Despite all this, the Western media (BBC, The Times and Süddentsche Zeitung) on 7 February 1983 mentioned rumours of a failed military coup against Nicolae Ceausescu which had allegedly taken place at the end of January 1983. “At the beginning of 1983, at a time, therefore, when the Romanian leadership, after the death of Brezhnev, was under increasing pressure from the Moscow leadership, serious reproaches against the defence policy of Ceaușescu could be heard at a conference of the commanders even in the presence of the head of state and of the party”[1, p. 71 – 72], wrote analyst Anneli Ute Gabanyi. Walter Bacon Jr., in his study on socialist Romania, wrote of the Army’s grievances: “The alleged conspiracies against Ceausescu among the armed forces are not only symptoms of elite discontent, but also signs of a general malaise among Romanians who have had to bear the brunt of the inability of the regime to respond to the economic crisis” [1, p. 72].

Opposition, dissidence and military plot

On 8 November 1984, the 15th Division of STASI reported, on the basis of information provided by a Romanian citizen, a German speaker who was on a tourist visit to the GDR, that “in 1982/1983 there was an attempted putsch against the government of the Socialist Republic of Romania” [2, p. 370 – 371] which was “planned, organised and executed by leading members of the Romanian Army” [2, p. 371]. The STASI leadership was informed that the coup d’état in Bucharest failed as a result of “the intervention of special forces (within the Army and Securitate), with a large number of the participants being «liquidated»” [2, p. 371]. STASI analysts considered that “the reason for the putschists’ action was the influence exerted by the state and party leadership on the country’s military and security policy” [2, p. 371]. STASI officers noted that the population of socialist Romania was dissatisfied with the fact that all power was in the hands of the “Ceaușescu clan” so that “after the foiling of the attempted putsch, many parts of the population, especially the Hungarian and German minorities in Romania, still sympathise with the putschists, because people believe that a restructuring of the government could increase the performance of the national economy” [2, p. 371].

STASI’s information was inaccurate, but a military coup was being prepared in the autumn of 1984 by a group of generals and civilians, some of them educated in the USSR and with affinities to its values, who were looking for a way to get rid of “Ceaușescu clan”. The initiator of the military plot was Colonel-General (r) Nicolae Militaru [3], former Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industrial Constructions (5 June 1978 – 8 February 1984) and former Commander of the 2nd Army in Bucharest (8 July 1969 – 5 June 1978). Indications of the extremely close relationship between the Commander of the 2nd Army in Bucharest, Colonel-General Nicolae Militaru and the USSR’s military representatives in Romania are provided by the former Minister of National Defence, General (r) Constantin Olteanu.

In the context in which at the end of 1974 (November), there were a series of staff movements in the central structures of MApN, Nicolae Militaru had a discussion with Major-General Constantin Olteanu in which he proposed the command of the 2nd Army to him, in the context in which he was to take over the position of Chief of the Romanian General Staff. “I frankly informed him that the Minister of National Defence had submitted a paper proposing three generals for the position of Chief of the General Staff, but his name was not on it. Perhaps, I specified, to get over the moment, the Minister of National Defence may have sent another proposal directly to the Commander-in-Chief without going through our division. Intervening, General Militaru said: “The Soviet military attaché told me that I would be appointed Chief of the General Staff. He even congratulated me”. I was surprised by what I heard from General Militaru. I did not ask him whether the Soviet military diplomat had given him the information directly or through a third person. If what he told me was true, it meant that the name of General Militaru had also been circulated in certain circles, and had reached the ears of the Soviets. At the time, it was not understood that the appointment of General Ion Coman as Chief of General Staff even if it meant a certain downgrade, Nicolae Ceausescu sought to interrupt the series of generals who had studied in the Soviet Union and had held this position” [4, p. 109], Constantin Olteanu in his memoirs.

On the occasion of the balance convocation at the Military Academy in June 1973, Nicolae Ceaușescu asked Minister Ion Ioniță a chief of the General Staff of the Patriotic Guards. The Minister of National Defence proposed Nicolae Militaru, but Ceaușescu would nominate General Vasile Milea, former Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army under Nicolae Militaru, acting Commander of the Second Army (8 July 1969 – 5 June 1978). From 14 to 19 February 1978, an operational and strategic application on the map of the Warsaw Treaty was carried out in the resort of Mangalia-Nord, on the Warsaw Treaty line. The Romanian military delegation was led by Colonel General Ion Coman, Minister of National Defence, together with the command of the Romanian 2nd Army, headed by Colonel General Nicolae Militaru.

On the evening of 18 February 1978, Colonel General Nicolae Militaru together with Generals Dumitru Fotescu, Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army, and Stelian Popescu, Commander of the 3rd Army, attended a meeting at “Dacia” Hotel with Soviet and Bulgarian generals after the end of the application. According to Nicolae Militaru, the Soviet generals spoke against the foreign policy of Romania and the foreign policy of Nicolae Ceausescu, the position of Romania within the Warsaw Treaty and the fact that the position occupied by Nicolae Militaru is inferior to his training and experience. Nicolae Militaru did not respond verbally to the statements of the Soviet generals [5, p. 306]. “In addition – notes Constantin Olteanu in his memoirs – General Nicolae Pleșiță who was in close relations with General Nicolae Militaru from when they had worked in Cluj garrison, told me that he had discussed the serious situation with him and had ‘friendly’ advised him to self-declare that he was a collaborator with Soviet intelligence bodies. In conclusion, General Nicolae Pleșiță addressed me as follows: “Comrade Costică, you should know that Nicu (Nicolae Militaru – author’s note) – is not a traitor, I know him well”. When I asked if he had informed Nicolae Ceausescu about this case, General Nicolae Pleșiță told me that he had informed the Supreme Commander in detail. Finally, General Nicolae Militaru self-declared, in writing, that he was a collaborator of the GRU (General Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army) [6]. Had it not been for the “friendly” advice of General Nicolae Pleșiță, it was possible that things might have stopped there” [4, p. 124].

