Amid the outbreak of diversionary-terrorist attacks across Romania on the evening of 22 December 1989, the way in which the newly established political authority—the Council of the National Salvation Front (CFSN)—handled relations among the country’s security structures (the Army/Ministry of National Defence, the Securitate/Department of State Security – DSS, and the Ministry of the Interior) constitutes another controversial episode in the history of the December 1989 Romanian Revolution. Examining these fraught, bloody relationships from December 1989 sheds light on how the CFSN and, later on, the National Salvation Front (FSN), together with various military figures, would engage in the political battles up until 20 May 1990, as well as their subsequent involvement in Romania’s post-December political stage.
Profound Distrust between the Army and the Securitate
Early on, the relationship between the revolutionary authority—constituted as the Council of the National Salvation Front (CFSN) as “the organ of state power in Romania”[1]—and the Securitate was relatively straightforward. All military activities were to be coordinated by the Supreme Military Council, which oversaw all units of the Ministry of National Defence (MApN) and the Ministry of the Interior, including the Securitate. Colonel General Iulian Vlad, the head of the Security Service, placed himself under the command of the newly self-appointed Minister of National Defence, Colonel General (Ret.) Nicolae Militaru, as early as the night of 22–23 December 1989.
Once the so-called “terrorist phenomenon” was unleashed, the Anti-Terrorist Special Unit (USLA) and the Securitate Troops Command (CTS) were placed under the Army’s direct command overnight between 22 and 23 December 1989. Then, in the early hours of 23 December 1989—at around 5 a.m.—the CFSN announced on television that “the Army and the Securitate are fully cooperating to secure the country’s stability and the peace of our citizens”[2]. At that point, the Securitate—still a key institution of the Romanian state and its intelligence service—continued to operate in service of the new leadership and of the people. Throughout the night, the head of the Securitate issued orders “concerning the transfer of Interior Ministry units in the field to Army control, the subordination of county-level Securitate[3], the handover of weapons and ammunition to the Army, and the guarding and securing of documents”[4]. On 23 December 1989, Colonel General Iulian Vlad, the head of the Securitate, left for the headquarters of the Ministry of National Defence (MApN), summoned by the new Minister of National Defence so that he and the entire Securitate leadership could be kept under observation.
In Telephone note no. In Telephone Note No. SA 2/905, sent by the General Staff on 23 December 1989 with the signature of Major General Ştefan Guşă, First Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff—it was stipulated that “they (the Patriot Guards – editor’s note) are under no circumstances to enter the offices of militia or security organs[5],” and that “the Militia and the Securitate will continue to carry out all their responsibilities in close coordination with economic units and other enterprises in their localities”[6]. At this point, the CFSN still recognised the Securitate, and cooperation with MApN units was ongoing. “From the 23rd on, I remained at the Ministry of National Defence. We carried on our duties, and I complained to General Militaru about the telephones being cut off. General Militaru convened a meeting with all the branch and unit commanders. My deputy, General Bucurescu, also complained about the phone cuts, and Militaru said he would restore order. I stayed there until the night of 24/25 December, but the conditions were dire because I couldn’t do my job. The Ministry of National Defence personnel had their own system, an operational unit, and Army phone lines, so they could communicate freely. I had no adjutant. I asked for some people, was promised them, but they never arrived. Finally, I asked for the head of military counterintelligence, General Vasile, who did arrive but couldn’t achieve much more,”[7] the former head of the Securitate later told the Senate Committee investigating the events of December 1989.
