Nicolae Ceausescu and the Army. Dissidence and Military Opposition. 1965 – 1989 (I)*

During the communist regime in Romania (1945 – 1989), the Romanian Army was at the centre of the attention of the governmental political factor in order to transform it into an armed and secure arm of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) for the defence of the political, economic and social regime, as well as the independence and sovereignty of the socialist state against foreign intervention, especially by the member states of the Warsaw Treaty. The military institution was “democratised’ after 6 March 1945 and, later on, pushed down the slope of a nationalism with clear anti-Sovietism and anti-Russian accents. This study aims at analysing this process of de-Sovietisation and re-nationalisation of the Romanian Army after 1965, the relations between Nicolae Ceausescu and the Army’s leaders, as well as the ability of the Army to position itself in relation to the political and economic failures of Ceausescu regime, through different formulas of opposition and dissidence. Did some of the generals of the Romanian Army plan a military coup against Nicolae Ceausescu, with the support of the USSR, or was it just an unjustified fear of Ceausescu regime? The answer to this question, as new documents and testimonies have entered the historiographical circuit after December 1989, confirms that the representatives of Ceausescu regime amplified their fear of the power of the Army and tried to control and rein it in. According to some military decision-makers at the time, the leadership of the Socialist Romanian Army did not dare to think of a military coup against Nicolae Ceaușescu.

The politicisation of an Army

In the process of communisation/sovietisation of Romania, the transformation and subordination of the Army to the policy of PCR was a major objective of the party leaders in Bucharest. In April 1945, a large number of volunteers of “Tudor Vladimirescu” and “Horia, Cloșca si Crișan” Divisions were to be reintegrated into the Romanian Army, who enjoyed as of the date of their reintegration “all the rights, advantages and obligations of the military personnel who were part of the Romanian Army”. On 8 May 1945, the Higher Directorate of Culture, Education and Propaganda was set up within the Ministry of War, which was to carry out intense and aggressive propaganda in the Army with a view to orienting the military and the troops towards communist ideology. On 19 March 1945, Groza Government issued Law no. 186, which led to the retirement of: 70 generals, 1,878 officers, 4,081 non-commissioned officers and 1,139 military sergeants. The “royal strike” and the popularity it enjoyed in the army from the outset prompted the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (CC) of the PCR, at its meeting on 25 September 1945, to decide to purge at least half of the officer corps.

Taking advantage of the military cuts, about 30% of the officers voted against PCR in the elections of 19 November 1946. In accordance with the provisions imposed by the Paris Peace Treaty (10 February 1947), the Government enforced, on 18 August 1947, Law no. 293, which proposed more than 100 generals of the Romanian Army for retirement in stages. Under this law, between September 1947 and March 1948, 83 generals, 1,991 officers, 1,547 non-commissioned officers and 253 military sergeants were transferred on reserve status, totalling 3,874 military personnel who had proved hostile to the policies of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Government. Between 1945 and 1947, 32,368 military personnel were put on reserve status, including 12,003 officers, 17,948 non-commissioned officers and 2,417 military sergeants, which means that at least 2/3 of the military personnel in active service on 9 May 1945 were removed from the Army, the vast majority of them on political grounds.

Under the conditions created by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania in the summer of 1958, the Army began to be renationalised. This concerned organisational structures, staff training and the training of troops, military education, providing and equipping with weapons and military technology, military symbolism, etc. In 1959, the four higher military education academies were merged into the General Military Academy: the Staff-Major, Military-Political, Military-Back and Technical Military Academies. Decree no. 381 of 1 October 1959 of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly of RPR established the 25^th day of October as the Romanian Army Day. At the same time, in July 1959, the corps of non-commissioned officers, which had been disbanded on 14 July 1950, was re-established. “The year 1960 represents a new stage in these changes, which aimed to eliminate some of the accessories of the Soviet model imposed on the military organisation of the country between 1945 and 1950. (…) In terms of organisational structures, the system of military regions, implemented under the 1947 legislation and imported from the Soviets, was abandoned. In its place, large army-type operational units have been set up, with a higher degree of troop mobility and greater flexibility in the exercise of leadership. It has to be said that such a measure was partly in keeping with Romanian military traditions, since armies only existed as operational structures in wartime, while in peacetime, the armed corps functioned with a mixed operational and territorial structure. Also in the field of military structures, the transformation of the infantry divisions into mechanised divisions should also be mentioned, this generating a fundamental change in the land troops, which increased their technical character”[1, p. 39], military historian Colonel (r) PhD. Petre Otu notes.

The meeting of the Political Bureau of CC of the PMR on 31 March 1960 decided to reduce the staff of the Army and the Ministry of the Interior [2] which allowed the communist authorities to launch an intense campaign “which was to illustrate, in the conception of the initiators, the stability of the regime and its peaceful, non-aggressive vocation” [1, p. 39]. The criteria for the selection, training and promotion of future military cadres were changed, so that “devotion to the regime, to the detriment of professional training, level of culture and competence” came first [1, p. 39]. At its meeting of 20 April 1960, the Political Bureau of CC of the PMR adopted a new Statute of the Officers’ Corps, which introduced new provisions in line with the needs imposed by the process of modernisation of the Army, training and new technical equipment. The new Statute extended by one year the period of service in rank for senior lieutenants, captains, majors and lieutenant-colonels, and also established that promotions in rank were to be made once a year by order of the Minister of National Defence. In order to be admitted to higher military education, candidates were required to have completed high school and a baccalaureate diploma. The ranks of major and colonel were to be obtained by examination, and officers would be graded every year instead of every two or three years as before. The Ministry of the Armed Forces (MFA) was given the right to revoke military ranks up to the rank of private “for offences incompatible with the rank of officer” [1, p. 40].