According to statements made by Major General Constantin Nuță to Constantin Olteanu to force a full confession from Nicolae Militaru, given that “the military counter-intelligence officers did not know in advance that such a discussion would take place, did not specifically direct an informant and did not have any operational techniques in place” [4, p. 124]. Former Minister of National Defence Constantin Olteanu did not believe the version of the surprise that GRU and Nicolae Militaru had caused the officers of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Division, and Nicolae Ceausescu was in no hurry to immediately dismiss Colonel-General Nicolae Militaru [7].

In dialogue with Alex Mihai Stoenescu General (r) Victor A. Stănculescu confesses, with reference to this episode in 1978: “He summoned us to the Academy, the whole case was processed and it was announced that the Deputy Minister of Constructions had been appointed. Being the Soviet’s man, Ceaușescu could not shoot him” [8, p. 145]. There remains an unknown in this case: was the case processed with elements from the counterintelligence file of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Division or a presentation of the way in which the rules of conduct of the Romanian military were violated in their relations with the Soviet military ally? General (r) Mircea Mocanu, former commander of the Anti-Aircraft Land Defence Command (CAAT), takes a different view of the relationship between Nicolae Militaru and Nicolae Ceaușescu with effects on the nomination of the former as being pro-Soviet. “The theory that General Militaru, on a terrace, at a restaurant, had passed military secrets to a woman representing the KGB is an invention, a fabrication of Securitate. He had nothing to transmit to the USSR. She had nothing to know. First of all: What did he command? He was commander of the Bucharest Army. This Army was put where it was by the Soviets. After the war, they fixed the place of each regiment. Second: every spring, every year, until 1989, the General Staff sent the text, map and tables of the Romanian Armed Forces from the General Staff in Moscow to the Unified Command. And not only did we get the combat technology from them, but they came periodically to check its combat capability. What secrets did he know? I know what secrets Militaru sold to women. He liked women! He was a good man, a clever man, a first-class seducer. Everyone knew that. So where did it come from then? I’ll tell you from where! When Brezhnev came to Bucharest for the last time, after getting off the aeroplane, he saluted the guard, the anthem was sung…He went on to shake hands. First came the Central Committee and the government, a few activists, then the Army representatives. We were like this: first, General Militaru, representing the Land Army; second, General Mocanu, representing Air Defence; third, General Zărnescu, representing the Air Force; and fourth, Rear-Admiral Dinu – he was from the Army Intelligence Division, but he was dressed as a sailor and represented the Navy. Ceausescu accompanied Brezhnev. Brezhnev was barely dragging his feet, barely shaking hands with us. He was finished, worn out! There was a metre and a half between the last in the Government and General Militaru. When Brezhnev reached Militaru, Militaru saluted and said in Russian: «I salute you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union!». The eyes of Ceausescu widened. But, he moved on! He left, the visit was over…In a short time, Militaru was discharged from his position as commander of the Army in Bucharest and appointed deputy to the Minister of Industrial Constructions” [9, p. 19], says General (r) Mircea Mocanu.

Nicolae Militaru remained Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industrial Constructions until 8 February 1984, although on 4 April 1983, he was put on reserve status and retired from the Ministry of National Defence. At the same time, he remained an alternate member of CC of the PCR until 22 November 1984, but was not elected in the 13th Congress of the PCR. In this capacity, he was able to stay at the “Elias” Hospital where he met Ion Iliescu who had come to visit Valter Roman. On 17 April 1983, Nicolae Militaru wrote to Nicolae Ceausescu asking to be appointed to the command of the Military Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania. After the meeting with Ion Iliescu, Nicolae Militaru went on, according to his own testimony in 1991, to contact political and military personalities of the communist regime who could be involved in a political and military plot to remove Nicolae Ceausescu from power. Colonel General Nicolae Militaru succeeded in rallying the reserve generals Ion Ionita and Ștefan Kostyal [10], first-rank captains (r) Radu Nicolae and Anton Bejan, who were joined by Ion Iliescu and Virgil Măgureanu.

The 1st Rank Captain (r) Anton Bejan is named in the report no. AB 044/15.03.1965 of the Secretary of the Political Council of the Military Navy Command, 1st Rank Captain Marin Vasile, addressed to the Secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Armed Forces of the Romanian People’s Republic, Major General Ion Dincă, as having more than unprincipled discussions with Vice-Admiral Alexeev, representative of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Command in Romania. “After the end of the application – said the 1st Rank Captain Marin Vasile in his report -, Alexeev and Major Fomin made every effort and finally managed to meet with the 1st Rank Captain (r) Bejan. The first thing Alexeev did when he met with Bejan, (Major Fomin was also present) he held him to account for why he had fallen down in the work he was doing. He replied that he did it on purpose, because “they” can make you accountable for anything. Asked by Alexeev what was new, Bejan replied, “The Romanians have become outright nationalists, they have started to wave the Bessarabia issue”. In response to Bejan, Alexeev said: “When Bessarabia was united with us, Romania did not even exist”. When it was mentioned that the Romanians were making a fuss about history, Alexeev said with malice: “Well, if that’s the way the problem is being posed, we’ll finish with this history in 2-3 days” [11, p. 202].