Despite the distrust that prevailed between the CFSN and MApN representatives on one side, and the Securitate leadership on the other, on 24 December 1989 the future Deputy Prime Minister, Gelu Voican-Voiculescu drew up a “briefing note on gathering information regarding the organisation of terrorist groups“[8] which the Securitate forces were to carry out in cooperation with the MApN. Additionally, on 24 December, Gelu Voican-Voiculescu approved and signed a document titled Measures for organising activities to counteract terrorist groups, stipulating: “1. Immediate commencement of individual screening and selection (undertaken by Colonel General Vlad Iulian, assisted by Colonel Șarpe Paul of the MApN Intelligence Directorate) of USLA officers considered suitable for operational involvement in actions (capturing, destroying, neutralising) against terrorist groups”[9]. During the night of 24–25 December 1989, Silviu Brucan fuelled Army’s mistrust in the Securitate and its commanders by accusing “Securitate of harbouring terrorists”[10]. The sharp dispute between Silviu Brucan and Iulian Vlad took place in the presence of Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, Generals Nicolae Militaru, Vasile Ionel, future Chief of the General Staff, Vasile Al. Gheorghe, Lieutenant-General Gheorghe, head of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Directorate (UM 0632) of the Securitate, and Romeo Cîmpeanu, Major-General and deputy head of the General Inspectorate of the Militia (IGM).
Strikingly, even though the Securitate high command was stationed at the Ministry of National Defence, under tight Army supervision, large-scale actions against Securitate headquarters and CTS units got underway across the country. “Following 23 December 1989, very serious and unfounded attacks were aimed at the larger unit and its subunits, and certain senior officials of the 4th Army—led by Colonel General Iulian Topliceanu—abusively violated military honour and dignity. They ordered and announced in the press that the Security Brigade be disarmed and hand over its weaponry and all equipment to the MApN forces. Between 24 and 29 December 1989, the command of the main unit and some of its subunits were placed under surveillance by groups of officers observing both commanders and all servicemen. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and soldiers in firing positions were deployed around the Brigade Command, and Battalions 15 in Cluj and 51 in Oradea. Every piece of weaponry, ammunition, communications device, and transport equipment, along with every room, was inspected; we were required to produce our organisational charts for verification, and the command staff were subjected to intense pressure[11],” stated Colonel Vasile Mihalache, formerly in charge of the Cluj Security Brigade in December 1989, in a spring 1990 declaration. Between 22 and 26 December 1989, certain CTS subunits were disarmed and confined to Army barracks—such as those in Zalău and Baia Mare—while the commander of the 51st Security Battalion in Oradea was warned by Major General Nicolae Şchiopu that the 11th Mechanised Division “Carei” would crush them with tanks. At the same time, the 81st Mechanised Division from Dej was preparing to occupy the Securitate troops’ barracks in Tășnad.
Discussing how First Directorate officers ended up part of the counter-terrorism campaign, Brigadier General (Ret.) Vasile Mălureanu noted: “Was it honestly necessary or advisable to deploy civilian-clothed, armed Securitate officers on intelligence and anti-terrorist missions in conflict zones or areas under military authority? What complications might Major Cornel Ionaşcu’s team have encountered at the new MApN headquarters and Panduri ENT Hospital, had they not revised the travel routes and methods of transport they had already reported to the Military Command? Could it be that someone intended to compromise Directorate I, the key intelligence branch of the DSS? At the time, in the whirlwind of events, we thought our colleagues’ run-ins on these missions stemmed from the general chaos created by the baffling terrorist phenomenon and the weak coordination among the main forces striving to suppress it. But more than 20 years later, perspectives have evolved. Colonel Gheorghe Rațiu, the officers involved, and I now believe that these demands—emanating from some members of the Television Centre’s Military Command—were calculated moves designed to draw Securitate personnel into active combat zones, thereby supporting the ‘Securitate-terrorists’ deception”[12].
The Foreign Intelligence Headquarters under Army Blockade
In Bucharest, Army forces surrounded the buildings belonging to the Foreign Intelligence Centre (CIE) and had to contend with protesters demanding to occupy them. In his recollections, Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir of the SIE recounts how he managed to break the deadlock around his own unit (Unit UM 0208), which was besieged by demonstrators, Patriot Guards, and MApN soldiers, by enlisting the help of the Commander of the 2nd District Military Centre. Later appointed Deputy Director of the SIE (1990–1992), Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir recalls that on 23 December 1989, acting in the name of the CIE leadership, he sent out a circular telegram to the external operational groups, asking them to ensure the security of diplomatic missions and ciphers, to cooperate with the head of mission and other on-site diplomatic staff, and to wait for new instructions after the formation of a new government. “A genuine ‘manhunt’ for intelligence officers began at covert institutions and Romanian diplomatic missions abroad, where shady figures from the Romanian diaspora forced their way into and seized diplomatic and consular posts, under the complacent gaze of local police, who did not intervene to protect diplomatic premises as required by the Vienna Convention,”[13], records Gheorghe Dragomir in his memoir.