Political control over the Army would remain in place, despite certain changes in form but not in substance. On 5 October 1948, the Higher Political Directorate of the Army (DSPA) was set up, in accordance with the model existing in the Red Army, and Nicolae Ceaușescu would head this important political structure for the management and control of the Army from 18 March 1950 to 19 April 1954. Through the DSPA, the influence of the PMR became pervasive in all Army structures. In the domestic political context after the April 1964 Declaration of the PMR, Army General Leontin Sălăjan would propose to the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party (CC of the PMR), on 27 June 1964, the abolition of DSPA and the creation of the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces (CPSA). In early July 1964, CC of the PMR approved the composition of CPSA (31 members) and CPSA Bureau. “CPSA maintained most of the aims and objectives of DSPA. The newly elected Party Committees, i.e. the Bureaus of the grassroots organisations, took over the tasks of the political deputies of the heads of the central directorates within the Ministry, the commanders of arms and the heads of Faculties at the General Military Academy, and their functions were abolished. In the regiments that had independent battalions, party offices were set up at the unit level, and grassroots organisations were established at the unit and battalion level. At the same time, a series of changes were promoted in order to develop the patriotic spirit in the militaries, and since 1969, efforts have been made to establish and impose the doctrine of war for the defence of the homeland to the whole nation” [3, p. 265], according to Historian Petre Opriș.

De-sovietisation and distancing from the Soviet ally

The crushing of the “Prague Spring” (21 August 1968) by USSR and the member states of the Warsaw Treaty (Warsaw Treaty Organisation) imposed a new conduct in international relations for Romania, as well as in its relations with the Army as a power factor in the state led by Nicolae Ceausescu and the PCR. The political leadership of socialist Romania proceeded to take measures aimed at preserving control over the Romanian armed forces, namely: 1) the decision that Romania would no longer participate with troops in applications deployed on the territory of other countries; 2) the deployment on the national territory only of command and map applications, without troops of the OTV allies [4]; 3) the non-acceptance of the transit of Romanian territory and airspace by foreign troops or aircraft without the consent of the Romanian military and political authorities; 4) the cessation of sending officers and generals to study in Soviet military schools and academies.

Recalling that period in the history of the Romanian Army, Colonel-General (r) Constantin Olteanu, former Minister of National Defence (29 March 1980 – 16 December 1985), says: “Between 1949 – 1965, for example, 467 Romanian generals and officers studied in military academies, attended military schools and specialised courses in the Soviet Union. Compared to the first years, the number of those sent to study in the USSR was decreasing until it stopped after 1965. Unfortunately, over time, mistakes have been made in both directions. Thus, until the Declaration of the Plenary Meeting of CC of the PMR in April 1964, officers and generals who had studied in the USSR enjoyed a certain priority in occupying important positions (…) As it is well known, the vast majority of these officers and generals proved their professional competence, effectively contributing to the modernisation of the Romanian Army. (…) Greater care should have been taken in the composition of units, large units, commands, etc. with officers and generals who had studied in the country alongside those who had studied in the USSR, thus achieving a natural combination, free of animosities and suspicions” [5, p. 46]. At the same time, it was decided that in all command applications “to work – Military Historian Colonel (r) PhD. Petre Otu records – with the unnamed enemy, and the annual directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces was considered as a recommendation” [1, p. 41], the major Romanian units being subordinated to the National Military Command.

On 3 May 1966, Army General M. I. Kazakov, Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces Command, held talks with Generals Leontin Sălăjan and Ion Gheorghe on the subordination of the Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces to the USSR Minister of National Defence. In the report submitted to Nicolae Ceausescu, on 9 May 1966, the Minister of the Armed Forces, General Leontin Sălăjan, mentioned that General M. I. Kazakov “referred to the question of releasing the Supreme Commander from the position of deputy to the USSR Minister of Defence, considering that, if he is also deputy to the Minister, he also relies on the Armed Forces of the USSR and, if Comrade Sălăjan wants to take missiles, then [Marshal Andrei A.] Greciko can take [the missiles] out of the plan of Soviet Army and give them to [Romania]” [6, p. 91]. At the same time, General M. I. Kazakov noted that “if [Marshal Andrei A. Greciko] is not also the deputy [of the Soviet Defence Minister], there will be the question of agreeing with the [USSR] Defence Ministry, to go and pray” [6, p. 91]. The dismissal of Marshal Andrei A. Greciko as Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces would mean a gain in terms of independence, but “a great loss in terms of equipment and the speed of resolving these problems” [6, p. 91].

On 17 March 1969, the heads of delegations participating in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of OTV member states adopted in Budapest a series of documents of great importance for the smooth functioning of OTV, namely: The Statutes of the Defence Ministers’ Committee of OTV Member States, the Statutes of the United Armed Forces and Unified Command of OTV Member States, the Statutes of the Military Council of the United Armed Forces and the Statutes of the Unified Air Defence System of OTV Member States. In the Statutes of the United Armed Forces and the Unified Command of OTV Member States, it was provided that the Ministers of Defence of OTV Member States were no longer automatically considered to be the deputies of the Supreme Commander of FAU, who was also the deputy of the USSR Minister of Defence. Troops assigned by OTV Member States to take part in joint actions of FAU no longer came under the direct subordination of the Supreme Commander of OTV FAU and remained under the direct direction and guidance of the national military commands.

In a document dated 18 July 1995 submitted by the Ministry of National Defence (MApN) to Senator Șerban Săndulescu (PNȚCD), member of the Parliamentary Commission for the Investigation of the Events of December 1989, it was mentioned that the first MApN officers went to the USSR for military studies in 1948, the first graduating class of officers being in 1950 and the last in 1967. In total, 1,858 MApN officers graduated from military academies and schools, as well as advanced (specialisation) courses in the USSR. 816 officers graduated from military academies, with studies lasting 2-7 years, as follows: 1) 161 at general military command and defence academies (“K. E. Vorosilov“Higher Military Academy and “Mihail B. Frunze”Military Academy); 2) 348 at the military academies with weapon profile (artillery, armour, engineers, communications, transport, chemistry and radiolocation); 3) 257 at the military academies for technical-engineering; 4) 33 at the Military Academy of Back and Supply; 5) 17 at “V. I. ” Military Political Academy. To these officers are added 348 officers who graduated from military schools of 1 to 3 years’ duration in various military specialities, as well as 704 officers who graduated from advanced training courses in the fields of command, defence, services and medical care. At the time the document was drafted, 1,827 of these officers were no longer working in the MApN, having been removed from the military reserve, i.e. they no longer had any military obligations. “The other 41 officers, aged between 51 and 60, competently fulfil functions in the line of command, defence, technical, teaching and scientific research, and are predominantly rated in their service ratings as very good officers” [7, p. 157], MApN said. The Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior reported that the carried-out analyses revealed that between 1948 and 1968, no personnel of the Ministry of the Interior were sent to the USSR for academic or higher education. However, 1,000 staff members of the Ministry of the Interior underwent further training (specialisation) in civilian or military educational institutions in the USSR. In 1995, none of these people were still active.