In the volume O biografie între două revoluții: de la capitalism la socialism și retur (Nemira Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, 335 p.), Silviu Brucan argues (p. 173) that, in practice, Ion Iliescu  “tried to discourage Ioniță and Militaru from organising a military coup, considering it a «dangerous attempt»”. Such a statement must be understood and construed in the light of the withdrawal of Silviu Brucan from politics at the beginning of 1990 and the evolution of the two politicians on the political scene of post-Decembrist Romania. Historian Petre Opriș is of the opinion that one of the traitors of the plot was General Marin Dragu, former commander of “Tudor Vladimirescu” 1st Mechanised Division, of the 2nd Mountain Hunters Brigade (1968 – 1973), Head of the Operations Division of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1973 – 4 August 1975), deputy commander of the Infantry and Tank Command. Generals Gheorghe Gomoiu and Dimitrie Popa also provided information on the plot. Virgil Măgureanu mentions only Generals Marin Dragu and Gheorghe Gomoiu [12, p. 110 – 111]. General Gheorghe Gomoiu was relieved of his capacity of member of the Defence Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania by Decree No. 295 of 22 December 1983, and Lieutenant General PhD. Ilie Ceaușescu, Deputy to the Minister of National Defence and Secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Army, was appointed in his place.

Referring to this political and military plot, former Romanian President Ion Iliescu wrote: “Unfortunately, due to some imprudence on the part of General Militaru, who contacted former subordinates in the General Staff who had turned him in, both he and General Ioniță were warned, and in March 1984, I was removed from the leadership of the National Water Council. Not long before, Vasile Patilineț, a former Ambassador to Turkey (previously Secretary of CC of the PCR) died in a suspicious car accident. He too had participated in some discussions on the unbearable situation in the country. In June 1987, General Ionita died of rapidly progressing cancer” [13, p. 144]. In March 1984, Tudor Postelnicu would investigate Nicolae Militaru at the headquarters of CC of the PCR about this political and military plot [14] which was to produce its effects on the occasion of the state visit that Nicolae Ceaușescu was to make to FRG from 15 to 17 October 1984. It should be emphasised, however, that Nicolae Ceausescu would put on reserve status Generals Paul Cheler [15] and Dumitru Pletos [16] in February 1985.

It is worth mentioning that a STASI briefing note of 9 March 1981, referring to the assessment by the Western diplomats of the internal situation in Romania, stated that “the (Romanian – author’s note) Army would be ready to intervene in defence of power from the very beginning” [2, p. 342]. Recalling those attempts to overthrow Nicolae Ceausescu, Ion Iliescu would write: “There were few of us who, on the street, on the way home from work or in discreet meetings, openly discussing the political situation, the degeneration of the regime and the dead end we found ourselves in, imagined political solutions and circumstances that would allow the country to break out of the ever-tightening circle of the dictatorial system. We separately contacted a number of people who might be able to participate in such an endeavour. Unfortunately, the endeavours could not go beyond the limits of contacts, discussions and analyses and could not lead to effective action. On the other hand, I have been deeply disappointed by the few personal contacts [17] that I have had with some of those in positions of responsibility important enough to take effective political action. Fearful, they studiously avoided any hint of possible changes, leaving me with no hope that they would be able to take the risks of such an act” [18, p. 43 – 44].

Referring to the possible involvement of the Soviet intelligence services (KGB & GRU) in this conspiracy [19], while Nicolae Ceaușescu was negotiating an import of Soviet oil at the same time as the negotiations on the extension of the Warsaw Treaty were being postponed, historian Petre Opriș believes that “although it is plausible”, there is no evidence to prove it. The former head of the 4th Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, Lieutenant-General (r) Vasile Gheorghe, would declare, with reference to Nicolae Militaru in an interview given to journalist Angela Băcescu in March 1991, the following: “It is true that General Militaru Nicolae has taken a hostile position in the wake of the discontent caused by his removal from the Army, particularly in recent years. However, his allegations about the extent of his alleged links among generals and other categories of active military personnel are unfounded. In reality, these links related to a few reservists who were also dissatisfied with the administrative measures taken against them. Two active generals immediately reported to the Ministry of National Defence that General Militaru was trying to lure them “into actions directed against military order”. They were General Gomoiu Gheorghe Gomoiu and General Popa Constantin [20], to whom General Militaru offered positions if he were to take over the command” [21, p. 106 – 107].

Accusations and legends

In the context of the denigration of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, the post-Decembrist press mentioned the existence of generals (Nicolae Militaru, Vasile Ionel, M. Pancea, Gheorghe Logofătu etc.) and senior officers of the MApN [22] who allegedly worked for the GRU or the KGB, but the evidence, except for some suppositions, has never been made public, while the fate of the files in the archives of the former UM 0110 [23, p. 247] (anti-KGB), as well as the files of the former 4th Directorate of Military Counterintelligence remains a mystery [24].

A first case of political and military intelligence gathering in favour of the USSR was that of Lieutenant General Ioan Șerb [25] and which became the most often used example in the memoirs of former Romanian Securitate officers as an example of a happy ending in the struggle with the KGB & GRU. In September 1971, Lieutenant-General Ioan Șerb was caught in flagrante delicto by officers of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Division of the DSS and arrested. He was demoted and put on reserve status on 30 September 1971 and later sentenced to seven years in prison [26] by a military court for illegally possessing several military documents, including two maps with notes, at his home, and for disclosing state secrets to the Soviet Union.

