Political and Diplomatic Efforts to Reshape the Soviet Political Landscape (1991)*

The defeat of the coup of 19 – 21 August 1991 would provide an opportunity to strengthen the Russian SFSR, ban the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party in the union republics, and mark the beginning of the proclamation of independence by the constituent republics of the Soviet Union. On 22 August 1991, President Boris N. Yeltsin signed the Decree on Ensuring the Economic Basis of the RSFSR’s Sovereignty, so that, in accordance with its provisions, all enterprises and institutions under (pan-)Union jurisdiction came under the jurisdiction of the Russian SFSR. The Russian Government ceased funding all-Union ministries, with the exception of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Transport. On 28 August 1991, the Russian SFSR took control of the State Bank of the USSR and the Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR. On 24 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet in Kyiv proclaimed Ukraine’s independence, with a referendum to be held on 1 December 1991 in order to confirm Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence through a public vote. In the new political situation within the Soviet Union, the sovereign republics were taking steps to bring the Ministries of Internal Affairs and the local KGBs under their jurisdiction.

The start of the „parade of independence”

Against the backdrop of the „parade of independence”, Pavel Voșceanov, Press Secretary to President Boris N. Yeltsin, declared on 26 August 1991 that the Russian SFSR did not contest the right to self-determination, but that there was, nevertheless, the issue of borders. „The Russian Federation does not question the constitutional right of every state and people to self-determination. However, there is the issue of borders, which could remain unresolved only under conditions of friendly relations secured by an appropriate treaty. In the event of the cessation of such relations, the RSFSR reserves the right to raise the issue of border revision. This applies to all neighbouring republics, with the exception of the three Baltic republics”^[1], Pavel Voșceanov would declare to journalists. Pavel Voșceanov was thinking of the moment in 1954 when Ukraine incorporated the Crimean Peninsula into its administrative borders, or of the annexation of certain territories to Kazakhstan. According to Pavel Voșceanov’s account, President Boris N. Yeltsin “had no political desire to remain in the Union at any cost”^[2], but felt offended by the Ukrainian law on independence. Officials in Kiev and Alma-Ata immediately protested and refused any discussion on the subject, accusing the leaders of the Russian SFSR of displaying a „Russian imperialism”. The Vice-President of the Russian SFSR, Aleksandr V. Rutskoi, the Mayor of Leningrad, Anatoli A. Sobchak, and Gavriil K. Popov, the Mayor of Moscow, welcomed Pavel Voshchanov’s statement. In a televised interview, Gavriil K. Popov would mention not only the Crimean Peninsula, but also certain areas on the left bank of the Dniester and Odessa. Faced with accusations from Ukrainian journalists that President Boris N. Yeltsin and the Russian leadership were clinging to the communist-imperialist legacy, Pavel Voșceanov would declare: “Don’t you want to live with Russia in a union? Is that a communist legacy for you? Then leave, but return Crimea and Donbas to us! Because they became part of Ukraine thanks to the ‘communist legacy’! You received them from Nikita Khrushchev with the approval of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU”^[3].

On 24 August 1991, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev issued a statement regarding the role and place of the CPSU in the new domestic political context of the Soviet Union. “The Secretariat and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU did not take a stand against the coup; the Central Committee failed to adopt a firm position of condemnation and resistance, and did not rally the communists to fight against the violation of constitutional law. Among the conspirators were members of the party leadership; a number of party committees and the mass media supported the actions of the state criminals. This placed millions of communists in an ambiguous situation.  Many party members refused to collaborate with the coup plotters, condemned the plot and joined the fight against it. No one has the moral right to accuse all communists en masse, and I, as General Secretary, consider it my duty to defend them as citizens against unfounded accusations. In this situation, the Central Committee of the CPSU must take the difficult but honest decision to dissolve itself. The fate of the republican communist parties and local party organisations will be decided by them themselves. I do not consider it possible to continue in the role of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and I hereby resign from that position. “I believe that democratically minded communists, who have remained faithful to constitutional legality and the course towards the renewal of society, will speak out in favour of creating a party on a new basis, capable of joining forces with all progressive forces in the work of continuing radical democratic transformations within the interests of the working people,”^[4], Mikhail S. Gorbachev would declare. Soon, Mikhail S. Gorbachev would be forced to accept that, in his absence, “a decisive shift of power had taken place, from the centre to the republics and from him to Yeltsin”^[5].

In the US Government circles, the view of CIA analyst Fritz Ermarth was beginning to gain acceptance; he believed that “the turn taken by events this week will accelerate the de-communisation of the Soviet Union, the ‘deconstruction’ of the party and the KGB, and the establishment of the Russian state”^[6]. At the same time, Fritz Ermarth believed that Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s conception of the Soviet presidency was no longer viable, so that, if he was lucky, “perhaps Yeltsin would let him be head of state in much the same way as Queen Elizabeth”^[7]. And yet… in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post dated 1 September 1991, journalist Ann Devroy reported from Kennebunkport, stating that “senior officials in President Bush’s entourage”^[8] had expressed “deep unease at the prospect of losing a diplomatic partner of the stature of the Soviet Union led by Mikhail Gorbachev and the emergence in its place of dubious, charismatic leaders such as Russian President Boris Yeltsin”^[9]. Appearing on CNN’s ‘Newsmaker Saturday’, Brent Scowcroft, the US President’s National Security Adviser, publicly stated that “it was not yet very clear for what purpose”^[10] the President of the Russian SFSR, Boris N. Yeltsin, intended to use his power. On 26 August 1991, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was to take place, during which President Mikhail S. Gorbachev was to deliver a speech that was laconic compared to his previous addresses. Taking responsibility for the errors in the process of selecting and promoting personnel, as well as for his own indecision and inconsistency, Mikhail S. Gorbachev set out the priority tasks for the near future: “1) resuming the process of signing the union treaty; 2) establishing relations with the republics that did not intend to join the renewed Union; 3) setting up administrative bodies to govern the Union until the adoption of the new Constitution; 4) reforming the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; 5) ensuring strict control over the army and the internal and security agencies; 6) accelerating the transition to market economy; 7) holding presidential and parliamentary elections across the Union immediately after the signing of the Agreement”^[11].

At the close of the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev took the floor and warned that, following the coup attempt of 19 – 21 August 1991, the centrifugal tendencies of the union republics had intensified, creating a real danger of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. The President of the USSR advocated for continuing the process of signing the new Union Treaty, even if subject to minor amendments. At the same time, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev continued to hope that Ukraine would accede to the new Union Treaty and, also, warned that the inviolability of borders was enshrined therein. “Therefore, there can be no territorial issues within the Union. But their emergence cannot be ruled out should the republic leave the Union”^[12], President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would declare. On 28 August 1991, against the backdrop of the Kiev authorities taking control of all military units of the USSR Ministry of Defence and the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, led by Anatoly A. Sobchak, and one from the Russian SFSR, led by Vice-President Aleksandr V. Rutskoi, travelled to Kiev to attend the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, the spokesperson for the President of the Russian SFSR stated that, should the Ukrainian SSR cease its commitments within the Soviet Union, the Russian SFSR reserved the right to raise the issue of border revisions.

Following a telephone conversation between Presidents Leonid M. Kravchuk and Boris N. Yeltsin, the Russian President declared that the Russian SFSR had no territorial claims against the Ukrainian SSR in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty dated 19 November 1990. “In the event of the withdrawal from the USSR of one of the parties to the aforementioned treaty, its territory shall be determined as at 19 November 1990. Consequently, the existence or absence of union relations cannot be an argument for calling into question the current borders between Ukraine and Russia”^[13], stated the declaration of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. President Leonid M. Kravchuk would state very clearly that Ukraine would not be able to participate in the new negotiations on the new Union Treaty until the referendum on 1 December 1991 had taken place. The leader in Kyiv was convinced that a renewed Union could only be a confederation of independent states.

Following the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue in Kyiv, it was agreed that the parties: “1) would, during the transition period, establish provisional state structures on an equal footing in order to ensure the normal functioning of society and the economy, and would initiate the drafting of an economic agreement as soon as possible; 2) would not adopt unilateral decisions on military-strategic matters; 3) would uphold constitutional human rights and freedoms; 4) would declare the inviolability of their territories; 5) would exchange plenipotentiary representatives”^[14]. At the same time, the leaders in Kyiv agreed to suspend the formation of a Ukrainian national army during this so-called “transition” period. The joint communiqué of the two sides referred to the “former Union”^[15], which, in the opinion of President Leonid M. Kravchuk, represented “a real political fact”^[16]. Referring to this first Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, the historian Vladislav Zubok concluded: “The first confrontation between the Slavic republics ended in Ukraine’s favour. The Ukrainian leader could now begin his presidential campaign without alienating the Russian-speaking populations in eastern, southern and central Ukraine. The Russian participants in the talks knew, however, that the discussions had not resolved the fundamental disagreements. Crimea remained the bone of contention. Russia had already ceded the Soviet ports and bases on the Baltic Sea to the Baltic states; Ukrainian secession would have meant that Russia would have lost nineteen of its twenty-two Black Sea ports. The feeling that the Russian-Ukrainian agreement was unfair was to become the main source of conflict for the years to come”^[17].

On 29 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR voted to approve a new composition of the USSR Security Council, at the proposal of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, so that the leaders of the nine union republics participating in the Novo-Ogariovo negotiations on the new Union Treaty became members of this body. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR confirmed the suspension of the activities of the CPSU and ordered the establishment of a special commission of the (pan-)Union legislature to investigate the causes and consequences of the coup of 19 – 21 August 1991.  At the same time, the (pan-)Union legislature also set the agenda for the 5^th Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR. On 30 August 1991, taking into account the “Kiev Communiqué” of 28 August 1991, the President of the Kazakh SSR, Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, signed a similar communiqué together with the Vice-President of the Russian SFSR, Aleksandr V. Rutskoi. During the transition period, the two states were to jointly manage, within provisional state power structures established on a parity basis, the internal political, military-strategic, social and economic developments within the Soviet Union. The KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in each republic were subordinate to local authorities, whilst the Armed Forces of the USSR were to have dual subordination, both to national and (pan-)Union authorities.

Following the convening of the Federation Council on 1 September 1991, attended by representatives of the ten independent states, with the exception of the Republic of Moldova and the Baltic States, the “Declaration of the 10+1” was adopted. The members of the Federation Council would propose a series of measures, for a transitional period, to halt the disintegration of the power structures of the Soviet Union, until a new system of relations between the republics and the state was established. “Essentially, the authors of the Declaration abandoned the idea of a federation, proposing a confederative-style Union, though cooperation on an even more relaxed basis was also permitted. This document said almost nothing about the President of the Union”^[18], concluded Historian Gheorghe E. Cojocaru. The President of the United States, George H. W. Bush, would declare that this “Declaration of the 10+1” represented “a turning point in Soviet political thinking no less important than the move towards democracy and a market economy”^[19] seen in the union republics. Following numerous statements and debates on the “Declaration of the 10+1”, as well as on the present and future of the Soviet Union, the deputies at the 5^th Extraordinary Session of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR^[20] adopted the proposals of the “Declaration of the 10+1” through a Law, 90% of which was drafted by representatives of the Russian SFSR. President Boris N. Yeltsin proposed: 1) the preservation of the common economic space through the establishment of an Economic Union and 2) the establishment of the Union as a free community of sovereign states, based on the existence of various forms of inter-state relations. “Russia will build its relations with sovereign states on the basis of equality, good neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs. The Russian state, which has chosen democracy and freedom, will never again be an empire, nor a big or little brother; it will be an equal among equals”^[21], declared President Boris N. Yeltsin from the rostrum of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR.

