2003, p. 19 – 22. The required minimum for this great area would have included most of the non-German world. The preferential size would have included the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, the rest of the British Commonwealth, the Dutch East Indies, China and Japan. The concept drawn up within the note involved the development of economic integration, with the largest core possible and then, the widening of such core by extending it to other regions, depending on circumstances. It proposed the creation of global financial institutions in order to consolidate currencies and facilitate investment programs for the development of behind the times and underdeveloped areas. This recommendation, combined with a series of similar proposals, submitted by Harry White, from the US Treasury Department, let to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was expected to answer for preserving the stability of currencies, in order to facilitate trade, and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank, which was established to facilitate investments in behind the times and underdeveloped regions and open them up for development. All such plans were subject to a single purpose: the conquest of the third geopolitical global circle.

[10] Valentin Falin, The War could have ended in 1943, in Historia, Year 2, no. 41, May 2005, p. 26.

[11] Richard Rohmer, Rommel şi Patton, Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 13-14.

[12] The precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – the main civilian foreign intelligence service of the United States of America.

[13] Richard Rohmer, op. cit., p. 13-14.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Ibidem, p. 15. „They seemed ready to renounce everything, until Vistula…probably to the Oder…even the Elba. August 15 was the worse day of my life. This plan failed by chance. It alone can account for the manner in which the Army Group („B” – n. n.) acted; otherwise, it makes no sense”, said Hitler, on august 31, 1944, before Lieutenant Generals Westphal and Krebs, regarding the possible surrender on the Western Front (See: Walter Warlimont, Al III-lea Reich: Comanda Supremă, Editura Elit, Iaşi, 1998, p. 487 – 492).

[16] Cristian Popişteanu, Dorin Matei, Marea Britanie. SIS la lucru, în Magazin istoric, Anul XXX, serie nouă, nr. 7 (352), iulie 1996, p. 29.

[17] Georges Blond, Debarcarea. Agonia Reichului, Editura Militară, București, 1980, p. 330.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] Ibidem.

[20] In substantiating his attitude towards the Warsaw insurrection, Stalin considered six factors: 1) the new in Warsaw; 2) the discussions with the Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk; 3) Rokossovski’s military chances on the front; 4) the relations with the Lublin committee; 5) the NKVD assessments regarding security in liberated Poland and 6) his grand strategy. 

[21] Norman Davies, Varşovia. Insurecţia din 1944, Editura RAO, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 95.

[22] Ibidem.

[23] „Stalin faced a weighty strategic problem. Once his armies had occupied all the territory he was claiming for the USSR, he had to decide whether to keep them moving westwards on the direct road to Berlin or turn south into the Balkans. The Soviets stood a fair chance of conquering the capital of the Reich before the Wehrmacht could marshal its defenses and before the Western powers could participate. If they turned south, they could probably overrun three or four countries in rapid succession, thereby denying the West access and ensuring Soviet control over half of Europe. In the best of circumstances, they might conceivably find the resources to do both. In the first week of August, however, Moscow could have had no certain information either about the roadblock in Warsaw or about Rokossovski’s exact situation. So it was not unwise to stop the advance until clarifying all aspects of the problem”, concluded historian Norman Davies (Ibidem, p. 323).