In the 1970s, the Romanian military authorities fulfilled their obligations under the provisions of OTV (participation in applications organised by the authorities from Bucharest in agreement with CFAU), while Nicolae Ceausescu declared: “Romania is a member of the Warsaw Treaty. On this basis, we have an obligation to take action to strengthen cooperation with the armies of the socialist member states of the Warsaw Treaty, to carry out the appropriate joint training actions [8, p. 42], in order to be always ready to fulfil our commitments” [9, p. 520]

 A military doctrine of its own

In line with the foreign policy principles set out in the early 1970s, Nicolae Ceausescu asked military and civilian specialists to draw up a Romanian military doctrine and an appropriate legislative framework. On 14 March 1969, the Defence Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania [10] was set up with the aim of “examining, coordinating and resolving the main issues in the field of the defence of the country and ensuring the security of the state, both in peacetime and in wartime” [3, p. 150]. The Defence Council of the RSR was subordinate both to CC of PCR and to the Grand National Assembly. Between the sessions of the Grand National Assembly, the Defence Council of RSR was also accountable to the State Council of RSR for all its activities. In accordance with the provisions of Decree no. 444/1972 on the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence (MApN), the name of the Ministry of the Armed Forces was dropped, and it was specified that the MApN would carry out its activities under the leadership and guidance of PCR, would execute the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces [9, p. 366] and would carry out the measures established on the basis of the decisions of the Defence Council of RSR.

At the same time, Law no. 14 of 28 December 1972 on the organisation of the national defence of the Socialist Republic of Romania [12] and the concept of a homeland defence war waged by the whole nation [13, p. 103] will be drafted. Referring to this concept, which represented the fundamental strategic option [14, p. 452] of the military doctrine of socialist Romania, Lieutenant General Gheorghe Logofătu wrote in 1987 that it “summarises the type of war that our state will wage in order to repel any armed aggression that might be launched against it [15, p. 10], its social-political essence, its features and the strategic concept of waging it” [13, p. 101]. Also, the development of the Romanian defence industry [16], was to represent, between 1965 and 1989, an extremely important objective on the work agenda of the General Secretary of PCR.

At the Plenary Meeting of CC of the PCR held at the Palace Hall in Bucharest on 22-25 April 1968, Nicolae Ceaușescu announced that he would step up efforts to manufacture in Romania certain categories of armaments and combat technology for the Romanian Army. In the official press release published in Scînteia newspaper on 25 April 1968, it was stated: “The Plenary listened to the report of the Minister of the Armed Forces – Comrade General Colonel Ion Ioniță – on the combat and political preparation of the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania and their equipping with armaments and military technology” [17, p. 8 – 9]. At the same time, “The Plenary established the appropriate measures to intensify the production of armaments and combat technology in order to meet the needs of the army in the best possible conditions” [17].

On 26 April 1968, Nicolae Ceaușescu declared to the party activists in Bucharest: “Our state has been making great financial and material efforts to equip our armed forces with modern combat technology. It is understandable that, as long as imperialism exists and, as a result, the danger of aggression and war, including the danger of a world war, is maintained, it is necessary to do everything to ensure the continuous strengthening of our armed forces, their fighting capacity for the defence of the homeland. As you may have learnt, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee decided to take new measures in order to provide our armed forces with the necessary and modern combat technology. To this end, measures have been laid down to produce in our country a larger part of the means of defence [6, p. 193], importing in particular that combat technology whose production in our country is not economically justified or cannot be carried out at a satisfactory level” [19, p. 183 – 184].

 Setting up the Patriotic Guards of Socialist Romania

In the context of the extremely tense relations with the USSR and its allies in the West, as well as the provisions of the doctrine of the homeland defence war waged by the whole nation, Nicolae Ceausescu started to form and organise “popular formations for fighting and training for the defence of the homeland”, namely: Patriotic Guards, Civil Defence Formations and those for training the youth for the defence of the homeland. The first Patriotic Fighting Formations (FLP) were made up of workers and intellectuals, formed in 1944 by Emil Bodnăraș, and were involved in the coup d’état of 23 August 1944, taking Marshal Ion Antonescu and his main collaborators into temporary custody after their arrest at the Royal Palace. Until 6 March 1945, members of the FLP were used by PCR to seize political power, and after the establishment of the government led by PhD. Petru Groza, they were employed in the state body, the Ministry of the Interior and the Army. By Decree No. 442 of 20 November 1959 of the Great National Assembly, the Labour Guards were set up as armed combat formations intended to ensure both the defence of enterprises and to assist the state bodies in defending public order against “counter-revolutionary elements who would try to strike at the conquests of the people” [3, p. 291].

The Labour Guards had a Central Command, staffs in the regional, district and municipal party bodies, and in some enterprises and a number of local party bodies there were sub-units of the Labour Guards consisting of platoons, companies and battalions. In 1959, the Labour Guards had a strength of 37,000 fighters, and in the following years their strength reached 46,000-47,000 fighters. The Ministry of the Armed Forces ensured the provision of arms, ammunition, equipment and combat techniques, as well as the necessary specialists for the military training of the Labour Guards fighters. On 22 January 1960, the Political Bureau of CC of the PMR decided that the Ministry of Internal Affairs would take over the Central Command of the Labour Guards together with “all other tasks resulting from the above amendment, with the party bodies continuing to provide political control and guidance to all members” [3, p. 291] of the Labour Guards. In accordance with Decision No. 501 of 24 April 1961 of the Political Bureau of CC of the PMR, the strength of the Labour Guards was reduced from 46,636 to 23,000 fighters as of 1 June 1961. On 15 January 1962, the Labour Guards were disbanded in their entirety, in the context of a substantial reduction in military expenditure of Romania.