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would seek the support of the Congress to establish this Union of Sovereign States, even if modified from what was agreed at Novo-Ogaryovo, such that it would provide “federal ties in some matters, confederal ties in others, and associative ties in a third category”^[22]. The daily newspaper Izvestia of 7 September 1991 noted that at section seven of the Law adopted on 5 September 1991, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, complying with the declarations of sovereignty and acts of independence adopted by the republics, it was emphasised that “the attainment of independence by the republics which have decided to give up membership of the new Union requires them to conduct negotiations with the USSR in order to resolve the entire range of issues related to secession, as well as their immediate accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other important international agreements and conventions, including those guaranteeing human rights and freedoms”^[23].

Following negotiations between President Mikhail S. Gorbachev and national leaders, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR would pass the Law on State Power in the USSR during the transition period, whereby the powers of the Central Government were significantly curtailed. During the transition period, in accordance with the Law of 5 September 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had the right to amend, through joint decisions of the two chambers (the Council of Republics^[24] and the Council of the Union^[25]), the Constitution of the USSR, admit new states into the USSR, hear the President of the USSR on the most important matters of domestic and foreign policy, approve the (pan-)Union budget, declare war and conclude peace. Laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR came into force only after their approval by the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics. Where laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR contradicted the constitutions of the union republics, local authorities could suspend them. The decisions of the State Council of the USSR, chaired by the President of the USSR and comprising the heads of state/republics, were binding.

The law of 5 September 1991 represented “a colossal legal undermining of the single Soviet state”^[26]. “In essence, the resolutions approved at the Congress meant ‘the cessation of the legal existence of the former Union’, although this was not explicitly stated”^[27], concluded the historian Gheorghe E. Cojocaru. At the close of the 5^th Extraordinary Session of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, it was decided by a majority vote to dissolve this parliamentary body, which had emerged from the turmoil of perestroika and glasnost. Former Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov would consider the dissolution of the Congress and the end of the USSR Constitution to be an act of “foolishness”^[28], as the President of the USSR, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, had thereby helped the President of the Russian SFSR, Boris N. Yeltsin, to destroy the “legal framework, without obtaining anything tangible in return”^[29]. On 6 September 1991, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev convened the State Council of the USSR in order to discuss, first and foremost, the issue of the independence of the Baltic States. The Prime Minister of Estonia, Edgar Savisaar, arrived at the meeting ‘by chance’, given that the leaders of the Baltic States had not attended the session. Concerned about the possibility of an agreement between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which would imply a potential Soviet/Russian comeback, Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar delivered a conciliatory message. “We should not dramatize our divorce. We are in the same geographical space. We are not going to fly to the Moon”^[30], Edgar Savisaar would declare. Finally, the leaders of the union republics voted to form a delegation to conduct negotiations with the Baltic States “regarding the entire range of issues related to the rights and interests of these republics within the USSR”^[31]. Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, Anatoli A. Sobchak and Eduard A. Shevardnadze were tasked with leading these negotiations, one for each republic. At the same time, the State Council of the USSR refused to recognise Georgia’s independence, prompting the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in Tbilisi, Akakii Asatiani, to declare that Georgia was severing all official ties with the USSR.

On 2 September 1991, the United States recognised the independence of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia). President George H. W. Bush was under pressure from the American press following his speech at the Rada in Kiev on 1 August 1991. In an opinion piece in The New York Times on 29 August 1991, entitled ‘After the Fall’, William Safire wrote that the US President “had foolishly placed Washington on the side of Muscovite centralism and against the tide of history”^[32]. William Safire openly advocated for the recognition of Ukraine’s independence. On 4 September 1991, President George H. W. Bush and members of his cabinet discussed the situation in the Soviet Union and how it might affect American interests. Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defence, argued for abandoning Mikhail S. Gorbachev in favour of Boris N. Yeltsin, as well as for recognising Ukraine’s independence. It should be noted that there were 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles stored in silos on Ukrainian territory, as well as 42 strategic bombers and 1,800 nuclear warheads stored in special bunkers. The largest missile manufacturing plant, producing the SS-18 missiles, was located in Dnipropetrovsk. Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Soviet Union was to have enormous geopolitical and strategic implications.

 Efforts to re-establish relations with Ukraine

Gennady E. Burbulis, Chief Adviser to President Boris N. Yeltsin and Secretary of State from July 1991, was an advocate of building the Russian state, taking control of Soviet economic assets and launching radical market reforms. On 23 September 1991, Egor T. Gaidar’s team of economists drew-up the first draft of a document called ‘Russia’s Strategy during the Transition Period’. In the view of the authors, President Boris N. Yeltsin was the only politician capable of carrying out the project to create a Russian state. Egor T. Gaidar and Gennady E. Burbulis would propose building “under the guise of an economic community…in which Russia, due to its geopolitical position, industrial power and raw materials, would assume the role of informal leader”^[33], through a system of bilateral military and political alliances, as well as a “trade zone in which the rouble would remain a common currency, with shared energy and transport infrastructure, as well as technical and scientific cooperation”^[34]. With regard to the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Memorandum recommended holding “confidential discussions with the leaders of the armed forces, according to which the only way to preserve the army would have been its gradual transformation into a Russian army”^[35]. Following discussions with President Boris N. Yeltsin, Yegor T. Gaidar and Gennady E. Burbulis received approval to implement the Memorandum. On 28 September 1991, Gennady E. Burbulis flew back to Moscow from Sochi and confided to a circle of friends and associates that the countdown had begun for the USSR Council of Ministers, as proposed by Mikhail S. Gorbachev. At the same time, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Leonid M. Kravchuk, set off on a political and diplomatic tour of the United States and the UN General Assembly session. On 25 September 1991, Leonid M. Kravchuk was received in the Oval Office by the President of the United States. The leader from Kyiv would inform American policymakers that “the Soviet Union had practically disintegrated”^[36] and that there was no national Government. American policymakers were inclined towards the idea of a confederation between Russia and Ukraine, which did not conflict with the interests of the United States. On the contrary, Leonid M. Kravchuk argued that Ukraine held 30% of the Soviet Union’s entire military and industrial potential, and that it was better for Western aid, loans and direct investment to go directly to Ukraine rather than to the USSR as a whole. President George H. W. Bush would later admit that the leader in Kyiv “did not seem to understand the implications and complexity of what he was proposing”^[37].

In his speech at the UN, Leonid M. Kravchuk spoke of a future Ukraine as a neutral and non-nuclear state. On 27 September 1991, Leonid M. Kravchuk gave a lecture at Harvard University, and Philip Zelikow of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government would ask him about the future of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons: will they be eliminated or transferred to Russia? The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR invited him to discuss the matter with Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and to come to Kyiv. In a Memo addressed to members of the US National Security Council, Philip Zelikow wrote: “The nuclear issue has a critical technical dimension, but it is also likely to be linked to broader Ukrainian political concerns”^[38], most likely Crimea and Donbas. Referring to the outcome of the US tour of the Kiev leader, historian Vladislav Zubok noted: “In the autumn of 1991, Kravchuk probably did not realise that ‘Ukrainian nukes’ were not a political asset, but rather a huge responsibility. The nuclear warheads and bombs in Ukraine’s stockpiles had been assembled in two nuclear laboratories on Russian territory; their expiry date was more than ten years away and they required special maintenance. Despite all its technical and scientific potential, Ukraine would need many years and many billions to acquire the skills and capacity to maintain and use such weapons. Most worryingly, their malfunctioning could have caused issues that would have made the Chernobyl disaster seem like a minor issue! The nuclear arsenal on Ukrainian territory was to become the focal point of Ukraine’s relations with the Russian Federation and the United States for years to come”^[39]. In speeches during the presidential campaign, launched by Leonid M. Kravchuk after his return from the American tour, the leader in Kyiv would declare: “Everyone knows that: the Council of Ministers of the USSR no longer exists; the Union within the USSR no longer exists. There is no one left to cooperate with at the state level!”^[40]. The name of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev was not mentioned at all.

On 28 September 1991, Georgy H. Shahnazarov, Adviser to President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, would meet with Gennady E. Burbulis, Boris N. Yeltsin’s Secretary of State, to urge him to support a new Union Treaty. Gennady E. Burbulis would demand that the Russian SFSR be supported in establishing its statehood, after which all the Union republics would gravitate towards it and a reorganisation of the Soviet political landscape would become possible. Gheorghi H. Shahnazarov believed that a new Union would be better for Russian interests, so that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan could remain within Russia’s geopolitical sphere of influence. Otherwise, these Union republics would be “drawn towards other blocs and alliances, and bringing them back by force would be unthinkable”^[41]. The two officials parted ways without finding common ground for continuing the dialogue.

On 1 October 1991, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, Gennady E. Burbulis declared that “Russia is the only republic that could and should be the successor to the Union and all its structures”^[42]. Leonid M. Kravchuk reacted extremely harshly and declared that any change to the status of the Crimean Peninsula would be rejected and that he would demand joint access to Soviet nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory. Anatoli S. Cerniaev would comment on Leonid M. Kravciuk’s statements: “He is claiming nuclear missiles, and Donbass, and Crimea…What an idiot…Does he really think Sevastopol belongs to him too!!!… Even a super-democrat, if he is a Russian democrat, would stand up against this!”^[43]. In the run-up to the meeting of the USSR State Council on 11 October 1991, the text of the new draft Union Treaty would be published in some newspapers. Leaders in Kyiv would reiterate that Ukraine would not participate in discussions on a new Union Treaty until after the referendum on Ukrainian independence on 1 December 1991. On 21 October 1991, the new Supreme Soviet of the USSR would convene, attended only by deputies from Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as well as observers from the Republic of Moldova and Azerbaijan. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would brief the deputies on the resumption of work on drafting the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States. The draft was due to be ready by mid-November 1991, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was to ensure the continuity of power during the transition phase, namely the ‘Constituent Assembly mission’. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev believed that there was a growing “mood in society in favour of a new Union state in which the sovereignty of the republics would be guaranteed, the common economic market preserved, the new pan-union structures effectively operational, and the rights of every nation and citizen, as well as security and the rule of law, ensured”^[44]. However, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR remained indifferent to President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s ideas, the assembly being “at times even hostile to his appeals”^[45].

The State Council of the USSR issued an Appeal to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR calling for Ukraine’s participation in the new political structure. “To put it bluntly, we cannot imagine the Union without Ukraine. We are convinced that the multinational people of Ukraine, too, cannot imagine their future without union relations with all the peoples of our country, to whom they are bound by centuries of history”^[46], the Appeal of the State Council of the USSR stated. At the same time, the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR postponed the election of their chairmen in the hope that the leaders in Kyiv would decide on Ukraine’s return to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. On 22 October 1991, the Kiev legislature decided that Soviet armed forces stationed on Ukrainian territory should come under Ukrainian jurisdiction. At the same time, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR reiterated in a special resolution that Ukraine was a denuclearised state, emphasising that “the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory was temporary, pending their redeployment and destruction”^[47]. At the end of October 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR decided that “it is not appropriate for Ukraine to participate in the establishment and activities of any inter-republican structures which lead or may lead to Ukraine being classified as part of another state”^[48]. A group of observers was to participate in the Council of Republics in Moscow as representatives of the Kiev legislature. At the same time, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was established, which no longer recognised the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Kiev legislature was to adopt the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine, guaranteeing all ethnic groups equal political, social, economic and cultural rights. Minorities were granted the right to use their mother tongue alongside the Ukrainian state language in localities with a compact minority population.