[24] Despite this extraordinarily difficult situation from mid-autumn 1941, Stalin did not foreswear his ambitious foreign policy objectives. The future resident of NKVD in Washington, Vasily Zarubin, also known as Zubilin, was summoned by Stalin on October 12, 1941, before leaving for the US, to ask him to put together an efficient system not only to monitor events, but also to influence them through the USSR friends. One of the most important agents of Soviet Union influence on American soil, thanks to the position held, was Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s personal adviser. He was exploited „blindly”, as this espionage technique is called, by the head of Soviet „illegals” in the US, Isak Abdulovich Ahmerov, who played upon the tremendous admiration and trust of Hopkins in Stalin. A number of names may be added to Harry Hopkins, names which became famous within the Soviet espionage and anti-fascist fighter gallery: Hede Massing, Josephine Herbst, Noel Field, Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, Dorothy Parker, Donald Ogden Stewart, Ella Winter, Sinclair Lewis and many more. Their main mission was the betrayal and undermining the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration, the misappropriation of the public opinion from the crimes of Stalinism, of certain important American currency funds by the top secret operations of the Soviet espionage „apparat”, as well as the most serious issue, with extremely severe consequences, of destroying any form of anti-fascist opposition, so as to lay the foundations of post-Nazi Stalinist power in Europe. Alger Hiss was working for Department Four (Military Intelligence, later renamed into GRU) of the NKVD, under codename ALES, and starting with 1936 she became part of the State Department. The payroll of Department Four also included Julian Wadleigh (State Department), Harry Dexter White (Treasury Department) and George Silverman, a governmental statistician. In March 1945, following a meeting between Alger Hiss and Isak Ahmerov, the Moscow Headquarters was informed that „ALES (Hiss) and his entire group were awarded Soviet decorations”, and ALES recounted that, at the request of the soldiers (NEIGHBOURS – GRU), „Comrade Vishinsky”, „sends them their gratitude”. The following could be considered among the people who worked for the NKVD: Laurence Duggan (agent „19”, later FRANK) of the State Department; Martha Dodd Stern (LIZA), the daughter of the former US ambassador in Germany, William E. Dodd, and the wife of millionaire Alfred Kaufman Stern (also a soviet agent); Martha’s brother, William E. Dodd Jr. (PRESIDENT); Boris Morros (FROST), Hollywood producer; Mary Wolf Price (KID and later DIR), an undeclared communist who was secretary to publicist Walter Lippmann; Henry Buchman (HOSIAN), the owner of a female fashion salon in Baltimore; Michael Straigt (NOMAD and NIGEL) of the State Department; Harry Dexter White (KASSIR, later JURIST) of the Justice Department; Duncan Chaplin Lee (KOCH), the personal assistant of OSS Director, General Donovan; Cedric Belfrage (CHARLIE), member of the British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York, liaison office between OSS and the Intelligence Service during the war. The number of microfilm reels sent to the Moscow Headquarters by the illegal resistance of the NKGB in the USA, led by Ahmerov, increased from 59 in 1942 to 211 in 1943, and from 600 in 1944 to 1896 in 1945.

[25] Peter Antill, Al Doilea Război Mondial. Berlin – 1945, Editura Litera, București, 2015, p. 50.

[26] Norman Davies, op. cit., p. 210.

[27] During the 1940-1941 period, the research of German physicists and chemists, gathered in what the authorities called „Uranverein” („the Uranium Club”), focused on two directions: obtaining nuclear energy through a reactor and separating the U-235 isotopes. Research were conducted by two researcher groups, respectively those from the „Kaiser Wilhelm” Institute, gathered around Heisenberg, Weizsacker and Karl Wirtz, in the Berlin neighborhood of Dahlem, and those from the Army research laboratory in Gottow, under the leadership of Kurt Diebner. This „Uranium Club” was, according to historian Thomas Powers, „a simple list of addresses of scientists, who competed against each other and who had nothing more in common than the hope to survive the war” (Apud Thomas Powers, Războiul lui Heisenberg. Istoria secretă a bombei atomice germane, Editura RAO, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 125), and less of a coherent organization, with a sole leader, which would signify the existence of a German program for constructing the atomic bomb. The results of experiments conducted during the summer of 1941 forced Werner Heisenberg to admit that a reactor could be constructed and, as a result, so could an atomic bomb. Soon, the information that rectors could generate raw material for a bomb began to spread quickly. Everything had been done by a team of only a few people and a budget of 60.000 marks (approximately 15.000 dollars at the time). „By September 1941 – confessed Werner Heisenberg to British historian David Irving – we saw the way to the atomic bomb opening before us” (Ibidem, p. 164). As the „Manhattan Project” came into being in the United States, the Allied Air Force would systematically bomb any town suspected of harboring German nuclear research facilities, and the allied secret forces intensified their efforts to gather information on Heisenberg and his people. It was a race against time, until December 16, 1944, even involving attempts to assassinate Heisenberg, given that he had decided not to build the German atomic bomb. The history of espionage regarding the German atomic bomb program was rife with „indiscretions” by the German atomist scientists, a fact which determined Albert Speer to state that „the physicists themselves were unwilling to get involved too deeply in an atomic program” (Ibidem p. 809). The meeting between German atomists, at the Harnack Haus, in June 4, 1942, and Minister Albert Speer would prove decisive for the future of the German atomic project. „I told them that, in principle, yes, we could make atomic bombs – confessed Heisenberg after the war – and we could build such explosives, but the entire process requires enormous expense and may take several years to conclude” (Ibidem, p. 206). Referring to this episode, Albert Speer believed that the amount required by Heisenberg was ridiculous for further research, respectively several million marks, which led him to believe that work was an absolutely early stage and the physicist themselves were unwilling to invest too much in this program. Why did Heisenberg visit Niels Bohr? Why did Heisenberg argue before Albert Speer that the bomb was an elusive goal? Why did he say that the bombs required two tons of U-235? This behavior by the scientist remains shrouded in enigma. Was it the opinion of man of knowledge or did he merely underline the difficulties in the hope of leading the project to a dead end? Given that, according to historian Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s advice played an essential part in quenching the interest of German officials for the atomic bomb, questioning his motives is crucial. When the Allied Intelligence Services captured a series of documents regarding the German atomic program on December 16, 1944, in Strasbourg, within the ALSOS Mission, they found out that there was no trace of building an atomic bomb, only a small scale research program, and the attempt to create a chain reaction to support it had failed on six or seven occasions. Samuel Goudsmit, the scientific leader of the ALSOS Mission concurred that the Germans had meddled in a problem that was beyond them, so the only thing left was to invent some alleged moral scruples. „Heisenberg’s War”, born of a moral choice, would embarrass the Allied atomist scientists – many of them were Jews who had fled Germany and who had suffered heavy losses during the Holocaust – and who would have to justify building the atomic bomb for President F. D. Roosevelt after the war.