In the context of the events that took place on the night of 20-21 August 1968 in Czechoslovakia, at the emergency meeting of CEx of CC of the PCR on the morning of 21 August 1968, Nicolae Ceausescu declared: “I think that in the situation we are in, it would be a good idea to think about re-establishing the Labour Guards as armed units of the working class, for the defence of the revolutionary conquests of our people (…) Let us also create patriotic guards in the countryside” [3, p. 292]. This proposal was immediately supported by Petre Lupu, Mihai Dalea and Manea Mănescu, and the members of CEx of CC of the PCR unanimously decided “to re-establish the armed patriotic guards, made up of workers, peasants and intellectuals (…) in order to ensure the peaceful labour of the Romanian people, the independence and national sovereignty of the homeland” [3, p. 291]. The county party committees started organising Patriotic Guards (GP) at the level of enterprises, institutions and municipalities.

On 23 August 1968, on the National Day of Romania, the first troops of the Patriotic Guards were to parade. Decree no. 765 on the establishment of the Patriotic Guards was promulgated on 4 September 1968 [20], and Law no. 14/28 December 1972 stated that the Patriotic Guards were “armed units of the working people from towns and villages, set up for the purpose of strengthening the defence capacity of the homeland” [3, p. 293], with the aim of “together with the armed forces, actively participating in the defence of the revolutionary conquests of the people, its peaceful work, the sovereignty and security of the homeland, the defence of towns and communes, enterprises, institutions and other socialist bodies” [3, p. 293]. The Patriotic Guards [21] operated under the direct leadership of CC of the PCR, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and local party bodies [22]. The Patriotic Guards were transferred to the subordination and structure of the Ministry of National Defence on the basis of Decree no. 35 of 31 December 1989 on the transfer of the Patriotic Guards and the activity of training young people for the defence of the homeland [23]. Between 17 and 22 December 1989, the Patriotic Guards were to represent an instrument of force which Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to use to stifle the opposition to him and his political regime.

 Complete subordination of the Army

Beyond the desire to strengthen the military organisation, in view of the fear of a Soviet invasion aimed at overthrowing him from power, Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to subordinate the military establishment to the military institution [24, p. 176 – 178]. “As for the Army and its leadership, it was too tough a nut for V. Patilineț and a wall almost impossible for N. Ceaușescu to break down. Generals Ioniță [25, p. 309], Ion Gheorghe, Vasile Ionel, Militaru, Niculescu and others had formed a strong barrier, impenetrable to measures or indications likely to harm the interests of the Army or diminish its combat capability. For years, N. Ceaușescu did not have the courage to stand up to the Army leadership and was forced to accept their position in a number of situations. The Trojan Horse was the Directorate of Military Counterintelligence which, according to the Soviet model, was part of the Ministry of the Interior” [26, p. 248], states Major General (r) Ionel Gal.

Based on the reports of the 4^th Military Counterintelligence Division, Nicolae Ceaușescu was aware of the state of mind of the Army, the state of combat readiness, military order and discipline, as well as the loyalty of the leading personnel and staffs within the Ministry of National Defence. As Generals Ion Ioniță and Ion Gheorghe were asserting themselves more and more strongly in the political arena [27] in terms of decision-making concerning the Army, Nicolae Ceaușescu skilfully launched and speculated on the concept of strengthening the leadership of the national economy with the military so that many generals were sent to leading positions [28] in the national economy. At the same time, the idea of using large numbers of military personnel from the Ministry of National Defence in the national economy would help Nicolae Ceaușescu in his desire to completely subordinate the leadership of this military institution [29, p. 51 – 52]. On 16 December 1978, Nicolae Ceaușescu said: “I do not wish to dwell on the concrete activities carried out in this respect; it would be difficult to list all the industrial units where the military are present, all the construction sites, irrigation works or the sections of the Danube-Black Sea canal where they work [30]. This activity of the military is an important factor not only economically, but also politically, because it leads to a stronger strengthening of the unity between the Army and the people, a deeper understanding by all the military that everything we achieve in the development of our homeland – to which they have made and are making an active contribution, both when they work as civilians and when they work as military – must be defended” [31, p. 429 – 430].

In the activity report presented to the 12^th Congress of PCR on 19 November 1979, Nicolae Ceaușescu argued for the need to reduce military spending by at least 10% by 1985. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces believed that 50 per cent of the sums thus accrued could be allocated to meet social needs in each country and 50 per cent to support developing countries. “Statistical data published at the time on the military expenditure of Romania between 1965 and 1981 reveal that the ratio between defence expenditure and annual budgetary expenditure rose slightly and then fell: 5.1% in 1965, 5.4% in 1970, 4.3% in 1974, 4.1% in 1975, 3.8% in 1978 and 3.2% in 1980 and 1981. At the same time, the volume of actual military expenditure rose from 4.735 billion Lei (in 1965) to 7.067 billion lei (1970), 8.58 billion Lei (1974), 9.71 billion Lei (1975) and 12 billion Lei (1978), before falling to 10.39 billion Lei (1980) and 10.40 billion Lei in 1981. Approximately 60% of the funds earmarked for the Army were spent on armaments, munitions and combat technology” [31, p. 228], concludes historian Petre Opriș.

Reflecting on those realities concerning the Socialist Romanian Army, Major General (r) Ionel Gal writes: “For these (the human and material sacrifices made in the national economy) and many other achievements Nicolae Ceaușescu appreciated the Army and gave it a huge credit, participated in all its annual analyses and balance sheets, as well as in the great military applications or military celebrations. The Army, for Nicolae Ceaușescu, was the granite shield, the armed arm of the people, the most faithful and loyal institution of the totalitarian regime. From the ranks of the Army, whenever necessary, cadres were promoted for other sectors of activity, in Securitate, in the Ministry of the Interior, in the economy, sport, science, technology, etc.” [26, p. 278].