At the meeting of the State Council of the USSR on 4 November 1991, the President of the USSR, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, spurred on by his dialogue with Western leaders met during the Madrid Conference on the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East (30 October – 1 November 1991), declared that the issue of the Soviet Union’s future was a matter of concern to the West. “It has long been understood there that it is in our interest, as well as that of the West, to renew, to reform, but, in any case, to maintain the Union as a fundamental pillar of the modern world. A question arises: what are we, the other politicians, waiting for? It is a political issue: we must move quicker in the process of drafting and signing the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States. (…) if the members of the State Council change their position and renounce what was decided at the last Congress, then we must redefine what we are going to do…”^[49], President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would declare. Referring to the Russian SFSR’s initiative to accelerate economic reforms, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would state that, nevertheless, he was concerned about “the lack of clarity in this programme regarding the economic treaty and the failure to understand the imperative to cooperate closely with the other members of the economic community”^[50]. The President of the USSR confirmed that he had discussed with President Boris N. Yeltsin, who had told him that the Russian SFSR “would act within the framework of the economic treaty and, moreover, would play the role of initiator of this cooperation”^[51]. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev was convinced that it was unacceptable “to destroy the market, create barriers, liberalise prices without control, etc.”^[52]. The President of the USSR was convinced, however, that this was a miscalculation, as it was impossible to liberalise prices “without having resolved the issue of incentivising entrepreneurs, without having decided on the de-monopolisation of production, and without having made adjustments to the budget”^[53]. The supreme leader of the Soviet Union was convinced that a social explosion could follow very soon and, quite possibly, people “will start attacking the cooperatives’ shops, and then turn on the state-owned ones”^[54].

At the same time, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would also express his opinion on the process of reorganising the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the law enforcement agencies within the Soviet Union. “The conclusion of his speech was clear: with all due respect for the intentions of the sovereign republics to have their own armed forces in the future, he proposed finding civilised, rational solutions and, above all, preventing the powerful and modern military potential of the world’s second superpower from becoming the subject of division, nationalisation and disorderly privatisation”^[55], noted Andrei S. Graciov. The President of the Russian SFSR, Boris N. Yeltsin, would declare that the official position of the Russian leadership is that they would not create their own Russian army. “Since we are striving, despite the difficulties, to create a new state, a Union of sovereign states, this state must unquestionably possess a single army, a single set of armed forces”^[56], President Boris N. Yeltsin would declare. At the same time, President Boris N. Yeltsin would state that the Russian SFSR did not wish to establish its own embassies at any cost, as it was rationing its financial resources. “Yeltsin’s reflections on the single army of the future state and on the need to maintain a central structure for foreign affairs confirm that, just one month before the meeting in the Belovezhskaya Forest, the Russian president had no deliberate intention of destroying the structures of the Union and refusing to sign the new Treaty on the Union”^[57], concluded Andrei S. Graciov.

“Confederative state” or “Confederation of democratic states”?

On 14 November 1991, the State Council of the USSR was to meet once again at Novo-Ogaryovo, attended by the leaders of the Russian SFSR, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, as well as the President of the USSR, to discuss the political future of the Soviet Union. President Boris N. Yeltsin insisted that the preamble to the new Union Treaty should read ‘Union of Sovereign States’. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev agreed, but categorically demanded that the new state be a ‘union state’, whilst the leader of the Russian SFSR spoke just as categorically in favour of a ‘union of states’. At the end of the meeting, the republican leaders agreed on the formula ‘confederative democratic state’. At the press conference that followed the meeting, President Boris N. Yeltsin stated that three concepts of the Union had been debated: 1) a federal state; 2) a confederative state; and 3) a state without specifying the nature of the new state, but that the compromise option of a “democratic confederative state” had been chosen. It was decided that the new Union Treaty would be initialled on 25 November 1991. Speaking to the media at the end of the State Council meeting, President Boris N. Yeltsin stated: “We have agreed that there will be a Union: a democratic and federal state”^[58]. Despite the fact that the new state was to become a subject of international law, it did not have its own Constitution, which was replaced by the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States, and the President and Vice-President were to be elected by direct vote of the citizens. Referring to the outcome of the meeting at Novo-Ogariovo, the historian Gheorghe E. Cojocaru concluded that Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s political talent enabled him “not only to preserve the concept of the union state, but also to persuade Yeltsin to announce to the country and the whole world the possible formation of a single confederative state”^[59]. At the same time, at this meeting in Novo-Ogariovo, it was decided that the Armed Forces of the USSR would remain united and would undergo reform, as would the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Subsequently, the USSR Ministers of Defence and Internal Affairs issued a joint statement noting that the “nationalisation” of military equipment, armaments and military assets in the national territories, particularly the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, was inadmissible, and reiterated that the military had the right to use force should the situation deteriorate.

On 21 November 1991, President Boris N. Yeltsin held a discussion with Galina V. Starovoitova, his adviser on nationality issues, regarding the Ukrainian referendum and how the vote would proceed. In the opinion of Adviser Galina V. Starovoitova, at least three-quarters of Ukrainian voters would vote for independence. “That cannot be true! This is our fraternal Slavic republic! And 30 per cent of the inhabitants are Russian. Crimea is Russian! All the people living east of the Dnieper gravitate towards Russia! (…) In that case, we will recognise this new political reality”^[60], President Boris N. Yeltsin declared. A few hours before the meeting of the State Council of the USSR on 25 November 1991, President Boris N. Yeltsin would state the following in an interview with the media: “At today’s State Council meeting, I will have to say: until Ukraine signs the political treaty, Russia will not sign it either. We will regard this as a desire to leave the Union. In that case, it will be free to do whatever it wishes. To introduce its own currency, to have its own army… And for Russia, the situation will change abruptly. That is to say, in response, we too will be forced to introduce our own currency, to see what we do with the army… So that, indeed, we are not caught off guard”^[61].

The State Council of the USSR would be attended by the President of the USSR, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the President of the Russian SFSR, Boris N. Yeltsin, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian SSR, Stanislav S. Shushkevich, the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, the Vice-President of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, Akbarsho Iskandarov, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, and the President of Turkmenistan, Sapamurad Niyazov. The President of Azerbaijan, Aiaz Mutalibov, did not attend the meeting due to the worsening situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The heads of the two Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Anuarbek Alimjanov and Konstantin Lubencenko, the Prime Minister of the Russian SFSR, Ivan S. Silaev, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris D. Pankin, the Chairman of the KGB, Vadim V. Bakatin, and the USSR Minister of Defence, Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov were also scheduled to attend the meeting of the State Council, as well as the ceremony at which the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States was to be signed. President Boris N. Yeltsin would demand in no uncertain terms, right from the start of the State Council meeting, that the text of the Treaty stipulate not the concept of a ‘confederative state’, but that of a ‘confederation of democratic states’. The President of the Russian SFSR would declare that, otherwise, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR would refuse to ratify the document. Stanislav S. Shushkevich, Sapamurad Niyazov and Islam Karimov agreed with Boris N. Yeltsin’s position and proposed that the Treaty should not be ratified, whilst Nursultan A. Nazarbayev would support the position of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. The President of the USSR proposed that the document be sent to the Union legislatures, which were to ask the plenipotentiary delegations to agree on the text and sign it. President Boris N. Yeltsin requested that any discussion be resumed after 1 December 1991, namely after the future of Ukraine had been clarified following the presidential elections and the referendum on independence.

The President of the USSR left the State Council meeting, slamming the door, angry at Boris N. Yeltsin for irresponsibly rejecting the ‘union state’ formula, accusing him of intending to ‘bury the union state’^[62]. At the press conference, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev appeared alone, unaccompanied by the leaders of the union republics. “Everyone was struck by Gorbachev’s solitary appearance before the press, the absence of the republican leaders’ signatures on the draft agreement; but if the draft had not been signed by the heads of the republics, how could the Supreme Soviets have supported such a draft?”^[63], President Boris N. Yeltsin would ask rhetorically. Shortly before the Ukrainian referendum, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev gave an interview to Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor-in-Chief of the American weekly US News and World Report. “Our country is a unique human community. It has been formed over the course of a thousand years and everything here is closely linked by history, culture, shared traditions, human and family ties, communal life, the division of labour, and cooperation in industry and science. If we break up, this process will be so painful that, under current conditions, it will turn into a catastrophe. (…) If Ukraine leaves the Union, Crimea will insist on the annulment of its annexation to Ukraine in 1954 and will demand a return to Russia. But if Ukraine remains in the new Union of sovereign states, then Crimea will have no objections to its membership of Ukraine,”^[64], the acting President of the USSR would declare. Speaking to the Belarusian newspaper Narodnaya Gazeta, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would declare: “The fabric that has been woven over the centuries must not be torn apart… Seventy-five million people live outside the borders of their ethnic homeland. Are they all to become second-class citizens? And let us not be told repeatedly that everything will be guaranteed by bilateral treaties concluded between the republics. I do not believe this can solve the problem unless there remains a state to ensure the legal protection of every individual… By abandoning one extreme, unitarianism, we must not allow ourselves to be swept into chaos and the disintegration of the Union. It will be an irreparable harm for us all”^[65].

 The ambitions of the Russian political elite are accelerating the disintegration of the USSR

In November 1991, Gennady E. Burbulis undertook a discreet visit to Kyiv to encourage Leonid M. Kravchuk in his and Ukraine’s efforts towards independence. The ‘Crimea versus Kremlin’ bargain^[66], as noted by the philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko, was to be concluded, and ‘the fate of Gorbachev and that of a state with more than three hundred million inhabitants were put at stake in his absence’^[67]. At the same time, Gennady E. Burbulis would drive discussions on the issue of denouncing the 1922 Union Treaty, namely the technical procedure for the de jure dissolution of the USSR. The meeting at Zavidovo was attended by the President of the Russian SFSR, Boris N. Yeltsin, as well as Generals Pavel Grachev and Viktor P. Barannikov. Some sources also mention the presence of Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov. President Boris N. Yeltsin proposed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of a new Union of the ‘three Slavic states’. The operation was to be called ‘The Wheel’ (in Russian ‘Koleso’), as the discussion took place in the forest and everyone sat on a huge tyre from a Soviet ‘Kamaz’ lorry. The place where this agreement was to be put in writing was to be Viskuli, the residence of the President of Belarus in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. Leonid M. Kravchuk confirmed that he too would attend the planned meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

In ‘Russian Strategy for Transitional Period’, Gennady E. Burbulis noted that, until the coup of 19 – 21 August 1991, the leaders of the Russian SFSR could count ‘on the support of the leaders of most of the union republics, who were seeking to strengthen their own political positions’^[68], but the dismantling of the old Centre would “inevitably bring the objective contradictions back to the fore”^[69] between the interests of the Russian SFSR and those of other union republics. “For the latter (the union republics – ed.), maintaining the flow of resources and existing economic and financial relations for a transitional period represents a unique opportunity to rebuild their economies at Russia’s expense. For the RSFSR, affected by a deep crisis, this means additional pressure on its economic structures, undermining its prospects for economic revival”^[70], noted Gennady E. Burbulis in “Russian Strategy for Transitional Period”. The authors of this “Memorandum” called on the leaders of the Russian SFSR to refrain from joining “rigid and all-encompassing economic units”^[71], given that it was not in the Russian SFSR’s national interest to participate in “the creation of permanent pan-republican bodies of economic administration”^[72].

Gennady E. Burbulis and his colleagues proposed the formation of a ‘Union of Independent States’ which was to bring together, initially, the three Slavic republics (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus). In such a situation, the President of the USSR had no choice but to tender his resignation, but Russia was not to act from a position of “strength” in its relations with the independent republics, so as not to be accused of imperialist tendencies. The Soviet Union’s oil and gas pipelines were to be an extremely valuable tool for the Russian SFSR to exercise political and economic influence in the future. The new Russian state was to take the USSR’s place in the UN, take over the structures of the USSR’s Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs, and relations with the former union republics were to develop in accordance with the norms of international law. It should be emphasised that President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would learn of the conduct of the ‘Wheel’ Operation and would initiate consultations with the President of the United States and the leaders of the G-7 to ensure that neither the US nor the member states of the EEC would recognise a potential Slavic union.