[28] The international scientific community became extremely concerned following the publication, on May 5, 1940, by William Laurence, reporter for the „New York Times”, of an article („The immense source of power discovered by scientist in atomic energy”) on the German effort to build an atomic bomb. The information came from Peter Debye, Nobel laureate for chemistry in 1936. W. Laurence’s article surprisingly reached Moscow, via Georgi Vernadsky, history professor at Yale University and brother to mineralogist Vladimir Vernadsky. „Thank you for the offcuts in the «New York Times» on uranium – wrote Vladimir Vernadsky, on July 5, 1940, to his brother – , you sent me in Washington. This is the first piece of news on this discovery I also received in Moscow in general. Things moved quite fast. On June 25, a „troika” was formed at the Academy, under my leadership (Fersman and Hlopin), with the right to co-opt others” (Apud David Holloway, Stalin şi bomba atomică, Editura Maşina de scris&Institutul European, Iaşi, 1998, p. 59). On June 30, 1940, the Commission on Uranium Issues was established, depending on the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Commission was to determine: a) the requirements needed to develop methods of uranium isotope separation; b) the initiation of research regarding the control over nuclear fission; c) the coordination and conduction of Academy research in the field. And thus the Soviet Union entered the „nuclear race”. The Soviet atomic program would be called Operation „Borodino”.

[29] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Cruciadă în Europa, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1975, 592 p.

[30] Ibidem, p. 509.

[31] Ibidem.

[32] Ibidem, p. 510.

[33] Ibidem.

[34] Ibidem.

[35] If the SS military forces loyal to Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the head of RSHA, managed to annihilate the SS and NSDAP fanatics through a coup d’etat, according to the agreements pending with the Western Allies, the 101^st Airborne Division was to be parachuted on the Tempelhof Airfield, and the 82^nd Airborne Division was to land in Gatow, while the 6^th British Airborne Division was to land in Oranienburg.

[36] Antony Beevor, Berlin. Căderea – 1945, Editura RAO, București, 2005, p. 277.

[37] The 84 American Infantry Division had occupied Hanover and, questioned by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on the following course of action on April 8, 1945, Major General Alexander Bolling stated: „General, we intend to push forward. We have a clear path to Berlin and nothing can stop us” (Ibidem, p. 278). Eisenhower’s response („Keep it up! Best of luck to you and don’t let anyone stop you!”) was deemed as a confirmation of the fact the next target was going to be Berlin.

[38] Ibidem, p. 222.

[39] Ibidem, p. 283.

[40] Ibidem, p. 284

[41] Ibidem, p. 285.

[42] Ibidem.

[43] Ibidem.

[44] Ibidem, p. 286.

[45] Ibidem.

[46] Ibidem, p. 287.

[47] Ibidem, p. 288.

[48] V. I. Ciuikov, Sfârșitul Reichului hitlerist, Editura Politică, București, 1976, p. 202 – 203.