In those years, the Division for Military Affairs and Justice of CC of the PCR became an extremely valuable auxiliary in the relationship between Nicolae Ceaușescu and the powerful institutions of socialist Romania [26, p. 284]. “Until 1964, the Division, under its various names, was an annex of the Ministry of the Interior, its role being one of information and liaison, although it was headed by the CC’s secretary for organisational matters, Nicolae Ceaușescu. The years that followed, which consolidated the political and executive power of the President of the country and the Commander of the Armed Forces, gradually led to the diminishing role and competence of the division in the exercise of the right of control. Its role was reduced to «control of party work», and any exceeding of its prerogatives was considered as interference or de-conspiracy of operational activity” [26, p. 283], testified Major General (r) Ionel Gal. The material submitted by these institutions to Nicolae Ceaușescu were directed to the Division so that “the Head of State was not presented with a material with different opinions, thus avoiding putting him in the position of arbitrator” [5, p. 167]. The Division for Military Affairs and Justice was heavily involved in all the preparations that were being made for the mobilisation and engagement in combat of “the entire nation”, participating “in the organisation of patriotic guards, the selection of men, their equipment, the initiation of elementary training sessions, the use of weapons” [26, p. 266], as well as “in the identification of all those who had shown themselves to be Russophiles – as Major General (r) Ionel Gal -, were linked to marriages contracted in the USSR or other obligations undertaken during their years of studies in Moscow” [26, p. 266].

On 16 May 1975, the Minister of National Defence, Army General Ion Ioniță, submitted to the Head of State the secret report no. M 02495, which presented an analysis of the Superior Political Council of the Army concerning the MApN personnel who had relatives abroad or had relations with foreign citizens: 410 military personnel, including 321 officers, 17 military majors, 72 non-commissioned officers, 10 students from military schools and 203 civilian employees [33, p. 66 – 69]. “Most of those who fell into the «with relatives abroad» or «foreign connections» category were often innocent. Life, with its unforeseen twists and turns, placed them in the position of outcasts of the regime, even if their training and behaviour did not justify such treatment (…) In this case, their career was blocked and their presence in the Army became problematic. However, the regime found a solution here too: transfer to the national economy, to the «socialist construction sites»” [33, p. 69], military historian Colonel (r) PhD. Petre Otu. As a rule, military officers who had studied in the USSR and were married to women from the Soviet Union were transferred to other, relatively equivalent positions, the explanation given to the Soviet allies being “cadre rotation”.

Nicolae Ceaușescu would order Major General Constantin Olteanu in 1978 that the cadre files of generals be removed from the circuit of the Cadre Division of CC of the PCR and be brought to the Division for Military Affairs and Justice. Proposals for the appointment or dismissal of generals from the MApN or the Ministry of the Interior were to be discussed in a restricted framework [34]. “We had the greatest difficulties with Elena Ceausescu on the issue of military staff because she was not familiar with the established terminology, echelons, functions, specific fields of activity. (…) On some proposals for promotion to the rank of general, she would sometimes comment, “If we make him a general, will he get smarter?”, or, on the promotion of some generals from one rank to another, she would sometimes say “Forget it, he’s got enough of a rank!”, or she would oppose, blocking the proposal at this stage, as she forbade us to reach Nicolae Ceaușescu with the proposals that she rejected” [5, p. 170], former Minister of National Defence, Constantin Olteanu confesses.

Referring to the relationship between Nicolae Ceausescu and the Army, political scientist Anneli Ute Gabanyi mentioned that information about the unrest in the Romanian armed forces in the 1970’s and 1980’s reached the West [35, p. 335]. “Officers who were sent to the reserve before their terms or transferred to the civilian economy [36, p. 73] in 1978, 1983, 1984 and 1985 created a potential for protest that colluded with the function elites opposed to Ceaușescu in the party and the security services. It was only after the change that details of various plans and coup attempts that jeopardised the position of Ceausescu were made public. In order to be able to combat resistance from parts of the officer corps, he initiated measures to ‘de-professionalise’ the armed forces” [36, p. 73], concludes political scientist Anneli Ute Gabanyi.

In January 1983, the analysts of Radio Europa Libera noted that the propaganda began to talk about the birthday of Nicolae Ceausescu (26 January) about the Romanian party and state leader as a military figure. Contemporanul Magazine of 26 January 1983 printed a photograph of Ceaușescu in the uniform of a major-general delivering a speech on 9 May 1950, while România Literară [37] reproduced a painting by Mihai Mustață depicting Nicolae Ceaușescu saluting the flag in front of a group of armed soldiers. “A massive pro-Ceaușescu campaign was unleashed in the run-up to PCR National Conference from the last December, when meetings and film screenings were organised  «in all military units and institutions» praising the achievements of Ceausescu era and the «indestructible bond between the Army and the people». Celebrations in military units and army cultural associations continued on the eve of the festivities linked to the 35^th anniversary of the republic, such as the festival «We have a flag, we have a country, we have a supreme commander», reported by the party newspaper Scânteia” [38, p. 46 – 47], the analysts of Radio Europa Libera reported in February 1983.

In November and December 1982, numerous sessions were organised on the role of Nicolae Ceaușescu in the shaping of the national military doctrine of Romania [39], as well as a meeting of the core activists of the general staff of the Patriotic Guards [40], a meeting of generals and officers from MApN and DSS who had been promoted in rank [41], a meeting of the party and command activists from DSS [42], a meeting of the active party and command staff of the Ministry of the Interior [43], a plenary session of the Higher Political Council of the Army [44], a meeting of the Political Council of the General Staff with the active staff, to which was added the celebration of the birthday of Nicolae Ceaușescu organised at MApN with the participation of senior officers from the Bucharest garrison [45].

 (To be continued)

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*Article appeared in the magazine Deutsche internationale Zeitschrift für zeitgenössische Wissenschaft, nr. nr. 89/2024, p. 12 – 21.