On 1 December 1991, 31,891,742 registered voters (or 84.18% of the electorate) took part in the referendum on the confirmation of Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence of 24 August 1991, of whom 28,804,071 (or 92.3%) voted ‘Yes’. On the same day, presidential elections were held, and Leonid M. Kravchuk, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and de facto head of state, was elected with 61.6% of the valid votes cast to become Ukraine’s first president. “Perfectly reasonable Russians simply foam at the mouth if it is suggested that Ukraine (from which they all derive their history) might break away and become independent”^[73], confessed the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Rodric Braithwaite. In his view, Russian-Ukrainian relations “are just as volatile as those in Northern Ireland: but the consequences of an explosion would be far more serious”^[74]. Meanwhile, Nursultan A. Nazarbayev was elected President of Kazakhstan with 98% of the valid votes cast following a presidential election held on 1 December 1991. Following the presidential elections in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as the Ukrainian referendum on independence on 1 December 1991, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev declared: “The will of the peoples of the two republics to consolidate their independence and sovereignty, as expressed in the two votes, gives them a new freedom to make an informed choice and to decide on their participation in the new Union of sovereign states. Independence is not an obstacle on the path towards a new Treaty on the Union. On the contrary, it is precisely the full sovereignty of the republics that enables them to take considered and voluntary decisions regarding their participation in the future Union”^[75].

On 2 December 1991, against the backdrop of political developments in Ukraine, namely the holding of the referendum on independence, Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest, gave an interview to Radio România Actualități and mentioned that there was an issue in the Romanian-Ukrainian relations concerning the Romanian territories incorporated into Ukraine as a result of the provisions of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. “It is a matter of acknowledging the existence of this problem in Romanian-Ukrainian relations, a problem that stems from the past and which will have to be resolved, in the spirit of and in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. (…) Undoubtedly, the Republic of Moldova will also have to participate in these negotiations”^[76], Ambassador Traian Chebeleu would declare. On 5 December 1991, during the inauguration ceremony for President Leonid M. Kravchuk, the People’s Deputy of the USSR and writer Dmitri Pavlîciko read out the Appeal to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, which stated: “As far as it is concerned, Ukraine considers the 1992 Treaty on the Formation of the USSR and all subsequent constitutional acts of the USSR to be null and void”^[77]. At the same time, President Leonid M. Kravchuk would express his position very clearly: “Ukraine will enter into political unions with the republican states, but will not join a Union in which there will be a governing body above the states. More than 90% voted for Ukraine’s political independence. And this is the will of the people”^[78]. On the same day, Ukraine renounced the 1922 Union Treaty, thus becoming the first Soviet republic to withdraw from the political process initiated at Novo-Ogariovo. Under the pretext of discussing bilateral Russian-Belarusian issues, President Boris N. Yeltsin informed President Mikhail S. Gorbachev that he would be travelling to Minsk in the coming days^[79]. “I spoke with Yeltsin before his departure for Minsk. I presented my arguments, both old and new. And he merely repeated: but Ukraine, can you guarantee that it will be part of the Union? I sensed there was a secret plan. And when I found out that Burbulis and Shakhrai^[80] were also going to Minsk, everything became clear. Burbulis had written a memorandum that was ‘circulating’ through various offices even though it was marked ‘strictly confidential’. What was the point of this memorandum? Russia, he claimed, had already lost half of what it had gained after the August coup. Gorbachev, cunningly, was casting his nets, rebuilding the old centre, and the republics were supporting him. All this runs counter to Russia’s interests and must be stopped. Knowing this, I tried to convince Yeltsin that Ukraine could be drawn into the process of ratifying the Treaty and that the key step was for the Russian Federation to sign it first. But the Russian President dismissed my arguments, and I already sensed why. The Russian leadership was fed up with any ‘Centre’. Such were the origins of what took place in the Belovezhskaya Forest”^[81], Mikhail S. Gorbachev would note in his book December 1991.

And yet… it must be noted that it was not the referendum in Ukraine that became the final impetus leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also the economic and financial situation of the USSR and the ambitions of the Russian political elite. The USSR Ministry of Finance printed 3.9 billion roubles in 1986 and 5.9 billion roubles in 1987, whilst in 1988 – 1989 the injection of rouble liquidity rose to 11.7 billion roubles and, subsequently, to 18.3 billion roubles. In 1990, the USSR Ministry of Finance printed 28.4 billion roubles, and in 1991 the injection of roubles rose to 93.4 billion roubles. “The ‘savings’ of the Soviet population grew exponentially, but quickly turned into worthless piles of paper. And a state that could not fulfil its primary function – a stable currency – was doomed to collapse”^[82], concluded historian Vladislav Zubok.

The Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement

On 7 December 1991, President Boris N. Yeltsin delivered a speech to the Supreme Soviet of Belarus and told the media that four or five options regarding the political future of the Soviet Union would be discussed, including the option of three Slavic states. “It would be unethical of me to anticipate the results of the negotiations. You will find out about them later”^[83], President Boris N. Yeltsin would declare. The three leaders left for Belovezhskaya Pushcha in the afternoon of 7 December 1991. The USSR Minister of Defence, Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, General Viktor P. Barannikov, were aware of what was happening at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, given that the residence was guarded by a special unit. During the discussions between the three presidents, Leonid M. Kravchuk very clearly stated that Ukraine would not sign the new Union Treaty proposed by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. In this situation, the Prime Ministers of Ukraine, Vitold P. Fokin, and Belarus, Veaceslav F. Kebici, as well as State Councillor Gennady E. Burbulis, were invited to the discussions in the hope of finding solutions. Gennady E. Burbulis would be the one to ask the leaders of the three Slavic states whether they would agree to sign “a document stating that the USSR, as a ‘geopolitical reality’, has disintegrated or ceased to exist.”^[84]. Should the response be positive, the experts of the three leaders were to draft a document to that effect that very night. In an effort to find solutions for the realisation of the idea of a ‘union of fraternal states’ or the ‘union of independent states, but without subordination to a single centre’^[85], Sergei M. Shakhrai proposed that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as the last founding members of the USSR in 1922, following the disappearance of the fourth founding member, Transcaucasia, had retained the right to self-determination provided for in the (pan-)union agreements, as well as in the Constitution of the USSR.

In the end, the three presidents came to favour the formula ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, which signified that ‘the era of the unitary state was a thing of the past’^[86]. Referring to those moments, the Belarusian Prime Minister Veaceslav F. Kebici would later recall: “Whenever we managed to formulate a particularly convincing sentence, I was told: ‘Go and pour yourself a glass of champagne.’ We didn’t drink any spirits at all whilst we were working. Only afterwards, once everything was over… The Russian side was concerned only with the paragraphs that had political aims. They weren’t interested in what we would write regarding economic issues”^[87]. The participants at the meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha decided that the documents signed there should be officially named the ‘Minsk Agreements’. In an interview published on 11 December 1991 in Izvestia, Egon T. Gaidar stated: “Various options for Union were proposed, but all were unacceptable to the Ukrainian leadership. It was decided that it was far more important and useful to devise some new formula for the relationship between the republics than to retain the old name, or the single parliament, or the capital in Moscow, and thereby isolate Ukraine from Russia. Thus, the agreements arose from an attempt to move to a new level of relations, one that would allow us to overcome the mistrust that had arisen and imperial traditions, and to create a new basis for a shared existence in the future”^[88].

On 8 December 1991, in the presence of several journalists, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed by Boris N. Yeltsin and Gennady E. Burbulis on behalf of the Russian SFSR, Stanislav S. Shushkevich and Veaceslav F. Kebich on behalf of Belarus, and Leonid M. Kravchuk and Vitold P. Fokin on behalf of Ukraine. “We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR) and Ukraine, as founding states of the USSR and signatories to the 1922 Union Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties, note that the USSR, as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality, ceases to exist”^[89], as stated in the document of 8 December 1991. It should be emphasised that Galina V. Starovoitova’s proposal to establish a moratorium of three to five years to negotiate the modification of the border between Ukraine and the Russian SFSR, namely the issue of the Crimean Peninsula, was not raised in the discussion between President Boris N. Yeltsin and his counterparty in Kyiv. “Burbulis explained the reason: Kravchuk had arrived in a triumphant mood and would not even have wanted to consider such a proposal. Starovoitova felt that it was a political mistake not to raise this issue at all. If she had been invited to Viskuli, she would have gone. But the meeting was an all-male affair, with the exception of the typists and waitresses”^[90], concluded historian Vladislav Zubok.

At the same time, the head of the KGB in Belarus informed the Belarusian Prime Minister, Veaceslav F. Kebici, that the head of the KGB in Moscow had been informed of the act of high treason taking place in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. “The act of high treason is clear and beyond doubt. You must understand. I could not stand idly by. I have taken an oath”^[91], the head of the KGB in Belarus would declare. The typist, Evgenia Pateichuk, of Ukrainian ethnicity, was shocked the moment she had to type the document agreed upon by the three leaders of the Slavic states. Referring to those moments that were to mark the history of the Soviet Union, the Historian Vladislav Zubok would note: “The three Slavic leaders would insist for years that the Soviet Union was already dead when they met. Nevertheless, they behaved at the meeting as if they were performing a ritual killing. Kravchuk recalled that Yeltsin was very tense and that he relieved his tension with alcohol. Kozîrev recalls that Yeltsin drank heavily at Viskuli because ‘he had no clear vision of the outcome and was unsure whether he was doing the right thing. Thus, he acted chaotically and regained a firm footing only when he realised that a peaceful solution to the puzzle of a collapsing Soviet State and the creation of a new community was within reach”^[92]. The leader of Kazakhstan, Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, would acknowledge that President Boris N. Yeltsin had informed him on 6 December 1991 that he was leaving for Minsk, but without inviting him to the talks at Belovezhskaya Pushcha. On 8 December 1991, President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev was informed that the three leaders of the Slavic states had put into practice an older idea of the Kazakh President, namely a Union of the four states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). Nursultan A. Nazarbayev’s idea had provided for the office of President of the Union, as envisaged in December 1990, but the document signed at Belovezhskaya Pushcha no longer contained this provision. Following the dialogue between the President of Kazakhstan and the leaders in Kiev and Minsk, it became clear that Ukraine would not accept any political solution other than the one agreed upon. Stanislav S. Shushkevich and Leonid M. Kravchuk refused to come to Moscow, leaving it to Boris N. Yeltsin to inform Mikhail S. Gorbachev of what had been agreed at Belovezhskaya Pushcha.

The signing ceremony for the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States took place in deathly silence and concluded at 14:17 (Moscow time). The journalists present at the ceremony did not ask any questions, at the request of the ceremony’s organisers. In his first press conference after 8 December 1991, Stanislav S. Shushkevich would state: “Belarus, Ukraine and Russia are neighbours, and any economic action in one of the republics is immediately felt in the other. By concluding the Convention, we have resolved many of the pressing issues. For example, regarding our own currencies and price liberalisation, we may, in the future, discuss joining the single European currency (? – ed.). Every point of the Convention was discussed extremely carefully and in depth. Each article went through four or five drafts. We aimed for the Convention to cover everything, and above all, to comply with people’s interests, regardless of their ethnic background”^[93].