Meanwhile, five CIE officers operating under diplomatic cover were detained at various Romanian border crossings when entering the country, despite holding diplomatic passports and despite being part of official MAE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) delegations. The authorities accused them of terrorism. In Bucharest, a CIE unit was attacked by protesters, resulting in the first CIE officer losing his life. “Within that unit,” recounts Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir “which managed intelligence and counterintelligence on the United States and Canada, a highly unusual incident occurred—something the Revolution «historians» have omitted. According to this unit’s personnel reports, a military truck carrying armed men dressed in camouflage burst in by force. They apprehended and confined all 20 staff present, and ransacked the archives, which contained both external and internal agent data for the aforementioned regions. In the confusion—since the officer on duty had no instructions on how to respond—he tried resisting the ‘assailants’ and was killed on the spot. The truck, along with the archives, secret database computers, and the 20 officers, ‘vanished’ into the night.”[14]. The officers of that CIE unit were eventually released from an Army barracks in mid-January 1990, though the archives were not recovered[15]. Speaking to the author in September 2010, former Director of Army Intelligence (DIA), Vice Admiral (Ret.) Ștefan Dinu categorically denied any claim that MApN subunits had stormed the CIE bases. “It’s an invented story meant to look like the Army attacked, which is patently untrue[16],” Vice Admiral (Ret.) Ștefan Dinu maintained.
Events in certain Securitate units, including those of the CIE, show that the Securitate chief failed to predict the revolutionary upheaval[17] in all its complexity. The course of action chosen provided a short-term remedy, but the long-term strategy—at some point intended to secure the Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus—was not one of the best Before long, the Securitate in all its forms would fall irretrievably, alongside the Ceaușescu regime and the collapse of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) as the nation’s exclusive ruling party.
Extreme Tension and Suspicion between the Army and the Securitate
A harrowing incident occurred at the Ministry of National Defence (MApN) in those days, where Major General Marin Neagoe[18]—former commander of the 5th Security and Guard Directorate (UM 0666) of the Securitate—was being held in the Ministry’s detention area and subjected, by his own testimony, to humiliation and abuse. While the “terrorist phenomenon” was unfolding, the former 5th Directorate chief requested to be taken out of detention to report to Lieutenant General Victor A. Stănculescu, knowing he had been appointed by Nicolae Ceaușescu as Minister of National Defence. In the former Minister’s office, attended by Generals Stănculescu, Militaru, Hortopan, Vlad, Colonel Gheorghe Ardeleanu, and CFSN delegate Mihai Montanu, Neagoe attempted to persuade the Army’s top brass that his men were not the terrorists. He also instructed his subordinates to assemble at the 5th Directorate garage to be inspected by Mihai Montanu, General Iulian Vlad and General Ion Hortopan[19]. In his memoirs, Marin Neagoe paints a striking picture of the Securitate leadership’s—specifically Colonel General Iulian Vlad’s—failure to shield subordinate officers whose military honour and human dignity were grossly violated. It is mystifying that the Securitate chief did not intervene to secure the release of the 5th Directorate commander, even though Major General Marin Neagoe insisted he had executed the Securitate chief’s orders swiftly and precisely, alongside his subordinates.