The memoirs of the former Securitatea reveal that certain secret Army structures may have been involved in preparations for a coup against Nicolae Ceaușescu in the autumn of 1988. In his book called În decembrie ’89 KGB a aruncat în aer România cu complicitatea unui grup de militari/In December ’89 the KGB blew up Romania with the complicity of a group of soldiers (Ziua & Omega Press Investment Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, 157 p.), military counterintelligence officer Valentin Raiha claims that the application carried out in Făgăraș – Brașov area, between 8 May and 30 September 1988 by the Large Units and Units subordinated to the Fourth Army, aimed at the arrest of Nicolae Ceausescu and those close to him on the occasion of a demonstration exercise to be presented to the party and state leadership. Valentin Raiha insists on the fact that the diversionary scouts subordinated to the Army Intelligence Directorate (DIA), namely the 404th Battalion of the Deep Research by Parachute from Buzău, who were on the perimeter of the 1988 application, had more important and secret missions than routine ones, which were to check the safety of the military body of the application.

The media in Romania in the 1990’s spoke about a trip to Moscow on 11 December 1989 by a group of civilians and officers from MApN and DIA, including the PhD. Scientific Researcher Ioan Mircea Pașcu [27], Colonel Paul Șarpe [28, p. 107], Major Gheorghe Lungu, to “a colloquium on security in the Balkans”. Such a trip would amplify the suppositions of the DSS memorialists regarding the involvement of DIA in a possible scenario of a military coup against Nicolae Ceausescu with the assistance of GRU. In his memoirs called Jurnal de.. “Front” (Diary of…”Front”), Ioan Mircea Pașcu writes that a group of specialists in the field and some diplomats from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [29] went to Moscow on 11 December 1989 at the invitation of the Moscow Diplomatic Academy addressed to the Romanian Association of International Law and International Relations, for a scientific meeting on the issue of Balkans. “The flight took place via TAROM on 11 December 1989, returning on 16 December, when the events in Timisoara broke out, of which we were unaware. To Moscow, we travelled, of course, without knowing who the other passengers were, with a delegation from the Ministry of Defence, which was going to an activity concerning the the Warsaw Pact. That fact was later intensely exploited by the media, allegedly as proof of the secret links that those who came to power after the Revolution would have had with the Army and with…. Moscow!?” [30, p. 14], writes Ioan Mircea Pașcu.

The rivalry between Securitate and the Army Intelligence Division will also have its say in deciphering the enigmas of how the Army may have been involved, or even was involved, in the various more or less well-known attempts to overthrow Nicolae Ceaușescu by force. The holiday taken by Lieutenant General Victor A. Stănculescu with his wife at Lake Balaton, in Hungary, in 1989, will be of great interest to the officers of UM 0110 and those of the 3rd Counterintelligence Division of the DSS. On the basis of the information obtained by the 3rd Counterintelligence Division from the entourage of two AVO (Hungarian Security) officers, the DSS suspected Lieutenant General Victor A. Stănculescu of links with the KGB, the head of the KGB for the Eastern European area. The former Minister of National Defence rejects accusations by former Securitate officers that he had an operational link with the Hungarian military attaché in Bucharest, Colonel Șandor Aradi. The accusation of DSS officers relates to the visit which Colonel Șandor Aradi paid on 12 September 1989 to the office of Lieutenant General Victor A. Stănculescu. “It was a discussion which, first of all, was not recorded, of course, because there was no way, since I checked the office periodically, that something could not have come up. And secondly, there was no exchange of documents, which kept us out of any trouble. You’d have to be an idiot, like the Securitate officer who probably wrote this, to exchange documents with the Hungarian military attaché at the Romanian Ministry of Defence headquarters” [8, p. 44 – 45] Victor A. Stănculescu would declare.

Western analysts of the Soviet space claimed at the time that the Minister of National Defence, Colonel-General Constantin Olteanu had been involved, in December 1985, in an attempted riot against Ceaușescu. It all had to do with a visit to Moscow by the Defence Minister from Bucharest and the fact that the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei A. Gromîko had tried to win him over to the idea of a change of leadership in Bucharest [31, p. 203]. Referring to this episode, Constantin Olteanu states: “As Minister of National Defence of Romania, between 9 and 14 December 1985, at the invitation of Marshal Serghei Sokolov, Minister of Defence of the USSR, I paid an official visit to Moscow. (…) In connection with the above-mentioned speculations, for the sake of an accurate record of the facts, I would like to state the following: on the occasion of that visit, I did not meet Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the PCUS, nor was any proposal put forward to that effect. It is well known that the level of hospitality in such cases is determined by the hosts who, in this case, as I said before, nominated Andrei Gromîko who held the highest state position. Before leaving for Moscow, Nicolae Ceaușescu had asked me, as in all such situations, to send a verbal message on his behalf to the person in the Soviet leadership who would receive me – M. Gorbachev, A. Gromîko or N. Rishkov – he said. The fact that on our arrival in Moscow we were greeted by an impressive number of Soviet marshals and generals, that the main moments of the visit were covered in the press and on Soviet television, that television stations in other countries picked up images of the visit, which reached Romanian viewers (via Sofia!), that the delegation was accompanied in the localities included in the programme by Marshal V. Kulikov, was interpreted in a tendentious way. This also contributed to the exaggerated interpretation of the fact that the dinner that we organised, in accordance with our approval (and on the basis of reciprocity) at the Romanian Embassy in Moscow, was honoured by a large number of marshals and generals. After all, the above-mentioned actions did not go beyond the protocolary framework customary on the occasion of a visit by a minister of national defence to any state. All these speculative interpretations were intended to give credence to the idea of my rapprochement with the Soviets for a hidden purpose” [31, p. 198, 202 – 203].