At the same time, the three leaders of the Slavic states adopted a Declaration of the Heads of State in which they described the political, economic and social context in which they had decided to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was “a solution for navigating this difficult phase in their countries’ history”^[94]. The three founding states of the CIS declared their commitment to contributing to the strengthening of international security, guaranteeing the implementation of international agreements to which the Soviet Union was a party, as well as ensuring unified control over nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation. In his memoirs, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would note: “I ask: who was in a deadlock? Eight republics were ready to sign the Union Treaty; debates had begun in the parliaments. Was Ukraine in a deadlock? Then let us not all lock ourselves into this deadlock, but let us help Ukraine. Finally, we must ask: by dissolving the Union for the sake of ties with Ukraine, did Yeltsin save these relations? On the contrary, within the CIS they found themselves in the most deplorable situation”^[95]. The Prime Ministers of Ukraine, Vitold P. Fokin, and Belarus, Veaceslav F. Kebici, as well as State Councillor Gennady E. Burbulis, would sign a Declaration on the Coordination of the Economic Policy, which mentions the need to preserve and strengthen economic relations between the three states, as well as the commitment of the three states to promote “a coordinated policy of economic reforms, to refrain from any actions that might have caused economic harm to one of the parties, to build their economic ties on the basis of the existing rouble and introduce national currencies, taking into account the economic interests of the parties, to coordinate price liberalisation measures, to act so that to ensure the unity of the economic space, to coordinate external economic policy, customs policy and ensure the free transit of their national territories, to regulate through a special agreement the issue of the debts of former pan-Union enterprises, to allocate the necessary funds for dealing with the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, etc.”^[96].

At the end of the meeting in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the leaders of the three Slavic states would sign a Declaration on the Events in the Republic of Moldova, which mentions the “serious concern” of the three heads of state regarding the development of the conflict between the separatists in Tiraspol and the constitutional authorities in Chișinău. The leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus called for the use of peaceful methods to resolve the issues in dispute, including in the sphere of minority rights, in accordance with the rules of the international law, as well as the resumption of political dialogue and negotiations with a view to resolving the differences. Before phoning Washington, President Boris N. Yeltsin rang Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, the USSR’s Minister of Defence, and informed him of the events that had taken place in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov agreed with the decisions made by the three heads of state and thus sided with the new ‘Centre’ of power. At 22:08 (Belovezhskaya Pushcha time), or 13:08 (Washington time), President Boris N. Yeltsin telephoned the President of the United States, George H. W. Bush. Overcome with emotion, President Boris N. Yeltsin informed him of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement, of the “sixteen articles” of the Agreement, rather than fourteen, and of the fact that the President of Kazakhstan fully agreed with all the actions of the three heads of state and wished to sign the Agreement. President George H. W. Bush was also informed that President Mikhail S. Gorbachev was not yet aware of the decisions taken at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, and that the USSR Minister of Defence agreed with the decision of the three heads of state. President Boris N. Yeltsin assured the White House leader that the new Community was to take joint control of the Soviet strategic forces and the rest of the USSR Armed Forces. The USSR Minister of Defence would be waiting for President Boris N. Yeltsin at the airport upon his arrival from Minsk.

The President of the USSR would meet with the President of the Russian SFSR, Boris N. Yeltsin on 9 December 1991 at Kremlin, in the presence of Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, but Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s questions would remain unanswered. The State Council of the USSR would never meet again, and the fact that the Belovezhskaya Pushcha documents were declared to have no legal force, in the opinion of the Constitutional Committee of the USSR, would in no way alter the new political and geopolitical reality that had emerged. On the evening of 9 December 1991, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would set out his position on the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements on USSR Central Television. “Undoubtedly, every republic has the right to secede from the Union, but the fate of the multinational state cannot be decided by the will of the leaders of the three republics. This issue must be resolved solely through constitutional means, with the participation of all sovereign states and taking into account the will of their peoples”^[97], President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would declare. The acting President of the USSR argued that it was necessary to debate both documents simultaneously – the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States and the Convention on the Formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States – in the national Supreme Soviets, as well as within the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. At the same time, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would call for the convening of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, as the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements proposed a different form of statehood; however, the President of the USSR had forgotten that this body had dissolved itself on 5 September 1991. The daily newspaper Izvestia of 13 December 1991 reported the following: “If one looks closely at the lines of M. Gorbachev’s statement of 9 December, one notices how they are permeated, as if through a fog, by Lukyanov’s text (from the days of the coup – ed.). Down to the smallest detail. Both Lukyanov and Gorbachev propose that the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR be convened as the supreme judge, and that a referendum be held”^[98].

The leaders in Kyiv rejected President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s proposals, and Leonid M. Kravchuk would declare: “No referendum will take place in Ukraine. We are an independent state”^[99]. On 10 December 1991, the Kiev Parliament ratified the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, but made 12 key amendments to the text, aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s independence in relation to the CIS. The Kiev legislature decided only to conduct “consultations in the field of foreign policy”[100] and not “coordination of activities in the sphere of foreign policy”[101] as provided for in the original text. At the same time, the Kiev Parliament decided to revise the text concerning the Armed Forces as follows: “The member states of the Community shall reform the military units of the former USSR located on their territories and, forming their own Armed Forces on this basis, shall cooperate in ensuring international peace and security”[102]. The President of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, would note in his memoirs that he had been informed by the leaders of the three Slavic states of the content of the documents signed at Belovezhskaya Pushcha. “Having taken note of the text of this Agreement, I became convinced that it was largely acceptable to us as well. It in no way undermined independence; on the contrary, it strengthened it. At the same time, it ensured the maintenance of economic and humanitarian relations, which was extremely important. I had no doubt that the positions mentioned were also to our advantage. To gain a deeper understanding, from first-hand sources, of the Agreement’s ultimate aims and the process of acceding to it, I undertook a whirlwind trip on the route Chișinău – Moscow – Minsk – Kyiv. It was my own initiative, supported, if my memory serves me correctly, by Prime Minister V. Muravschi. “Those in the Parliament’s leadership did not exactly welcome it”^[103], Mircea Snegur would note in his memoirs.

Boris Yeltsin’s Russia seeks a special relationship with NATO

Encouraged by the decisions of the Kiev legislature, the Supreme Soviet in Minsk ratified, on the same day of 10 December 1991, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States and, at the same time, withdrew from the 1922 Union Treaty and declared the mandate of the Belarusian delegation to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to have expired. From 12 December 1991, the deputies from Belarus would have only observer status in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev visited the USSR Ministry of Defence late on 10 December 1991 and delivered a 50-minute speech, after which he left the building. “We do not need confrontation; the task is to consolidate our forces, to take everything positive from the draft Treaty on the CIS and the declaration of the three leaders, to discuss them in the Supreme Soviets of the republics and, through parliamentary channels, to reach the right decision”^[104], the acting President of the USSR would declare. The newspaper Izvestia would report: “The President probably did not have enough time to listen to the views of the officers and generals on the situation in the country, the army and the issues of concern to them”^[105]. The statements made by the President of the Soviet Union no longer meant anything to the Soviet military. “He had nothing of substance to say”^[106], Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov would conclude.

On 11 December 1991, President Boris N. Yeltsin held a “meeting” with the military at the headquarters of the USSR Ministry of Defence, asking them to regard it, however, not as a “consultation” or “assembly”. President Boris N. Yeltsin informed the military of the political situation in the USSR, of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement, and of the fact that the Russian SFSR would take control of an army of over three million men, whilst maintaining unity of command and control. Soviet military forces stationed along the non-Russian peripheries of the USSR, including in the Baltic States, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, were to be withdrawn or remain there legitimately, with the consent of the new states. The Black Sea Fleet was not to be handed over to Ukraine. There was no intention to establish a Russian Ministry of Defence unless the Russian SFSR was compelled to do so. At the same time, President Boris N. Yeltsin promised the military that he would increase their pay by 1.9 times, with effect from 1 January 1992.

On 12 December 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR ratified the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Of the 247 deputies, 188 out of a total of 201 present voted in favour, six voted against, and seven abstained. “The disintegration of the all-powerful organs of the Centre led to a loss of direction, deepened the economic crisis, lowered the standard of living of the population, and increased social instability. Two years ago, it became clear that the pan-Union structures were incapable of fundamental renewal. On the contrary, the command system threw its last vital forces into the fight to preserve its absolute power It became the main obstacle to reform,”^[107], President Boris N. Yeltsin declared before the Russian deputies. At the end of the session, the Russian legislature voted to withdraw from the 1922 Union Treaty with 166 of the 173 deputies present voting in favour, three against and nine abstaining. At the same time, deputies in the Russian legislature decided to drop the republic’s acronym, which contained the terms ‘socialist’ and ‘Soviet’, so that the Russian SFSR became the Russian Federation/Russia. On 12 December 1991, at 13:28, the Russian Federation legally seceded from the USSR and, at the same time, it was decided to recall the Russian delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. During the course of 14 December 1991, President Boris N. Yeltsin would meet with Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov to discuss the concept of a military union within the CIS, as well as the candidates for the position of Supreme Commander of the CIS United Armed Forces. At the same time, the USSR Minister of Defence would dismiss Army General Vladimir N. Lobov, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, following the rejection of his proposals for military reform by Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov.

And yet… it should be noted that President Leonid M. Kravchuk would assume the position of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which consisted of the personnel of the the military units of the Kiev, Odessa and Transcarpathian Military Districts, the Black Sea Fleet, as well as other military units stationed on Ukrainian territory, with the exception of those forming part of the USSR’s Strategic Deterrence Forces. For its part, the Minsk Parliament proceeded to draft the legal framework necessary for the operation of the national armed forces, which were to number around 90,000 military personnel. There were 180,000 USSR military personnel stationed on Belarusian territory, representing 5% of the total strength of the USSR Armed Forces. Romania recognised the independence of the Russian Federation on 17 December 1991. On the same day, the Russian Federation recognised the independence of Armenia and Kazakhstan, and on 18 December 1991 that of the Republic of Moldova. The Russian Federation was determined “to establish and develop inter-state relations with Moldova on the basis of a comprehensive bilateral treaty, in strict compliance with the commitments arising from the universally recognised principles and norms of international law”^[108]. At the end of a Declaration signed by President Boris N. Yeltsin, it was noted that “the Moldovan authorities have adopted a favourable position towards the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States and have announced their willingness to study it in depth”^[109]. At the same time, President Boris N. Yeltsin expressed his hope that “Russia and Moldova, as independent states, will be able to maintain and intensify, under the new historical conditions, the old traditions of fraternal cooperation and mutual understanding”^[110].

The wording of the statement of the Russian Federation President fuels the theory of a secret agreement between the presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova regarding accession to the CIS versus recognition of the Republic of Moldova’s independence, given that the meeting between Presidents Boris N. Yeltsin and Mircea Snegur on 12 December 1991 remains shrouded in mystery. “Perhaps this was precisely one of the topics discussed during the 15 December talks with the separatist leader I. Smirnov^[111], who skilfully played the role assigned by Moscow of exerting internal pressure on the authorities in Chișinău, who were desperate due to the delay in Moldova’s international recognition? How else can one explain the firmness with which one of the Transnistrian leaders declared on national television as early as 20 December, on the eve of the summit in Alma-Ata, that Snegur was going to sign the Agreement on the establishment of the CIS, whilst his Press Secretary was unable to give a definitive answer either way, stating only that the president was going to ‘study’ this document ‘in detail on the spot’?”^[112], concluded historian Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, referring to this delicate moment in the early days of the Republic of Moldova’s statehood.