References:

1. Petre Otu, Armata și partidul, de la „dezgheț” la „explozie”. O relație dificilă /The Army and the Party, from “Thaw” to “Explosion”. A Difficult Relationship, in Dosarele Istoriei/History Files, Year VI, issue 5 (57), 2001.
2. 2,512 officers, 112 non-commissioned officers and 1,100 civilian employees were put on reserve status.
3. România 1945 – 1989. Enciclopedia Regimului Comunist. Instituții de Partid, de Stat, Obștești și Cooperatiste/Romania 1945 – 1989. Encyclopedia of the Communist Regime. Party, State, Public and Cooperative Institutions (coordinated by Dan Cătănuș), Bucharest, Publishing House of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism/Romanian Academy, 2012.
4. According to the general concept of the military applications carried out in Romania in the 1970s and 1980s, activities planned by the leadership of the Ministry of National Defence, together with the United Armed Forces Command (CFUA), every two years, Romanian generals and officers were bound to elaborate the strategic and operational-tactical situations to be applied during the military exercises that were conducted on the map, as well as the methodology of the operations. The Romanian representatives then presented to CFAU the overall concept of the applications, with a view to achieving co-operation with the two army commands, Soviet and Bulgarian, which formed an “Army Group” (“Front” in Soviet/Russian terminology) whose command was composed of Romanian officers and generals.
5. Constantin Olteanu, O viață de om. Dialog cu jurnalistul Dan Constantin/A life of man. Dialogue with journalist Dan Constantin, Bucharest, Niculescu Publishing House, 2012.
6. Petre Opriș, România în Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia. 1955 – 1991/Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. 1955 – 1991, Bucharest, Militară Publishing House, 2008.
7. Șerban Săndulescu, Decembrie ’89. Lovitura de stat a confiscat Revoluția Română/December ’89. The coup confiscated the Romanian Revolution, Bucharest, Omega Press Publishing House, 1996.
8. “Benefiting from the 1956 statutory provisions, which did not bind him to consult his deputies (representatives of the allied armies) in order to analyse and solve problems with them, the commander-in-chief usually took decisions on his own, on the instructions of the Soviet government, without consulting the governments of the allied states (or even his deputies). Moreover, he ordered the Romanian armed forces to increase their combat capacity during the Berlin crisis (August 1961) and the Caribbean crisis (October 1962). In issuing these orders, General Leontin Sălăjan, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces, considered that the Soviet government not only failed to comply with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty, but also showed a tendency to subordinate the other countries to the Soviet Union, putting them in a position to be engaged in war without their parties and governments having decided to do so,” note the authors (Constantin Olteanu, Alesandru Duțu, Constantin Antip) of România și Tratatul de la Varșovia. Istoric. Mărturii. Documente. Cronologie/Romania and the Warsaw Treaty. Historic. The testimonials. Documents. Timeline, Bucharest, Pro Historia Publishing House, 2005. The first signals questioning the leading role of the USSR in the alliance were recorded during the meeting of the Chiefs of Defence of the armies of the OTV countries, which took place in Moscow from 4 to 9 February 1966.
9. Nicolae Ceaușescu, România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate/Romania on the road to building the multilateral socialist society, vol. 20, Bucharest, Politică Publishing House, 1981.
10. See: Law No. 5 of 14 March 1969 on the establishment, organisation and functioning of the Defence Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in the Official Bulletin, Part I, No. 32 of 14 March 1969.
11. The command of the Armed Forces – declared Nicolae Ceausescu– cannot be exercised by any outside organisation; it is a sovereign attribute of the leadership of our party and State” (Apud Nicolae Ceaușescu, România pe drumul desăvârșirii construcției socialiste/Romania on the road to completion of the socialist construction, vol. 3, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1969).
12. The law was published in the Official Bulletin of RSR No 160 of 29 December 1972.
13. Lieutenant General Gheorghe Logofătuconsiders that the homeland defence war waged by the entire nation represents “a determined military, economic, political, ideological, diplomatic and other types of response to any aggressor who might threaten the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in which all the human, material and spiritual resources of the country will be engaged in a united effort until victory is achieved” (Apud Lieutenant General Gheorghe Logofătu, Aspecte strategice ale războiului popular de apărare, in Studii de strategie militară/Military strategy studies, coordinated by Lieutenant General Nicolae Eftimescu, Bucharest, Militara Publishing House, 1987).
14. “Our strategic objective is the defence of our homeland, and we do not intend to go beyond our borders, so we have no other strategy than to ensure that the Romanian land does not fall victim to any imperialist aggression, to the policy of force”, declared Nicolae Ceausescuin 1977 (Nicolae Ceausescu, România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste…/Romania on the road to building the multilateral…, vol. 13, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1977).
15. “A future war will be for Romania a war of defence of the revolutionary conquests, against any aggression, for the defence of the integrity and independence of the country, and all the people will participate in it directly!”, Nicolae Ceausescusaid on 17 December 1985, at the balance Convocation of the basic, command and party activists of the Army (Idem, Cuvântare la convocarea-bilanț a activului de bază, de comandă și de partid din armată, 17 decembrie 1985/Speech at the meeting-balance of the basic asset, command and party in the army, December 17, 1985, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1986).
16. Such a decision was taken as a result of the analyses carried out over several years (1965-1967), after consulting Romanian specialists and reviewing information officially provided by the representatives of RSF Yugoslavia. On 25 March 1965, Army General Leontin Sălăjan, Minister of the Armed Forces, met in Bucharest with Army General Ivan Gosnjak, State Secretary for National Defence of SFR Yugoslavia and member of the Yugoslav delegation attending the funeral of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. On this occasion, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces wished to obtain information on how the Yugoslav Army is being equipped. Following the exchange of information on how the Yugoslav Armed Forces are being equipped, General Leontin Sălăjanagreed with the comments and proposals of the Yugoslav Secretary of State and told him that “it is good that certain categories of military technology should also be acquired from other countries, as the monopoly of a single country in the production of armaments is not advisable, and that it contributes to improving the quality and broadening the possibilities of acquisition”.
17. Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român din 22-25 aprilie 1968/Plenary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party from April 22-25, 1968, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1968.