It is very likely that the wishes of the Minister of National Defence in Bucharest to improve bilateral Romanian-Soviet cooperation in the defence industry may have upset the ego of Nicolae Ceaușescu and his vision of present and future relations with the USSR, so that he decided to dismiss Colonel-General Constantin Olteanu and limited the prospects of this co-operation.  It should be noted, however, that the former Minister of National Defence claims in his memoirs that there were discreet and indirect signals that Nicolae Ceausescu wanted to replace him at the head of the ministry with Colonel-General Vasile Milea, acting Chief of the General Staff [4, p. 457 – 465]. At the same time, Nicolae Ceaușescu would announce, on 17 December 1985, at the balance convocation at MApN level, that the Army would participate in the achievement of important economic and social objectives (e.g.: Bucharest – Danube Canal, the achievement of 1,500,000 hectares of irrigated land, the plan for the afforestation of Romania, several main canals, not navigation canals, etc.) “It is clear that the announced programme redirected the activity of the military body, taking it even further away from its natural mission” [4, p. 465], former Minister of National Defence Constantin Olteanu said.

Conclusions

In a report dated 9 December 1987, the GDR military attaché in Bucharest, Lieutenant-Colonel Gabler, reported to the Ministry of Defence in East Berlin: “The internal situation in the Socialist Republic of Romania, which is becoming more and more complicated and worsening, has direct negative effects on the combat capability and combat readiness of the Romanian armed forces. (…) The deployment of corps and troop units in the national economy is a clear proof of the worsening of the political and moral state of the army cadres, as well as of the military discipline and order (….) Because of the Romanian patriotism that has been inculcated in the armed forces cadres, in a strongly emphasised form for years, and the rigorous application of the Romanian military doctrine, but also because of the concern caused by secret police agents and “snitches” (whistleblowers), which partly prevails among officers and non-commissioned officers (generals and officers who have expressed critical opinions have been and continue to be removed from their positions), the armed forces firmly support the party and state leadership and fulfil the tasks entrusted to them” [2, p. 394 – 396].

On 5 September 1988, STASI analysts were to note, with regard to the position of the MApN leadership in Bucharest, that it “is considered to be invariably loyal to the party and state leadership” [2, p. 400] and that “no deviation from this position is to be expected as long as the interests of the army are not substantially harmed” [2, p. 400]. STASI officers noted that there were differences between the views of older officers “whose anti-Sovietism is stronger” [2, p. 400] and those of younger officers “who are more open to developments in the Soviet Union and changes in their own country” [2, p. 401], but this difference in outlook had “no influence on the loyalty to Ceaușescu” [2, p. 401]. This state of affairs was also a result of the political propaganda work carried out among the military, as Nicolae Ceaușescu declared: “Let’s make every serviceman at the same time a basic party activist. Every soldier, after finishing his military service, should become a good activist, a good propagandist, a good patriot, with a high revolutionary and patriotic conscience, with a high socialist conscience” [2, p. 539]. In spite of this propaganda effort, the deterioration of material and moral living conditions generated a series of negative reactions “obviously not openly expressed in official meetings, such as party assemblies (where most of the active cadres and civilian staff were party members), balances, political and ideological education” [2, p. 540].

Referring to the efforts of the US Embassy in Romania to maintain contacts with important people in Romanian society and in the communist power structure in Bucharest, including the Army, former diplomats Mircea Răceanu and Roger Kirk note: “The Army did not play an important role in the Romanian affairs, and it lacked resources. Although it appeared to be under Ceausescu‘s total control it was a potential source of opposition in the eyes of the American embassy. In any case, it could have become an important element in a post-Ceausescu era. Accordingly, military visits could have encouraged Romanian officers to see themselves as professional military personnel and not simply as slaves to Ceausescu. Moreover, visits by US military vessels to a member of the Warsaw Treaty were still rare enough to make them a useful example to other Treaty nations and a signal of the possibility of military autonomy” [32, p. 258 – 259].

In such a historical conjuncture, in a feverish expectation, we can conclude that we Romanians lacked a Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg and an Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris. We lacked a man who would take responsibility, even at the cost of his life, for organising a military coup d’état to overthrow Nicolae Ceaușescu, as well as a man who, as head of intelligence, would have protected and even encouraged a political and military plot that would have offered Romania and Romanians a different historical destiny. The two historical figures, with a destiny both tragic and great, loved Germany and its future more than their own lives, and sacrificed themselves so that humanity would know that not all Germans were like Adolf Hitler and his henchmen. In an October 2010 interview, the former head of the DIA in 1989, Vice-Admiral (r) Ștefan Dinu, confessed that it would have been at least 10 years before the leadership of the Socialist Romanian Army would have dared to think of a military coup against Nicolae Ceausescu [33].

____________________________________________

*Article appeared in the magazine Deutsche internationale Zeitschrift für zeitgenössische Wissenschaft, nr. 90/2024, p. 19 – 27

References:

  1. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Revoluția neterminată/Unfinished revolution, Bucharest, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1999.
  2. Stejărel Olaru, Georg Herbstritt, STASI și Securitatea/STASI and Security, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2005.
  3. Nicolae Militaruwas born on 10 November 1925 in Bălești (Gorj County) and died on 27 December 1996 in Bucharest. The future General of the Romanian Army attended “Mihail V. Frunze” Military Academy in Moscow from 1952 to 1956, becoming, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, chief of staff of the 10th “Ștefan cel Mare” Infantry Division in Iasi, then Commander of the Great Unit (MU), of the 2nd Mechanised Division in Craiova and, later, chief of staff of the 3rd Army in Cluj-Napoca (1961-1965). On 17 June 1965, he took command of the 3rd Army, which he held until 8 July 1969 when he took command of the 2nd Army in Bucharest. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel-General on 19 August 1974. He remained in that position until 5 June 1978. The historians Petre Opriș and Gavriil Preda have published (in the volume România în Organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia. Documente. 1954 – 1961/ Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Documents. 1954 – 1961, vol. I, Bucharest, INST, 2008, p. 305 – 306) a document dated 4 March 1961, namely the protocol of the Political Bureau of CC of the PMR, which approved the promotion to the rank of Major-General of 14 colonels, including Colonel Lepădatu N. Militaru (Infantry). In military documents from the 1960’s, the future opponent of Nicolae Ceaușescu signed “Militaru Nicolae Lepădat”.
  4. Constantin Olteanu, O viață de om. Dialog cu jurnalistul Dan Constantin/A life of man. Dialogue with journalist Dan Constantin, Bucharest, Niculescu Publishing House, 2012.
  5. Ioan Dan, Teroriștii din ’89 /The terrorists of ’89, Bucharest, Lucman Publishing House, 2012. “In a discussion I had with him (Nicolae Militaru– author’s note), he was keen to explain to me where he was suspected of having collaborated with the KGB or the GRU. He told me that, during the military applications organised under the Warsaw Military Pact, he refused to be helped by the translator in discussions with the Soviet military and, hence the suspicion,” General (r) Ioan Dan, former deputy head of the Military Prosecution Directorate, records, referring to General (r) Nicolae Militaru and his links with the intelligence services of USSR.
  6. The envelope containing the self-denouncement of Nicolae Militaruremained in the possession of Minister Ion Coman and was handed over in March 1980 to Constantin Olteanu when he took office as Minister of National Defence. In December 1985, the envelope was again handed over to Ion Coman and not to Colonel General Vasile Mileathe new Minister of National Defence. In such a situation a question arises: was Nicolae Militaru a secret agent of GRU or just a supporter of USSR policy within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and in the world? The non-existence in the historiographical circuit of documents from the files of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Division of DSS, with reference to Nicolae Militaru, adds to the mystery surrounding this officer and his role in the confrontation between the intelligence community of socialist Romania, which supported domestic and foreign policy of Nicolae Ceausescu and the KGB & GRU, as instruments of power of the Soviet Union.
  7. “In these circumstances, General Ion Coman,Minister of National Defence, said to me: “When you go to see the comrade, remind him of the dismissal of Militaru as commander of the 2nd Army!”. Nicolae Ceausescu, when I referred to General Nicolae Militaru,asked me: “Why is Coman in such a hurry to have Militaru discharged and seconded?”, resulting in the hesitation of the Commander-in-Chief in this case. I only said that I am convinced that the Minister of National Defence is aware of the situation that has arisen”, General (r) Constantin Olteanu
  8. Victor A. Stănculescu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, În sfârșit adevărul…/Finally the truth…, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2009.
  9. Sorin Turturică, Adevăruri pătrunse și nepătrunse/Intense and unfathomable truths, in Caietele Revoluției/The revolution notebooks, issue 5/37, 2011.
  10. He was born on 15 August 1922 in Timișoara. He graduated the Post-Academic Course for Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of Units and Large Units at the General Military Academy (January – July 1953), specialization course in the USSR (1956), and „K. E. Voroșilov” Higher Military Academy of General Staff in the USSR (April 1956 – November 1958). Military ranks: Major – August 1949, Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1950, Colonel – September 1951 and Major-General in August 1954. Positions held: Deputy Head of the Cadre Directorate (October 1949 – April 1951), Head of the Organisation – Training Directorate of DSPA (April 1951 – September 1953), Member of the Military Council of the 2nd and 3rd Military Regions and Political Deputy to the Commander of CAAT (August 1953 – September 1956), Political Deputy to the Commander of the General Military Academy (December 1958 – November 1959) and Head of the Control Directorate of DSPA (November 1959 – June 1970). By Decree No. 278 of 4 June 1970, Reserve Major General Stefan Kostyal was stripped of his rank and was listed as a reservist with the rank of private. In the 1980’s, he was imprisoned on official charges of stealing energy from his home meter. By Decree No. 108 of 8 February 1990, he was reinstated to the rank of Major General and was entered in the reserve military register with this rank. He died on 1 February 2013.
  11. Gavriil Preda, Petre Opriș, România în organizația Tratatului de la Varșovia. 1954 – 1968/Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Documents. 1954 – 1968, vol. II, Bucharest, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, 2009.
  12. See: Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Mihai StoenescuDe la regimul comunist la regimul Iliescu/From the communist regime to the Iliescu regime, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2008.
  13. Ion Iliescu, După 20 de ani. 1989 – an de cotitură în istoria națională și în viața internațională/After 20 years. 1989 – turning year in national history and international life, Bucharest, Semne Publishing House, 2010.