On the day the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR/Parliament of the Russian Federation voted to secede from the USSR and join the CIS, Gennady E. Burbulis travelled to Paris and Brussels to explain to Western political leaders the unfolding events in the former Soviet Union. For President Boris N. Yeltsin and Gennady E. Burbulis, the most important meetings were those with Jacques Delors, President of the EEC Commission, and with NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner. In his conversation with Manfred Wörner, Gennady E. Burbulis stated that the Russian reformers “were seriously considering the possibility of joining NATO”^[113] as part of Russia’s mission to eliminate all conditions for confrontation. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner remained, in Gennady E. Burbulis’s view, “confused, if not shocked”^[114]. In reply, Manfred Wörner would state: “Mr Secretary of State, your statement comes as a great surprise to me. I believe it is a very complicated task. You are a very large country. I cannot imagine in what form such a proposal could become a reality”^[115]. President Boris N. Yeltsin and Gennady E. Burbulis accepted Manfred Wörner’s refusal with great difficulty, but would continue to hope that the United States would accept and understand the wishes of the Russian democrats^[116]. Secretary of State James Baker’s speechwriter, Andrew Carpendale, in a memorandum addressed to the head of US diplomacy, noted that the United States “faces the same situation today: we have won the Cold War peacefully”^[117], but “now we must decide, as Yavlinsky says, what to do with the people we have defeated”^[118]. Secretary of State James Baker was convinced that neither Nicholas Brady, the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the US Congress would accept a new Marshall Plan. On the morning of 16 December 1991, Secretary of State James Baker was received by the President of the Russian Federation, Boris N. Yeltsin, in the Saint Catherine Hall of the Kremlin. The President of the Russian Federation was flanked by the USSR Minister of Defence, Marshal Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, and his deputy, General Pavel S. Grachev, as well as the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, General Viktor P. Barannikov, as a sign that the Soviet state’s security forces stood with the Russian leadership. Following an explanation of the events of 8 December 1991 at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, President Boris N. Yeltsin asked the US Secretary of State for the Russian Federation and the other two Slavic republics to be admitted to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)^[119].

The President of the Russian Federation wished for the United States to remove the Russian Federation from the ‘list of communist states’ and, at the same time, would ask the Washington Administration to recognise, through a special treaty, the existence and independence of the Russian state. At the same time, the political and military leadership of the Russian state informed US representatives about the situation regarding nuclear weapons located in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well as the security measures taken regarding the operation of the nuclear military system, including the fact that Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s nuclear hotline would be disconnected before the end of December. Unfortunately, Egon T. Gaidar’s request sent on 6 December 1991 to US officials, namely for aid of four to five billion dollars, would be rejected. On 10 December 1991, David Mulford of the US Treasury wrote in the Memorandum submitted to the White House: “If Yeltsin liberalises prices without well-established monetary and fiscal discipline, he will certainly face the hyperinflation he fears, with or without Western aid”^[120]. The American official was convinced that in a world of financial globalisation, speculators would crush the Russian rouble.

During his visit to Minsk, as part of the US Secretary of State’s tour of the USSR from 15 to 17 December 1991, Secretary of State James Baker was informed by President Stanislav S. Shushkevich that Belarus wished to give up its 72 strategic missiles and become a neutral, denuclearised state. For his part, President Leonid M. Kravchuk would declare that Ukraine wished to become a denuclearised state, but by the year 2000, whilst the President of Kazakhstan would request that nuclear weapons continue to be stationed on Kazakh territory and, at the same time, would seek ‘a special agreement regarding control over nuclear weapons by the coordination centre’^[121]. Despite all efforts at cooperation and a willingness to make serious commitments in the field of international security, the new leaders of the Russian Federation found themselves alone in a confrontation with the unknown, under the watchful eye of the West. “We had a clear interest in shaping the outlook and behaviour… of the successor states. Recognition was the biggest ‘carrot’ we had at our disposal, and we wanted to maximise our influence by delaying it as long as possible’^[122], admitted Secretary of State James Baker.

The Birth of the Commonwealth of Independent States

Against the backdrop of the Russian Federation’s leaders’ efforts to peacefully dismantle the Soviet Union, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, would take a public stance on 11 December 1991 regarding the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement. “I wish to unequivocally state: today, the prospects for signing the new Union Treaty and forming the economic community are more problematic than ever. This has come about through no fault of our own. To my deep regret, within the leadership echelons of a number of republics, some have begun to equate sovereignty with autarchy. The statement by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus regarding the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was surprising. The decisions adopted by the leaders of the three republics are too serious for us to rush to a categorical assessment. However, Kazakhstan must be prepared for any turn of events. “We are capable of living independently… At the same time, we remain supporters of integrationist processes, determined by the objective course of history…”^[123], Nursultan A. Nazarbayev would declare. On 12 December 1991, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan met in Ashgabat, at the initiative of the Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov, to coordinate their positions regarding the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Agreement. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the five Asian republics would apply for admission to the CIS as founding members alongside the three Slavic states, as well as maintaining a single control over nuclear weapons and a unified command of strategic and naval forces. The joint declaration by the five leaders stated that the new organisational framework, namely the CIS, “must guarantee the equality of all nations and peoples, and the defence of their rights and interests”^[124] and, at the same time, the CIS “cannot be based on ethnic or religious principles or any other criteria that would violate human rights and the rights of peoples”^[125]. The Commonwealth of Independent States was to recognise and respect territorial integrity and the integrity of existing borders. At the proposal of Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, the five leaders of the Asian republics agreed to hold a meeting with the three Slavic states in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991 to sign a new Convention on the CIS. The President of the Russian Federation immediately accepted the meeting. At the same time, the Alma-Ata Parliament would declare, in response to Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s statements regarding the transfer of Russian lands to Kazakhstan, that the republic’s territory “is indivisible, a fact enshrined in its Constitution and in the Declaration on State Sovereignty”^[126].

At the same time, an attempt by a group of People’s Deputies of the USSR, comprising representatives of several sovereign republics, to initiate the convening of the 6^th Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, with the aim of restoring constitutional order in the USSR, was thwarted by the leaders of the Russian SFSR. On 10 December 1991, Gennady E. Burbulis, Sergei M. Shakrai, Sergei A. Filatov, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, and Nikolai Reabov, Chairman of the Republic Council of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, met with representatives of the RSFSR in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In the dialogue between them and the People’s Deputies, Gennady E. Burbulis would warn the deputies against the undesirability of attempts to convene an Extraordinary Congress which ‘will generate confrontation in society, as will the holding of a referendum’^[127]. The Russian deputies were invited to participate in the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, even though the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had effectively been dissolved. On the evening of 17 December 1991, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR would adopt a new resolution ‘On Certain Issues Relating to the Recall of Groups of Deputies from the RSFSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR’, which joined the resolution ‘On the Authority of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR’, thus seeking to render the (pan-)Union legislature unable to function.

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev still hoped that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in whose proceedings delegations from the Asian republics were still participating, would be able to influence and manage political developments within the Soviet Union. “In the event of a further deterioration of the situation in the country, the People’s Deputies of the USSR reserve the right to convene the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in the future”^[128], stated a Declaration by the People’s Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR who, like President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, still held out hope. On 18 December 1991, the People’s Deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, representing Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics, were warned by officials in Alma-Ata not to enter into open confrontation with the Russian deputies prior to the meeting in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991.

On 18 December 1991, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev sent an open letter to the participants of the Alma-Ata meeting. “Since the beginning of perestroika, we have moved step by step towards all the republics achieving genuine independence. But I have always insisted that the disintegration of the country must not be allowed. This was and remains my understanding of the will of the peoples as expressed in the referendum, as well as of their tendency towards independence, whilst preserving the integrity of the historic union. This idea and this concern formed the basis of the formula regarding the ‘Union of Sovereign States’, which initially met with your support”^[129], wrote President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Later in the letter, the acting President of the USSR called for the multinational character of the future Commonwealth of Independent States to be very clearly defined, “ensuring absolute equality not only among member states, but also among all nations, religions and traditions”^[130]. President Mikhail S. Gorbachev proposed a new name for the future Commonwealth of Independent States, namely the Commonwealth of European and Asian States (CEAS), as well as ensuring the transparency of borders and maintaining, for a fairly long period, Community citizenship alongside national citizenship. The President of the USSR would ask the leaders of the future CIS member states to comply with the Agreement on the Economic Community, and to bring the process of establishing the ‘Eurasian market’ to a successful conclusion.

At the same time, the leader of the Soviet Union called for the preservation of the unity of the military-strategic security and defence system, with a single command, as well as the political representation of the future EEC on the world stage, following the model of the European Economic Community (EEC), with the status of a subject of international law. In the view of President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the CSEA was to be the successor to the Soviet Union and, therefore, should be granted a seat on the UN Security Council. The President of the USSR finally called for a final session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to adopt a resolution on the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transfer of its rights and obligations to the future Community of European and Asian States.

On 19 December 1991, 11 deputies representing the Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Gagauz ethnic groups within the territory of the Republic of Moldova published an Open Letter addressed to the heads of state who were due to attend the meeting in Alma-Ata. The authors of the Open Letter considered that “the supreme bodies of state power and administration of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, other constituent entities of the former Soviet Union and the nascent Commonwealth of Independent States can make a considerable contribution to reconciliation and mediation in stabilising and normalising the situation in the Republic of Moldova, and in creating the conditions for the self-regulation of the political, national, inter-ethnic and other processes taking place there”^[131]. At the same time, the following was called for: 1) the rapid recognition, following the example of the Russian Federation, of the state independence of the Republic of Moldova, which would have spurred the process of widespread recognition by the international community and its emergence as a subject of international law; 2) non-interference by other states in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, which implied the exclusion of the use of armed forces, including reserve officers, in the resolution of internal political issues; 3) the withdrawal of volunteer units from the territory of the Republic of Moldova; 4) the refusal to admit new volunteer groups onto the territory of the Republic of Moldova for the defence of the Russian-speaking population; 5) the adoption of measures to effectively implement the Republic of Moldova’s status as a demilitarised zone; 6) initiating consultations to resolve the Gagauz issue; 7) providing genuine assistance in establishing a viable diaspora in the Republic of Moldova: Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, etc., based on respect for human rights and the rights of national minorities, as recognised by the entire international community. The 11 members of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova also supported the idea of holding “a referendum on the issue of independence, as an important means of stabilising the political situation”^[132].

On 20 December 1991, before the Moldovan delegation set off for Alma-Ata, President Mircea Snegur told journalists, on the steps of the airplane, that “Moldova will participate as a plenipotentiary member in the Alma-Ata meeting, since the Minsk Agreement is based on a concept that radically differs from that of Novo-Ogariovo”^[133], so that the Centre would disappear along with its ossified structures. Referring to the intention to sign the Alma-Ata Agreement, President Mircea Snegur would state: “To do so, I must first familiarise myself with this document and then I will take the relevant decision. Furthermore, I always take the will of the people into account”^[134]. Vasile Nedelciuc, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, stated on 20 December 1991 that he was opposed to signing the Agreement on the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the CIS because “the Moldovan state is still fragile, it is only just beginning its journey, partly because the West was in no hurry to recognise our independence, pursuing a specific policy towards the disintegrating Empire”^[135]. MP Vasile Nedelciuc called for this document not to be signed by the leaders of the Republic of Moldova and, at the same time, for guarantees regarding the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict to be obtained from the signatory states of the Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS. “We should, first and foremost, secure recognition of our independence by the entire international community, obtain UN membership, and only then take decisions on how to break the deadlock which we find ourselves in”^[136], Vasile Nedelciuc would declare. On 21 December 1991, the leaders of 11 new sovereign and independent states (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan) would meet in Alma-Ata to sign the Protocol to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, concluded on 8 December 1991 by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Agreement on the Coordinating Bodies of the CIS, the Protocol of the Meeting of the Heads of Independent States, the Decision of the Heads of CIS Member States, and the Agreement on Joint Measures in the Field of Nuclear Weapons.