On 24 December 1989, acting on the orders of Colonel General (Ret.) Nicolae Militaru, the new Defence Minister, and in the presence of Colonel General Ion Hortopan—Commander of the Infantry and Tank Command—Securitate chief Colonel General Iulian Vlad, some General Staff officers, and CFSN representative Mihai Montanu, the Anti-Terrorist Special Unit (USLA/UM 0620) held a parade inspection at its headquarters. Simultaneously, armoured personnel carriers and a paratrooper subunit from the MApN encircled the USLA premises “to safeguard the unit[20],” even as teams from the USLA Special Intervention Service were dispatched across Bucharest to apprehend terrorists. “Colonel Z. G., leading the paratroopers, showed the qualities of a genuine commander: integrity, honesty, composure, competence, and perfect cooperation with Colonel Ardeleanu and USLA’s command structure. Thanks to him, genuine command of the unit was achieved, and General Nicolae Militaru received constant updates on the unit’s actual status. Along the way, these officers were also astonished by the mistrust openly shown by this unit, by the countless «information» received by short phone calls,”[21] according to Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret.) Teodor Filip in a paper on the history of the USLA.
During the night of 22–23 December 1989, the telephone connections between Securitate headquarters and its branches—including those linking the CIE to “covert” units—were severed under orders from Colonel Stelian Pintilie, Deputy Minister of Transport and Telecommunications (from 23 June 1984), who oversaw Unit “R” (the present-day Special Telecommunications Service of Romania). On 25 December 1989, the Army convened a meeting at its Drumul Taberei premises for 12:30 p.m., summoning all central Securitate unit chiefs and CIE leaders to issue “announcements of orders”[22]. he Securitate and CIE officers there came face-to-face with the tragic demise of the USLA crew commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gheorghe Trosca, USLA’s chief of staff. Tensions ran extremely high throughout the meeting, as the new Defence Minister, Nicolae Militaru, constantly levelled accusations at the Securitate. Subordinates noted that the Securitate chief seemed to be under arrest, and the Securitate’s outlook grew ever more grim. “Once the meeting was over, the MApN officers began checking our officer IDs, then handed them back without comment. The instant we left the meeting room and got ready to board the two buses, the DSS officers were suddenly fired upon with automatic weapons from the blocks located some 200 metres opposite the General Staff compound entrance. Instinctively, everyone took cover behind concrete slabs, waiting for the gunfire to subside”.[23], recounts Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir, who took part in that meeting on 25 December 1989.
Despite joint working sessions and a call from the Securitate chief on 23 December 1989[24] at 06:00, the extremely tense relations between the Army leadership and the Securitate and CIE officers began to surface in the execution of their duties by the security and external intelligence units. Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir of the SIE recounts, “An increasing number of voices from the Army leadership openly and firmly declared that the Securitate and Romanian espionage had fabricated the irredentist-Hungarian issue to justify their existence before the ‘dictator,’ particularly urging the CIE to provide dossiers on agents recruited within irredentist-Hungarian organizations abroad and CIE liaison officers.”[25].
On 26 December 1989, the new ruling authority issued Decree No. 4, which transferred the State Security Department and other bodies subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior into the Ministry of National Defence. For Romania’s intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus, the situation began to deteriorate swiftly. On the morning of 27 December 1989, a destabilizing rumor surfaced, heightening fears that CFSN leaders would be assassinated. Rumours such as “A dead body in every home!” and “You have triumphed at Christmas, we will triumph at New Year!” fuelled the Army’s and CFSN’s suspicions against the Securitate. Meanwhile, Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, tasked with the security of CFSN leaders, issued on 26 December 1989 a new document—a “questionnaire type aimed at identifying the origin and operational methods of the terrorists, listing individuals like Emil Bobu, Ion Dincă, Nicu Ceauşescu, Tudor Postelnicu, Generals Vlad, Stamatoiu, Bucurescu, Vasile, and Colonel Ardeleanu for interrogation”.[26]
Arrest of the Securitate Leadership
Suspicion against the Securitate leadership grew on 29 December 1989 when the new Deputy Prime Minister, appointed by Petre Roman—Gelu Voican-Voiculescu—created a “Problem List outlining methods to detect and detain remaining terrorists”[27], marked as “strictly confidential,” and submitted it to Prime Minister Petre Roman. The document alleged that “dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu had organized this terror apparatus and possible personal salvation prematurely (perhaps a year or more)”[28] and that “the apparatus was developed by foreign (or local) specialists following a complex plan”[29]. The 29 December 1989 document notes that Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu requested “an urgent investigation by the specialized bodies of the Ministry of National Defence, in the presence and with the cooperation of the Military Prosecutor’s Office, of individuals suspected of possessing information about the existence and organization of terrorist groups (Emil Bobu, Ion Dincă, Tudor Postelnicu, Nicu Ceauşescu, General-Colonel Iulian Vlad, Major General Bucurescu Gianu)”[30].