18. At the meeting of the Permanent Presidium of CC of the PCR held on 8 February 1971, it was decided to reduce the volume of imports of military technology, provided for in the 1971- 1975 armed forces equipment plan by 601.7 million Lei in foreign currency from the Ministry of Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Security Council and special units belonging to the Ministry of Vehicle Building Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry. The document entitled “Annex to the Plan of Measures on the Promotion by the Socialist Republic of Romania of Cooperative Actions within the Framework of the Implementation of the «Comprehensive Programme of Further Deepening and Improvement of Cooperation and Development of Socialist Economic Integration of CAER Member Countries», and with the Other Socialist Countries”, drawn up at the end of 1971 and approved at the meeting of the Permanent Presidium of CC of the PCR on 17 January 1972, states that, by March 1972, the Minister of Vehicle Building Industry, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee and the Minister of Foreign Trade were to submit to the Party leadership proposals for co-operation with the USSR in the production of certain types of munitions, armaments and spare parts for tanks and aircraft in Romania, as well as co-operation with the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland and Hungary in the production of utility and short-haul transport aircraft.
19. Nicolae Ceaușescu, România pe drumul desăvârșirii…/Romania on the road to completion of the…, 3.
20. The Decree was published in the Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania No. 116 of 5 September 1968, and was followed by Law No. 39 of 13 November 1968 approving Decree No. 765/1968 on the constitution, organisation and operation of the Patriotic Guards, published in the Official Bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Romania No. 150 of 16 November 1968.
21. Men up to the age of 60 and women up to the age of 55 joined the Patriotic Guards. Students underwent military training in the Patriotic Guards. The structure of the Patriotic Guards was similar to that of the armed forces, i.e. rifle (organised into battalions, companies, platoons and groups), arms (organised into batteries and platoons) and assurance (organised into platoons and groups) sub-units. As of 1976, the structure of the Patriotic Guards has also included the Brigade echelon as a Large Tactical Unit. The commanders of the Patriotic Guards sub-units were appointed by the party committees of enterprises and institutions, and the political deputies of the sub-unit commanders were selected by the party bodies. In 1989, socialist Romania had, during peacetime, about 1,500,000 Patriotic Guards, whose training was carried out and coordinated by 1,064 permanent military staff of the Ministry of National Defence.
22. The first secretaries of the Party Committees in the counties, municipalities and districts of Bucharest were the commanders of the Patriotic Guards, and the PCR Statutes provided for the Party to lead the Patriotic Guards at all levels. The Central Staff of the Patriotic Guards operated under CC of the PCR, and was staffed by active military personnel seconded from the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Interior.
23. It was published in issue 9 of the Official Gazette of Romania of 31 December 1989.
24. “Special mention must be made of the workers placed by the N. C. at the head of the state military institutions. Emil Bodnărașhad left a strong imprint on the People’s Army. I don’t know what military virtues the man had (it is said that he was head of his class), but his elegant severity, of a medieval misanthropic knight, as opposed to the obtuse barrack vulgarity, could not fail to impose on the high-ranking collaborators of the major states not to go to school. (…) In any case, since Sălăjan, the labour criterion in the election of Army chiefs has become unwavering. Next was Ioniță, a factory worker and militant in the youth movement, whom Ceaușescu promoted without hesitation. (…) I do not know how the generals and the troop felt about Ionita, but the civilians saw in him the rough image of the smug, self-sufficient and rude turner that was not making the slightest effort to get out of its old shell. What did he dream of? To seize power in Romania under Brezhnev, with whom he might have succeeded in resembling, since they shared the same ore in their intimate composition?”, Dumitru Popescu, a former member of the Political Executive Committee (CPEx) of CC of the PCR, referring to the leadership of the MApN (Apud Dumitru Popescu, Cronos autodevorându-se…Angoasa putrefacției. Memorii/Cronos…Anguish putrefaction. Memoirs, vol. IV, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2006).
25. “In a related context, General Ion Gheorgherecalls: «I can say that hundreds of times we were summoned together – General Ioniță and myself – to Leontin Sălăjan, later to Nicolae Ceaușescu or to Ion Gheorghe Maurer for various current problems. Although the debates were usually conducted in tense parameters, I cannot recall any circumstance in which General Ioniță took a step back from his correct and dignified attitude, or unjustifiably abandoned his opinions»”, records Cecilia Ioniță, the wife of the former Defence Minister, referring to the relationship between Nicolae Ceaușescuand her husband (Ion Ioniță, Însemnări/Notes, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2008).
26. Ionel Gal, Rațiune și represiune în Ministerul de Interne. 1965 – 1989/Reason and repression in the Ministry of the Interior. 1965 – 1989, vol. I, Iași, Domino Publishing House, 2001.
27. Referring to the relations between General Ion Ionițăand persons in Nicolae Ceaușescu’s immediate entourage the former Minister of National Defence, Constantin Olteanu recalls a visit that Emil Bobu, Secretary of CC of the PCR and Head of the Organisational Division, Coordinator of the Division for Military Issues and Justice, of the Staff Division of CC of the PCR, of the Central Staff of the Patriotic Guards and of CC of the UTC in 1976, wanted to visit the Ministry of National Defence.  The Deputy Head of the Military and Justice Division, Major General Constantin Olteanu, was asked to mediate this visit. “At the end of the conversation (with Ion Ioniță – author’s note) – he asked me in his abrupt style: “What does this Bobu want?”, he wants to visit you, I replied. “Fine, let him come tomorrow afternoon at four. But you come with him too!”. In the meantime, I informed General Ion Coman, Chief of the General Staff, and Gheorghe Gomoiu, Secretary of the Superior Political Council of the Army, about the planned visit. The next day, at 16:00, together with Emil Bobu, we went to the Ministry of National Defence. General Ion Ioniță did not greet Emil Bobu in the antechamber or in the doorway, but sitting at the working table, a fact that could not have gone unnoticed by our guest. After this moment devoid of the elementary aspects of protocol, the Minister of National Defence, displaying an air of superiority, presented to his guest, without any pleasure, some of the current concerns of the leadership of the Ministry, after which we parted. (…) At the end of this brief visit, Emil Bobu, clearly marked by the way he had been treated, said that General Ion Ioniță «Behaved like a patron!»”, the former Minister of National Defence records. A few months later, in the summer of 1976, Ion Ioniță was dismissed.