At the start of the meeting, the leaders of the Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan) proposed the adoption of a legal act on the dissolution of the USSR at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or the Soviet of Republics. “The Slavic Troika” opposed this and reminded the participants that only the three Slavic states had the status of founding states. “In these circumstances, the ‘Ashgabat Group’ did not rule out the possibility of forming a Central Asian confederation, having even drafted a proposal to that effect. The confrontation was avoided at the cost of accepting all the sovereign republics as founding states of the CIS”^[137], concluded historian Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, referring to the events that took place in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991. At the same time, based on the provisions regarding “maintaining the common military-strategic space under a single command” and “control over nuclear weapons”, contained in the text of the Alma-Ata Declaration and the Minsk Convention, Marshal Evgheni I. Shaposhnikov took command of the CIS Armed Forces until the issue of military reform was resolved. Proposals on military reform were to be submitted by 30 December 1991.

In November 1991, there were 71 Soviet divisions, 2,380 aircrafts, 1,035 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 70 heavy bombers on the territory of the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, there were 20 Soviet divisions, 850 aircrafts, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 30 heavy bombers. In Belarus there were 10 Soviet divisions, 470 aircrafts and 72 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kazakhstan had 4 Soviet divisions, 340 aircrafts and 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The other Soviet republics had forces ranging from one to four divisions, as well as between 100 and 300 aircrafts, but no intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Sergei M. Rogov, Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies in Moscow, the Armed Forces of the USSR numbered around four million personnel (excluding the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB’s border and railway units). The arsenal of the Soviet Armed Forces also included 10,500 aircrafts, of which 162 were heavy strategic bombers, 56,000 tanks, 65,000 armoured fighting vehicles, 90,000 guns, 700 warships, 59 strategic submarines and 1,300 intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads and 20,000 tactical nuclear warheads. The USSR’s defence budget stood at 108 billion roubles in 1991. Managing the present and future of the USSR Armed Forces was a complex and extremely delicate matter.

By a decision of the Council of Heads of State, the Russian Federation obtained the right to take the USSR’s place in the UN, including membership of the UN Security Council and other international bodies. In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on Joint Measures in the Field of Nuclear Weapons, “nuclear weapons, included within the unified strategic armed forces, ensure the collective security of all participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Article 1)”[138]. At the same time, the CIS member states were reaffirming their commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and were “jointly developing nuclear policy (Article 3)”[139]. Belarus and Ukraine were to accede to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as denuclearised states. Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan undertook to dismantle and relocate nuclear weapons from their national territories to the territory of the Russian Federation. The Agreement on Joint Measures in the Field of Nuclear Weapons was to be submitted for ratification to the Parliaments of the four nuclear-weapon states.

Referring to the Alma-Ata meeting of 21 December 1991, President Mircea Snegur noted the following: ‘In Alma-Ata, we were once again overcome with emotion right from the start of the meeting. B. Yeltsin, citing the (as yet bloodless) conflict in Transnistria, proposed that Moldova should not be admitted to the Community. Later, at the suggestion of L. Kravchuk, the issue disappeared. It is quite possible that this was a well-staged performance, intended to remind us in the future who the ‘idols’ or saviours are not, as former Foreign Minister Mr N. Țîu suggested in his book ‘«Diplomație în culise» (2002, pp. 111 – 112)”^[140]. The President of the Republic of Moldova would consider the Russian Federation President’s outburst offensive, but had decided not to respond^[141]. “I thought to myself then: ‘Whatever will be, will be. As wise people say, everything that happens is for the best. And if they do not admit us (a decision I very much doubted), then it means that our destiny lies elsewhere. Together with the people, we will find another solution”^[142], President Mircea Snegur confessed in his memoirs.

On his return to Chișinău, the President of the Republic of Moldova would find a rally in the Great National Assembly Square challenging the President’s authority and his right to sign the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the CIS. On 24 December 1991, President Mircea Snegur would deliver a speech in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in which he explained the Republic of Moldova’s path towards the CIS. He would mention that the examination of the documents regarding the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the CIS had been carried out with the full participation and consultation of Nicolae Țîu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Ion Costaș, Minister of Internal Affairs, V. Chițan, Minister of Finance, A. Cheptene, Minister of National Economy, as well as Alexandru Moșanu, Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, and Valeriu Muravschi, Acting Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova. “Mr V. Nedelciuc also expressed his wish and pleasure to travel with us to the capital of Kazakhstan, the matter having been coordinated with Mr A. Moșanu. So, initially, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs agreed to this trip. Later, he informed me by telephone that, following further consultations with the leadership of Parliament, he refuses to attend the meeting. This is regrettable and, I believe, significant”^[143], President Mircea Snegur would declare before the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

Continuing his address, President Mircea Snegur would ask the Parliament to examine the Referendum Law as a matter of urgency so that the proclamation of independence can be confirmed by a popular vote, thereby putting an end to the increasingly insistent calls for union with Romania. “In this way, we will have the opportunity to proceed with a referendum on this issue (of independence – ed.) to satisfy the members of the Union Council, who are burning with impatience. If the people say ‘Yes!’, I will always stand with them, although, I say this in all sincerity, I do not necessarily aspire to go down in history”^[144], President Mircea Snegur would declare. Referring to the attitude of some members of the political opposition towards the statehood and independence of the Republic of Moldova, President Mircea Snegur would declare that “those who oppose the approved legislative line have no moral right, and even less a legal right, to hold leadership positions in the state whose very existence they themselves call into question”^[145]. At the end of his address, the President of the Republic of Moldova would state that he would not deviate “in the slightest from the path to independence, however great the pressure from one side or the other may be!”^[146]. The Republic of Moldova would ratify the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States^[147] only on 8 April 1994, together with the Agreement on the Establishment of the Economic Union of 26 December 1993, by Resolution No. 40 of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. The Statute of the Commonwealth of Independent States^[148] was ratified only on 26 April 1994 by Decision No. 76 of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, specifying that “…the Republic of Moldova, as a member of the Commonwealth, shall refrain from participating in cooperation on matters of collective security and political-military issues…”^[149].

Romania would follow very closely the developments in the Republic of Moldova’s foreign policy regarding its relations with the former Soviet space, and implicitly with the CIS. Ambassador Marcel Dinu, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1993 and 1996 and, subsequently, Romania’s Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova between 1997 and 1999, would state the following: “Among my duties as State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the initiation, or at least the endorsement, of all actions concerning the relations with the Republic of Moldova undertaken by other ministries or state institutions and subject to Government approval. (…) On one of these visits (to Chișinău – ed.), I travelled there as a special envoy of President Ion Iliescu. I had to persuade the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur not to rush into things, to give further thought to the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), under the leadership of the Russian Federation – a tentative attempt to reconstitute the former USSR on different, less ideological grounds. The conversation with Snegur was both delicate and difficult. I suggested he follow the example of the Baltic States, which had been part of the former USSR and were refusing to join the CIS. I emphasized that the Republic of Moldova’s recently but hard-won independence and sovereignty would be severely undermined by membership of the CIS. I also told him that the very future of the new structure was questionable. In the end, he agreed that the Republic of Moldova should participate only in the economic activities of the CIS, not in those of a political or security nature”^[150].

On 24 December 1991, the Parliament of Kazakhstan ratified the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States and approved the presidential decrees recognising the independence of all the former Soviet republics. The legislatures of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan also approved the Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS on the same day, i.e. 24 December 1991. On 25 December 1991, the Parliament of the Russian Federation ratified the Agreement on Joint Measures in the Field of Nuclear Weapons. President Boris N. Yeltsin declared: “The USSR is no more, and we must get used to this. Let us get used to it and move forward”[151]. On 25 December 1991, at 7:00 pm, Mikhail S. Gorbachev tendered his resignation as President of the USSR, stating on that occasion, before the cameras of Central Television, that he had given up the fight considering that the course had been set for the country’s dismantling and the state’s disintegration. “I leave my position with unease. But also with hope, with confidence in you, in your wisdom and strength of spirit. We are the heirs of a great civilisation and, at present, it depends on each and every one of us for it to be reborn into a new, modern and dignified life”^[152], Mikhail Gorbachev was to declare before his compatriots. The following day, newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote: “He did everything he could. And what was done could only have been done by him”^[153].

Looking back on his journey through the Soviet political arena, from 11 March 1985 up to that very moment, Mikhail S. Gorbachev reminded his fellow citizens that, when he came to power, Soviet society “was suffocating under the constraints of the administrative command system, condemned to serve ideology and bear the terrible burden of boundless militarisation”^[154], thus recording a series of failures in attempts at partial reforms. Convinced of the historical justice of the democratic reforms begun in the spring of 1985, the former General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU believed that “what has been done must be appreciated at its true value”[155]. On 26 December 1991, newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda wrote that “perestroika brought us freedom of speech and thought”^[156], and, at the same time, perestroika “gave us and dashed many hopes”^[157]. The daily Izvestia noted, however, that “one can speak not of the fact that Gorbachev is leaving, but that he is being forced to leave”^[158], as well as the fact that “despite this unpleasant turn of events for Gorbachev, he did not resort to open confrontation”^[159].

At 19:38, the USSR national flag was lowered from the Kremlin and the national flag of the Russian Federation was raised in its place. In an interview given to Italian journalists from the publications La Stampa and La Repubblica on 26 December 1991, the former President of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, spoke about the past, present and future of the world that had collapsed and, at the same time, of himself as a politician and statesman: “We have our own reality, inspired by tradition, by a history, by a unified country that has naturally formed. Yes, I am spiritually connected to Europe, like many of my compatriots, but I am no less connected to the East. The main thing is that I am a very realistic person. I keep my feet on the ground. I do not believe those who claim that life in Russia can be like in Sweden or Italy. Nor those who believe that Russia has a special mission to fulfil. These diverse tendencies have always clashed in Russia. It must recognise its role as a bridge between the two cultures, that of Asia and that of Europe, and, at the same time, as part of a shared civilisation. I, too, consider myself part of humanity’s shared quest for freedom and justice. Every individual has the right to this quest, and perhaps our experience will give a new impetus towards the globalisation of the world”^[160].

On 30 December 1991, the leaders of the CIS member states would meet in Minsk to discuss the basis on which the new Community would operate and, at the same time, to reach a final agreement on the legal successor to the USSR. The delegation of the Republic of Moldova would sign only the Provisional Agreement on the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the CIS. President Mircea Snegur would not sign the Agreement on Joint Activities in the Field of Space Research and Utilisation and he would took a firm stance regarding the Agreement on Strategic Forces, namely that funding for those troops would cease for the states from which they were withdrawn.

Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Azerbaijan firmly asserted their legitimate right to establish national armed forces. At the end of the meeting, President Boris N. Yeltsin declared that the CIS had recognised the right of each state to resolve military issues in accordance with its own laws, either through an independent command or by delegating the leadership of the national armed forces to a Supreme Command of the CIS Unified Forces. Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova^[161] and Azerbaijan would opt for the first option, whilst the other CIS member states would agree to place their troops under a single command. In Zbigniew Brzezinski’s view, the Russian Federation’s loss of Ukraine as a geopolitical pivot and catalyst would drastically limit “Russia’s geostrategic options”^[162], and, at the same time, forced it “to rethink the nature of its own ethnic identity”^[163].

__________________________________

*Study published in Deutsche internationale Zeitschrift für zeitgenössische Wissenschaft, no. 126/2026, p. 54 – 72.

[1] Vladislav Zubok, Collapse, Bucharest, Litera Publishing House, 2024, p. 407.

[2] Ibidem, p. 408.

[3] Ibidem, p. 409.

[4] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Tratatul de Uniune Sovietică, Chișinău, Civitas Publishing House, 2005, p. 606.

[5] Ibidem, p. 607.

[6] Michael R. Beschloss, Strobe Talbott, La cele mai înalte nivele (At the Highest Levels), Bucharest, Elit Publishing House, 1994, p. 628.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Ibidem., p. 636.