The new Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Vasile Ionel, appended „Stamatoiu and Vasile” to the document following Gelu Voican-Voiculescu’s testimonies. Additionally, a number of dubious individuals with questionable pasts, such as Nicolae Doicaru, Virgil Măgureanu, were active around the new regime, masquerading as anti-Ceaușescu dissidents seeking to overthrow the still-active Securitate leadership. Silviu Brucan, emerged as the catalyst for all these vindictive tendencies, whether founded or not, thereby increasing pressure on CFSN leader Ion Iliescu Iliescu[31].
On the morning of 30 December 1989, Colonel General Vlad issued, at 09:30, order S/184 to all central and territorial information units of the Ministry of National Defence, namely the former components of the Securitate. This order communicated that by directive of the Minister of National Defence, “the complete destruction of any document[32] concerning informative-operational activity is strictly forbidden,”[33] and simultaneously, the heads of central and territorial information units “will take strict protective measures for all documents concerning informative-operational activity, as well as for the entire archive fund”[34].
By Decree No. 33 of the National Security Council (CFSN), on 30 December 1989, the State Security Department was abolished. On 31 December 1989, former Securitate chief Colonel General was informed that he needed to be present at the Minister of National Defence’s office at 13:00 instead of 11:00. Later, he was instructed to attend at 14:00 together with his deputies, Gianu Bucurescu and Aristotel Stamatoiu, and the head of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Directorate. “When the plan was almost ready (to catch the terrorists – editor’s note), I went with it to report to the minister, I even gave orders, one was saying: «By the disposition of the Minister of National Defence, Army General Nic. Militaru, order to all central and territorial information unit heads…’»; I was acting in good faith. Then Colonel Cerbu, who was at the office, told me he would receive me at 14:00 but to come with the adjutants. However, General Alexie had had a stroke, and I didn’t take him. I was expressly ordered to take General Vasile as well I had a premonition and told those next to me that we might not see each other again, and when I was driving to the ministry, my arrest was announced on the radio,”[35] declared the former head of the Securitate before the Senatorial Committee.
On the evening of the same day, Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, appointed by Ion Iliescu to command the former Securitate structures, met at 10 pm at the Ministry of the Interior’s headquarters with the commanders of the newly abolished security units. Historian Marius Oprea notes that “at the meeting, Voican guaranteed the DSS officers that the new power would not wage war against them but would limit itself to dismantling the institution”[36]. The liaison man between Gelu Voican-Voiculescu and the former Securitate became Colonel Gheorghe Goran[37], former head of the Bucharest Municipal Securitate. “In the first months, they were given trivial information and information about the economic situation, supply issues, water in dams, and similar matters,[38]” testified the former liaison of the CIE chief, Major General (Ret.) Ştefan Alexie.