  14. For details, see the testimony of General (r) Nicolae Militaruof 25 August 1992 when he asked to be recognised as a “Fighter for the victory in the Romanian Revolution of December 1989”, at http://ovidiu-nicolaeceausescu.blogspot.ro/2011/04/declaratie-memoriu-25-august-1992-gen.html. “In the preparations being made, the involvement of the Army, as an institution, in the coup d’état action was completely excluded, as was the use of conventional weaponry, in order to avoid loss of human life. The action was to be carried out by an «assault squad», made up of military personnel of various arms, and the army was to interpose itself between the civilian population, which was taking to the streets in support of the revolutionary forces, and the forces of repression“, Nicolae Militaru states in the said memo.
  15. After graduating from military school in Romania, he completed the Higher School for Tank and Tank Car Officers (class of 1951, USSR), the Advanced Training Course for Regiment Commanders (1955) and the Military Academy (1957-1959, USSR), with “Very Good” rating and the Gold Medal. General Paul Cheler served as deputy commander of the Infantry and Tank Command (1977-1981) for operational and strategic applications under the Warsaw Treaty, and was four times commander of the “Romanian Front”, each time being awarded the “Very Good” rating. He was put on reserve status under Decree No. 30 of 28 February 1985. We mention that he was a colleague at the Military Academy in Moscow with Major General Stefan Kostyal, who attended staff courses organised between April 1956 and November 1958.
  16. Dumitru Pletos fought in the Second World War. He graduated from the School of Officers in 1950 and then from the Military Academy in the USSR (1959 – 1961). From 1958 to 1959, he was the commander of the 234th Mechanised Regiment (which became the 36th Mechanised Regiment on 10 January 1959). Subsequently, he was the commander of the 2nd Mechanised Division in Craiova (August 1961 – June 1973) and of “Tudor Vladimirescu – Debrecen” 1st Mechanised Division. In February 1985, he was put on reserve status.
  17. With Manea Mănescuand Ion Gheorghe Maurer.
  18. Ion Iliescu, Revoluție și reformă/Revolution and reform, Bucharest, Enciclopedică Publishing House, 1994.
  19. On 23 September 1993, before the Senate Committee for the Investigation of the Events of December 1989, Nicolae Militarutold about his visit to the Soviet Consulate in Constanta: “On 20 August 1987, I went to Constanta in person and went to the Soviet Consulate General. We were part of the Warsaw Treaty, you know very well. We were extraordinarily afraid, we didn’t like ambiguity, even the ambiguity of Gorbachev. So I went there, went to the Consul General and asked three questions. I showed him my card. He walked away from me and after about twenty minutes he came and replied to the three issues. The first issue: that the Soviet Union has no reason and will never interfere in domestic affairs of Romania. So, as such, do as you like. The second issue: that the new authorities would be immediately acknowledged by the Soviet Government. And the third issue, which was the hottest, the most important: there will be no repetition of what happened in August 1968 in Czechoslovakia. I drank the brandy with which he had served me and the coffee, and I left with an extraordinary satisfaction. That was the only contact there was, that I know of, where I was personally involved.” The way in which the Soviet intelligence services and the Ministry of External Affairs from Moscow, with the agreement of the PCUS, dealt with the plot of Nicolae Militaru reveals the fact that such actions and such plotters were not in the foresight of the USSR political leadership.
  20. Lieutenant General Popa Constantin headed the Army Intelligence Directorate from 26 November 1960 to 10 December 1963, with the rank of Major General. Referring to the period during which Major-General Constantin Popa headed the DIA, the authors of the book Direcția de Informații Militare între ficțiune și adevăr/Military Intelligence Directorate between fiction and truth (Bucharest, 1994, 264 p.) state (p. 142): “General Constantin Popa was an officer with a rich and beautiful general and military culture, close in his relations with the people. He sought to maintain and capitalise on what had been achieved up to that time in the field of military intelligence and showed care and prudence in establishing appropriate relations between the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff and the similar Soviet body, taking into account the nature of state and military relations with the Soviet Union at that time”.
  21. Angela Băcescu, România 1989. Din nou în calea năvălirilor barbare/Romania 1989. Again in the way of the barbarian invasions, Cluj-Napoca, Zalmoxis Publishing House, 1994.
  22. Cristian Troncotă, Duplicitarii. O istorie a Serviciilor de Informații și Securitate ale regimului comunist din România/Duplicating. A history of the Information and Security Services of the Communist regime in Romania, Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2003. Historian Cristian Troncotămentions in the subchapter Military counterintelligence neutralises Soviet agents the existence of generals and senior officers of the MApN, the Ministry of Interior and the State Security Council proved to be GRU agents: Colonel Iulian Ungureanu, former commander of the School of Officers for the Ministry of the Interior in Oradea and, later, a worker with responsible positions in an operational division in the central body of the CSS; General Floca Arhip, deputy to the Minister of National Defence; General Vasile Petruț, former commander of the Guard Troops and, later, a worker in the Propaganda Directorate of the Higher Political Division of the Army; Colonel Dumitru Cociuban of DIA of the MStM, taken under political protection by Iosif Uglar, substitute member of CC of the PCR and President of the Committee for People’s Councils.
  23. Marius Oprea, Moștenitorii Securității/Heirs of Security, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2004. The historian Marius Oprea writes the following about UM 0110 archive: “It is possible that the answer to the disappearance of the documents of the former 0110 counter-espionage unit in the “Eastern countries” (especially the USSR) may be provided by reviewing the internal documents of the Archives Division of SRI. According to a source who remains anonymous, a large part of the archives of UM 0110, some 40,000 pages, stored at Iasi, was transferred to Bucharest in 1994-1995. Where, it seems, it never went”.
  24. The archives of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Division were taken over by MApN intelligence structures and are still in their possession. See: interview with the Head of the SRI Archives, Florin Pintilie, in Jurnalul Național, Year XIII, Monday, 16 May 2005, p. 8 – 9.