[9] Ibidem.

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 610.

[12] Ibidem, p. 611.

[13] Ibidem, p. 612.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Ibidem.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 410.

[18] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 616.

[19] Ibidem.

[20] The 5^th Extraordinary Session of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR opened on 2 September 1991 at 10.00 am in the Kremlin Palace, in the presence of 1,900 delegates.

[21] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 618.

[22] Ibidem, p. 619.

[23] Ibidem, p. 620.

[24] Each union republic delegated 20 representatives to the Soviet of the Republic, with the exception of the Russian SFSR, which was entitled to 52 representatives.

[25] In the Union Soviet, each union republic was entitled to one vote. Its membership comprised People’s Deputies from the USSR, in accordance with specific quotas and in coordination with the supreme authorities of the republics.

[26] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 621.

[27] Ibidem.

[28] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 419.

[29] Ibidem.

[30] Ibidem, p. 420.

[31] Ibidem, p. 420.

[32] Ibidem, p. 427.

[33] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 447.

[34] Ibidem.

[35] Ibidem.

[36] Ibidem, p. 450.

[37] Ibidem, p. 451.

[38] Ibidem, p. 453.

[39] Ibidem, p. 454.

[40] Ibidem.

[41] Ibidem, p. 455.

[42] Ibidem, p. 456.

[43] Ibidem, p. 457.

[44] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 641.

[45] Ibidem, p. 642.

[46] Ibidem

[47] Ibidem

[48] Ibidem

[49] Andrei S. Graciov, Naufragiul lui Gorbaciov. Adevărata istorie a destrămării URSS, Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 1995, pp. 112 – 113.

[50] Ibidem, p. 112.

[51] Ibidem.

[52] Ibidem.

[53] Ibidem.

[54] Ibidem.

[55] Ibidem, p. 114.

[56] Ibidem, p. 115.

[57] Ibidem, p. 119.

[58] Ibidem, p. 139.

[59] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 646.

[60] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 480.

[61] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., pp. 647 – 648.

[62] Ibidem, p. 649.

[63] Ibidem.

[64] Andrei S. Graciov, op. cit., p. 163.

[65] Ibidem, pp. 163 – 164.

[66] Ibidem, p. 164.

[67] Ibidem.

[68] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 662.

[69] Ibidem.

[70] Ibidem.

[71] Ibidem.

[72] Ibidem.

[73] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 480.

[74] Ibidem, pp. 480 – 481.

[75] Andrei S. Graciov, op. cit., pp. 166 – 167.

[76] Adrian Năstase, România după Malta, vol. VII (1 October – 31 December 1991), Bucharest, Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2009, pp. 380 – 381.

[77] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 666.

[78] Ibidem.

[79] The RSFSR delegation consisted of Boris N. Yeltsin, Gennady E. Burbulis, Egon T. Gaidar, Sergei M. Shakhrai, Andrei V. Kozirev and V. V. Ilyushin.

[80] Sergei M. Shakrai, State Counsellor to the President of the Russian SFSR, was one of the most influential members of the ‘Young Turks’ (‘Mladoturki’) group surrounding President Boris N. Yeltsin.

[81] Andrei S. Graciov, op. cit., p. 168.

[82] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 493.

[83] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 668.

[84] Ibidem, p. 669.

[85] Ibidem, p. 670.

[86] Ibidem, p. 671.

[87] Ibidem.

[88] Ibidem, p. 672.

[89] Ibidem, p. 675.

[90] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 498.

[91] Ibidem, p. 499.

[92] Ibidem.

[93] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 678.

[94] Ibidem.

[95] Ibid., p. 679.

[96] Ibidem.

[97] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 683.

[98] Ibidem.

[99] Ibidem, p. 684.

[100] Ibidem, p. 687.

[101] Ibidem.

[102] Ibidem.

[103] Mircea Snegur, Labyrinth of Destiny. Memorirs, volume II, Chișinău, 2008, p. 302.

[104] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 697.

[105] Ibidem.

[106] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 505.

[107] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 688.

[108] Idem, Politica externă a Republicii Moldova. Studii, Chișinău, Civitas Publishing House, 2001, p. 36.

[109] Ibidem.

[110] Ibidem, p. 37.

[111] On 15 December 1991, President Mircea Snegur met with Igor Smirnov, the leader of the separatists in Tiraspol. The Press Service of the Presidency of the Republic of Moldova announced on 19 December 1991 that the items on the meeting’s agenda concerned the ceasefire and the establishment of the Conciliation Commission to resolve the crisis caused by the events in Dubăsari. The press service stated that the rumours circulating regarding this meeting were “premeditated provocations by certain individuals or forces interested in further destabilising the socio-political situation” (Ibidem, p. 36).

[112] Ibidem, p. 37.

[113] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 508.

[114] Ibidem.

[115] Ibidem.

[116] Following the meeting of the heads of state and Government of NATO member states, held in Rome on 7 – 8 November 1991, the former Western adversaries of the Cold War proposed the institutionalisation of mutual consultation and cooperation, namely: 1) annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level within what would be called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; 2) regular meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ambassadorial level; 3) additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at ministerial or ambassadorial level, as appropriate; 3) regular meetings, at mutually agreed intervals, with NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees, as well as the NATO Military Committee and other NATO military authorities, with the permission of the Military Committee. The New NATO Strategic Concept, adopted on this occasion, stated: “In contrast to the predominant threat of the past, the remaining risks to the allied security are multidirectional, making them difficult to predict and assess. NATO must be able to respond to such risks, if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. Such risks may manifest themselves in various ways. Risks to allied security are less likely to result from aggression directed against Alliance territory, and are rather the result of the adverse consequences of the instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe” (Quoted in Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Bătălia pentru NATO. Raport personal, 2^nd ed., Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2014, p. 34).

[117] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 509.

[118] Ibidem.

[119] The North Atlantic Cooperation Council would oversee the future development of the partnership between NATO and Central and Eastern Europe following the 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. The inaugural meeting would take place on 20 December 1991 following the dissolution of the USSR. Its role was to facilitate cooperation on security issues between the participating states and to oversee the process of developing close institutional and non-protocolary ties between them. Implementation was carried out on the basis of work plans, initially set annually, but from 1995, these covered two-year periods. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council would take the process forward. In 1997, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council would be replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the number of partner states would expand to 22.

[120] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 514.

[121] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Tratatul de Uniune…, p. 700.

[122] Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., p. 516.

[123] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 692.

[124] Ibidem, p. 693.

[125] Ibidem, p. 694.

[126] Ibidem.

[127] Ibidem, p. 690.

[128] Ibidem, p. 703.

[129] Ibidem, p. 704.

[130] Ibidem.

[131] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Politica externă…, p. 37.

[132] Ibidem, p. 38.

[133] Ibidem.

[134] Ibidem.

[135] Ibidem, p. 39.

[136] Ibidem.

[137] Idem, Tratat de Uniune…, p. 709.

[138] Ibidem, p. 711 – 712.

[139] Ibidem, p. 712.

[140] Mircea Snegur, op. cit., pp. 302 – 303.

[141] “Of course, even years later, it is difficult to understand why our President did not speak out either. For, whether we like it or not, Moldova was becoming a member of the CIS without the representatives of all the delegations knowing the position of our republic’s top leadership on this matter. As for me, I was and remain of the opinion that Moldova’s admission, or the postponement of its admission, to the Community was a well-orchestrated game by Yeltsin and Kravchuk. I believe that they had discussed the issue itself beforehand, dividing up the roles they would play in this charade. The main director, in my opinion, was Boris Yeltsin, who used Moldova as an ally against Gorbachev and was now giving it the finger, warning it not to be too cheeky and to know its place, which, in his view, was only within the Community”, noted Nicolae Țîu in his memoirs, referring to the events in Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991 (Cited in Nicolae Țîu, Diplomație în culise, Bucharest, Enciclopedică Publishing House, 2002, p. 111).

[142] Mircea Snegur, op. cit., p. 303.

[143] Ibidem, p. 309.

[144] Ibidem, p. 310 – 311.

[145] Ibidem, p. 311.

[146] Ibidem, p. 312.

[147] The objectives of the Commonwealth of Independent States are: 1) cooperation in the political, economic, environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other fields; 2) comprehensive and balanced economic and social development of the member states within a common economic space, inter-state cooperation and integration; 3) ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms, in accordance with the generally recognised principles and rules of international law and OSCE documents; 4) cooperation between member states in ensuring international peace and security, the implementation of effective measures to reduce armaments and military expenditure, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament; 5) assistance to citizens of member states in free communication, interaction and free movement within the CIS; 6) mutual legal assistance and cooperation on other legal matters; 7) the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts between CIS member states.

[148] The Statute of the Commonwealth of Independent States was adopted on 22 January 1993 at the CIS Summit in Minsk.

[149] Mircea Snegur, op. cit., p. 313.

[150] Marcel Dinu, ‘Din consemnările unui ambasador român la Chișinău (1990 – 2002), in volume Politica externă a României cu privire la Basarabia reflectată în activitatea diplomaților săi (coordinator Ion M. Anghel), Bucharest, Universul Juridic Publishing House, 2016, pp. 260 – 261.

[151] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Tratatul de Uniune…, p. 715.

[152] Andrei S. Graciov, op. cit., p. 251.

[153] Ibidem, p. 191.

[154] Ibidem, p. 249.

[155] Ibidem.

[156] Pascal Lorot, Perestroika, Bucharest, Corint Publishing House, 2002, p. 139.

[157] Ibidem.

[158] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 717.

[159] Ibidem.

[160] Andrei S. Graciov, op. cit., p. 230.

[161] A total of 55,000 young men, including around 5,000 officers and sergeants from the Republic of Moldova, were performing their compulsory military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR. In accordance with paragraphs 5 and 8 of the Declaration of Sovereignty, and Articles 14 and 97 of the Constitution of the former Moldovan SSR, on 4 September 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR decided to suspend the application within the territory of the Moldovan SSR of Articles 31, 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the USSR, as well as the USSR laws on compulsory military service of 12 October 1967 and 28 March 1990, as well as the law on criminal liability for military offences of 25 December 1958, Articles 60 and 61 of the Constitution of the Moldovan SSR, and Articles 77, 78, 241, 249 and 250 of the Criminal Code of the Moldovan SSR. Citizens of the Republic of Moldova were no longer to be conscripted for active military service in the Soviet army, and reservists were no longer to be called up for military service. At the same time, in accordance with the same legislative act, as well as Decision No. 319 of the Government of the Republic of Moldova of 12 September 1990, the State Department for Military Affairs was established, whose mission was to develop programmes to ensure the creation of military-territorial formations. On 18 October 1990, the first (and only) Director General of the State Department for Military Affairs was appointed, namely Nicolae Chirtoacă, a former GRU officer. Following negotiations with representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defence, it was agreed that 35%, plus the carabiniers – 20%, i.e. 55% of those conscripted, would perform their military service in the Republic of Moldova. On 15 January 1991, out of the total number (9,192) of conscripts, 1,373 (10%) were allowed to serve their military service within the territory of the Moldovan SSR, whilst 4,212 people, or 45.8% of those conscripted, were assigned to the Odessa Military District. On 5 March 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR adopted a resolution halting the conscription of young men into the Armed Forces of the USSR and stipulating that all citizens of the Moldovan SSR should perform their military service solely within the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The President of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, issued Decree No. 194 of 3 September 1991, establishing the National Army of the Republic of Moldova. For further details, see: Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Vitalie Ciobanu, Departamentul Militar (1990–1991)’, in Cohorta, Issue no. 1/2010, Chișinău, pp. 28 – 36.

[162] Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, op. cit., p. 722 – 723.

[163] Ibidem, p. 723.