The Birth of Romania’s Foreign Intelligence Service
The concerns of the new ruling power regarding the future of Romania’s intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus are underscored by the drafting, by Gelu Voican-Voiculescu’s writing in his role as Deputy Prime Minister, of Order No. 1 issued by the head of the National Security Council. This document contained proposals for the new National Security Council intended to replace the activities of the now-dismantled State Security Department, which had entered into dismantling after its abolition. Reading the document reveals that one of the Securitate chiefs, Colonel Gheorghe Goran, head of the Bucharest Municipal Securitate, was nominated to command the forthcoming Bucharest Municipal Security, while Colonel Ion Deaconescu was nominated for the CIE. The staff of the 5th and 6th Directorates resigned from their positions, with cadres being “retired, except for those who proved loyal through completed missions”[39]. The document further specified: “Directorate 4 will be staffed with loyal MApN officers; the current staffing will be redistributed to MApN units as line officers or specialists, according to their training; the first measure will consist of the release by CI (counterintelligence – editor’s note) officers of the occupied offices, along with the documents in their possession. These documents will be handed over to the unit consolidation bodies”[40]. The document concluded by stating that the following former Securitate chiefs were to be considered “retired until further orders”[41]: Colonel General Iulian Vlad Lieutenant General Vasile Al. Gheorghe and Major General Gianu Nicolae Bucurescu.
Major General Gianu Nicolae Bucurescu (born 13 July 1934) was Deputy Minister of the Interior and liaison officer of the DSS chief with the rank of state secretary. The fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu found him at the Securitate headquarters on Câmpineanu Street, alongside Major General Alexandru Ţencu, commander of UM 0639 (Special Unit “T” for Technical Installations), waiting for orders from Colonel General Vlad Iulian. Regarding the behaviour of Gianu Nicolae Bucurescu on 22 December 1989, historian Marius Oprea notes: “His attitude raised questions among his former comrades: in the ambiguous situation created by the absence of General Vlad, who was in the Central Committee of the PCR’s headquarters, the leadership should automatically be taken over by his deputy, General Bucurescu. However, according to some accounts from his former chief of cabinet (later cadre in UM 0215, now 0962, the Ministry of the Interior’s intelligence service), he refused to answer the phone or give any indication regarding the activities that should have been carried out”.[42]. Such testimonies reinforce the conviction that there was no strategic plan for Romania’s intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus; everything was a spur-of-the-moment improvisation, chance, and sometimes bad luck. The document issued by Gelu Voican-Voiculescu emained merely on paper, without any practical legal value. Events were to follow rapidly, and the future of Romania’s intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus was destined to be entirely different.
Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir recalls that on the evening of 31 December 1989, around 20:00, he observed that the “’old guard’ of the CIE leadership was absent, even submitting retirement requests on the same day”[43]. The CIE headquarters was surrounded by MApN barricades on the evening of the same day, under the pretext that there was information indicating that “CIE cadres, aware of the arrest of the CIE chief, were preparing a coup d’état”[44]. The CFSN team that emerged was composed of Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, Virgil Măgureanu[45], Nicolae Doicaru[46] and Lieutenant-General Marin Pancea. The CIE personnel were informed that, until further orders, the institution would be led by Lieutenant General Marin Pancea, who had also assumed leadership of the Army Intelligence Directorate (DIA)[47]. Former CIE unit commander, Gheorghe Dragomir believes that the operation whereby “was to be ‘melted’ into the DIA” began that night of 31 December 1989[48]. Gheorghe Dragomir contends that behind the reorganization of Romanian foreign espionage stood a political figure, referred to as “The Professor”[49], who aimed “to create a mammoth secret service (a replica of the DSS) with both internal and external components, whose leadership had been promised”[50].
The “Professor’s” aspirations conflicted with the interests of DIA, which aimed to incorporate CIE into its own organisation. “CIE had become a desirable ‘pie’ for the new regime, which was ‘warring’ to divide the leadership of the secret services based on the interests of those manipulating from the shadows, often getting caught up in their own intrigues. From that moment, a «mad» rush began to seize the personal files of CIE personnel from both the central and external branches, including dossiers prepared by the counterintelligence unit. Trucks filled with such bags of documents were loaded onto army lorries and transported to DIA for «review and assessment». Subsequently, dossiers of officers who were fully conspirators and ‘illegal’ agents embedded in various countries, as well as agencies involving both Romanians and foreigners, arrived,”[51] concludes Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir. Vice-Admiral Ștefan Dinu[52], as stated by Virgil Măgureanu, intending to soon take over the leadership of the former UM 0110 (Counterespionage Unit against Socialist Countries and the USSR) and UM 0625 (Counterespionage Directorate), merged into a new counterintelligence structure within the MApN organisational chart.