28. In June 1976, Army General Ion Ionițăwas dismissed as Minister of National Defence and became Deputy Prime Minister in charge of coordinating the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Health, the State Committee for Water, the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the Civil Aviation and the Civil Navy. General Ion Gheorghe was sent to strengthen the Commission for the Coordination of the People’s Councils.
29. “In the last decade of the communist regime, the cadres of the Romanian army were re-proletarianised by providing special seats for admission to military schools for so-called workers (young people from the “labour market”) whose level of training was poor (which is why they passed the admission exam with averages slightly above 5!), but who benefited from material and financial advantages in flagrant discrepancy with young people from military high schools. In practice, the process of proletarianisation of the Romanian Army in the early 1950’s, carried out under Soviet military occupation, was being reverted to, due to the fact that, as the communist regime consolidated, specialists who no longer owed their position to their social origin and their role in the party, but to their knowledge and professionalism, began to gain access to the main fields of interest, which made them less permeable to dogmas and, consequently, posed great problems for the regime in ensuring the preservation of dogmas in relation to the accelerated professionalisation of the military elite. The reply of the regime was therefore, in the case of the army, to re-proletarianise the corps, with soldiers whose training was modest and who, just as in the 1950s, owed their position in the military hierarchy to the respect and ad litteram repetition of dogmas (of which they did not understand much!) rather than to professionalism which, in a de-professionalised army, did not even matter!”, writes Military Historian PhD. Florin Șperlea(Apud Major PhD. Florin Șperlea Starea de spirit a armatei în preajma Revoluției din Decembrie 1989 (The state of mind of the Army on the eve of the Revolution of December 1989), in Caietele Revoluției/The revolution notebooks, issue 1/8, 2007).
30. In report no. M 008259 of 10 December 1980, the Minister of National Defence, Major-General Constantin Olteanuasked Nicolae Ceaușescu to authorise the participation of 46,000 military personnel in the work being carried out on various construction sites in Romania. The Minister of National Defence mentioned that in 1979, with the exception of the 39,000 soldiers provided for in the plan, the Ministry of National Defence had deployed a further 6,000 soldiers to various sites of the economic ministries, 10,600 soldiers to harvest the summer harvest, 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 lorries to harvest the autumn harvest, and between July and October 1980, another 2,500 soldiers arrived in the Oltenia Coal Basin. At the same time, in November 1980, the Ministry of National Defence sent another 17,000 soldiers to the agricultural units for the rapid harvesting of the autumn 1980 harvest, and locally, on Saturdays and Sundays, on average, 20,000 soldiers.
31. Nicolae Ceaușescu, Apărarea națională a Republicii Socialiste România. Culegere de texte/National Defence of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Collection of texts, Bucharest, Militara Publishing House, 1983.
32. According to Major General (r) Ionel Galformer Secretary of CC of the PCR, Ion Comanwas guilty of turning the annual stock-taking sessions in the units and formations of Securitate, Militia and Securitate Troops into events in which the personality of the Supreme Commander was praised. “Although it was easy to realise that the security bodies were exceeding their powers – notes Major General (r) Ionel Gal -, that there were frictions between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of National Defence, as well as a dualism of power between the Minister Secretary of State (Head of the Security Department) and the Minister of the Interior, Ion Coman did not have the courage to tackle and get involved in these issues. He often played a negative role, being a man who lacked stance and firmness in the face of the subservience of the presidential couple to Securitate and the technical-operative pursuit of all the personalities who formed the nomenclature of the party leadership”.
33. The structure of the positions held by these people was as follows: 17 were in command positions, 16 in the party body, 42 were doctors, 42 engineers and 133 worked in various technical services of the MApN. At the same time, the CPSA statistics mentioned that 73 people worked in command headquarters, 42 in large units, 162 in MApN military units, 26 in various research centres, 98 in military educational institutions and 222 in various other sectors. See: Petre Otu, Militarii, rudele în străinătate și relațiile cu străinii (Military, relatives abroad and relations with strangers), in Magazin Istoric, Year XLV, new series, Issue 9 (534), September 2011.
34. The discussions were attended by the members of the Cadre Commission: Elena Ceaușescu, Emil Bobu, Constantin Olteanu, Tudor Postelnicuand Constantin Radu, Head of the Cadre Division of CC of the PCR.
35. Silviu Brucanargues in his book O biografie între două revoluții: de la capitalism la socialism și retur/A biography between two revolutions: from capitalism to socialism and return (Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 1998) that as early as 1976, the Minister of National Defence, Army General Ion Ionitahad discussed with the former Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Ion Gheorghe Gheorghe. “They could organise a coup from a strictly military point of view. I knew them both, but I was in contact only with General Ionita. In a discussion with him, I came to the conclusion that neither the working class nor the rest of the population were prepared at that time for such a coup and that for that reason they would not support it. In the end, the two generals gave up the idea of the coup”, says Silviu Brucan. Given that Colonel General Ion Gheorghe was relieved of his position as Chief of the General Staff in December 1974, it is extremely difficult to accept that he, in his position as first Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Municipal People’s Council and member of the Bureau of the Bucharest Municipal Party Committee (December 1974 – August 1977), could have organised a coup d’état with the military support of MApN units.
36. The daily Scânteia of 18 December 1985 referred to the fact that Nicolae Ceaușescuwhen asked by the generals who were dissatisfied with the transfer to the national economy when they would return to active service, said: ‘We hope that they will not need to return, in order to ensure peace and that it will not be necessary to resort to arms’ (Apud Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Revoluția neterminată/Unfinished revolution, Bucharest, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1999).
37. Issue 4 of 26 January 1983.
38. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Cultul lui Ceaușescu/The Cult of Ceausescu , Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2003.
39. See: Scânteia, 8 December 1982.
40. Ibidem, 26 December 1982.
41. Ibidem, 30 December 1982.
42. Ibidem, 12 January 1983.
43. Ibidem, 14 January 1983.
44. Ibidem, 18 January 1983.
45. Ibidem, 22 January 1983.