  25. From 1944 to 1946, he was a serving soldier in “Tudor Vladimirescu” 1st Infantry Division, then a non-commissioned gendarme officer from 1946 to 1948. He attended the School of Officers of MAI (1948 – 1949), and on 23 August 1949, he was promoted to second lieutenant and appointed political deputy of the company commander at Rădăuți Training Centre for Border Guards, later on commander of a border guards battalion. He became a captain in 1950 and went on training at “Klement E. Vorosilov” Military Academy in Moscow from 1950 to 1952. On 8 August 1954, he took over the command of the Command of Border Guard and Security Troops. Colonel Ioan Șerb was promoted to the rank of Major General on 30 July 1955 and commanded the Command of Border Guard and Security Troops until 1 March 1960, when all major guard units were transferred from MIA to MFA. On 3 November 1961 he was relieved from the position of Commander of the Border Guard Troops, following the decision of the Political Bureau of CC of the PMR. Major-General Ioan Șerb was appointed as Deputy Commander of the 2nd Army (1961) and on 10 June 1965, he became its Commander, replacing Lieutenant-General Ion Gheorghe. Lieutenant-General Ioan Șerb was appointed commander of the military parade organised in Bucharest on the occasion of the celebration of the National Day of the Socialist Republic of Romania on 23 August 1967. On 7 July 1969, the members of the Permanent Presidium of CC of the PCR approved the release of Lieutenant-General Ioan Șerb from the position of Commander of the 2nd Army and his appointment as Deputy Commander of the Infantry and Tank Command.
  26. He served only four years in prison.
  27. Ioan Mircea Pașcu was born on 17 February 1949 in Satu Mare. He graduated from the Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Foreign Trade in Bucharest (class of 1971) and holds a PhD in Political Science from the Institute of Political Science in Bucharest (1980). He worked as a researcher at the Institute of Political Science in Bucharest, Department of International Relations, being major in international security research (1971-1986) and as a lecturer in the Department of International Relations of “Stefan Gheorghiu” Academy of Social and Political Studies (1986-1989). He was a member of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Council of the National Salvation Front (31 December 1989 – 1 July 1990) and of the Provisional Council for National Unity (9 February 1990 – 15 May 1990). He was Presidential Counsellor and Head of the Foreign Policy Division and Political Analysis Department of the Romanian Presidential Administration (1 July 1990 – 1 October 1992). Lecturer in International Relations at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA) since 1990, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at SNSPA (1990-1996) and Head of the Department of International Relations at SNSPA since 2004. He has participated in numerous international scientific seminars, research internships and fellowships in the West: the Seminar for American Studies from Salzburg (Austria, 1973), Ford Foundation Fellowship (1979 – 1981), visiting associate professor at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford University (1985), Resident Researcher at the Institute of East-West Security Studies (New York, 1988-1989), Japan Foundation Fellowship, Centre for Slavonic Research, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, and Visiting Researcher at the Japan Forum on International Relations (1992-1993). He was Vice-Chairman of the National Salvation Front (1990-1992) and Vice-Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (1997 – 2006), Member of the Romanian Parliament for Maramureș, Chairman of the Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security of the Chamber of Deputies (1996 – 2000), Member of the Romanian Parliament for Satu Mare (2000 – 2007), State Secretary in the Ministry of National Defence (22 March 1993 – 22 November 1996), Minister of National Defence from 2001 – 2004. Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (since 1993) and of DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) Advisory Committee (since 2002). From 2009 to 2014, he was a Member of the European Parliament on behalf of the Social Democratic Party.
  28. Vartan Arachelian, În fața dumneavoastră. Revoluția și personajele sale/In front of you. The revolution and its characters, Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 1998. In a television show of journalist Vartan Arachelianand called În fața dumneavoastră, DIA Colonel Paul Sarpe categorically rejected claims that he had travelled to Moscow on 11 December 1989. “It’s an aberration, a gross lie”, said Colonel Paul Șarpe, a former deputy chief of DIA in December 1989.
  29. The members of the delegation, according to the recollections of Ioan Mircea Pașcu, were Ambassador Niculae Micu from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PhD. Cristian Popișteanu (Manager of Magazin Istoric magazine), a lady from the Institute of World Economy and a gentleman named Iordache from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest.
  30. Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Jurnal de…„Front”/Diary of…”Front”, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2010.
  31. Constantin Olteanu, România – o voce distinctă în Tratatul de la Varșovia. Memorii. 1980 – 1985/Romania – a distinct voice in the Warsaw Treaty. Memoirs. 1980 – 1985, Bucharest, Aldo Publishing House, 1999. “The author (Anneli Ute Gabanyi – editor’s note) believes that in December 1985 the Soviet State President Andrei Gromîkoallegedly tried to persuade General Constantin Olteanu, the Romanian Defence Minister, to overthrow Ceaușescu. It is certain that Olteanu was received in the USSR with special honours, which did not cease to arouse comment. As a result, Ceaușescu replaced Olteanu with General Vasile Milea. There are rumours from abroad. In any case, things are not simple with General C. Olteanu either”, wrote Vremea. Totuși iubirea of 11 March 1991.
  32. Roger Kirk, Mircea Răceanu, România împotriva Statelor Unite. Diplomația absurdului (1985 – 1989)/Romania v. United States. The Diplomacy of the Absurd (1985 – 1989), Bucharest, Silex Publishing House, 1995.
  33. See: Constantin Corneanu, DIA între loialitate și supiciune/The DIA between loyalty and supposition (1)/ https://www.aesgs.ro/dia-intre-loialitate-si-suspiciune-1/; Idem, DIA între loialitate și supiciune/The DIA between loyalty and supposition (2)/ https://www.aesgs.ro/dia-intre-loialitate-si-suspiciune-2/; Idem, DIA între loialitate și supiciune/The DIA between loyalty and supposition (3)/ https://www.aesgs.ro/dia-intre-loialitate-si-suspiciune-3/.