On the day of 3 January 1990, Ion Iliescu, president of the CFSN, called the central office of CIE and requested that Major General (Ret.) Mihai Caraman be informed that he was expected the following day, 4 January 1990, at 09:00, at Victoria Palace. Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir was the one who was still in contact with Mihai Caraman at that time and called him to relay Ion Iliescu’s request. Mihai Caraman appeared the following day at the CFSN president’s office, ignoring the presence of “the Professor” in the anteroom and refusing any discussion with him. After discussions with Ion Iliescu and subsequently with the leadership of CIE, Mihai Caraman was reinstated into active service and appointed, on 18 January 1990, as deputy of MApN and commander of CIE with the rank of state secretary in MApN (18.01.1990 – 13.12.1990).
“The initial disappointments – remarks Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir appeared among the younger staff of SIE when General (Mihai Caraman – editor’s note)—after stabilising the institution, began reactivating personnel who were either in reserve or had emerged post-events (from 1989 onwards – editor’s note) as «dissidents» or had been marginalised by the former CIE leadership“[53]. The new CIE leadership encountered numerous difficulties in attempting to reclaim control of the CIE offices “occupied by the Army under a verbal order from Minister Militaru, for which there were no formal takeover minutes or inventories, with the new ‘occupiers’ refusing to accept their return”[54]. The former deputy director of SIE, Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir testified that Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu played a crucial role in mitigating the tensions between CIE and the Army. Referring to the reorganisation of Romanian foreign espionage, Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir writes: “The new service «conceived» by the new leadership aimed to revert to a massive organisation where the proportion of well-paid staff and roles would return to the administrative and logistical department. In this reorganisation scheme, there was a lukewarm place for a series of ‘friends’ and ‘clients’ of the new leadership”[55]. This was just the beginning of a behaviour that would shortly lead to press scandals involving SIE and Director Mihai Caraman[56].
On 8 February 1990[57], via Decree no. 111 of the CFSN, CIE was reorganised, remaining part of the MapN and on 13 December 1990, Law no. 39 was promulgated, stipulating the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE)[58], subordinated to the Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT). Mihai Caraman was reappointed as Director of EIS[59]. He was removed from office on 9 April 1992 and retired with the rank of colonel-general. The new director of SIE became Colonel Dr. Ioan Talpeș[60] of the MApN, former presidential advisor with the rank of deputy minister for Defence, Public Order, and National Security, under President Ion Iliescu.
Reorganisation and Dissolution of the Former Securitate Structures
In January 1990, following the dissolution of the former State Security Department, the Army leadership ordered the former Security units to submit personnel rosters and the missions they had fulfilled according to their job descriptions, to facilitate the creation of new organisational charts. Lieutenant General Gheorghe Logofătu was responsible, by order of the Minister of National Defence, for coordinating the dismantling of the Securitate. On 4 January 1990, by Decree no. 19[61] of the President of the CFSN, the deputy to the Minister of National Defence was appointed as head the remnants of the Securitate. UM 0195 (Foreign Counterintelligence), Directorates 4[62] and 5 of the Securitate, UM 0110, the Political Security Council, Special Unit “T” for Technical Installations (UM 0639), the Command for Operational Technique and Transmissions and the Bucharest Municipality Security were disbanded.
The personnel of UM 0110 were incorporated into the former Counterintelligence Directorate along with those from UM 0650 (Independent Service for Foreign Trade) and UM 0500 (Independent Service for Protecting State Secrets). The “D” Service – Disinformation was placed under the authority of CIE, and the Foreign Trade Enterprise “Dunărea” (UM 0107) was to merge with “Romtehnica” within the Ministry of National Defence (MApN). The leadership of MApN transitioned into reserve those cadres who had reached the age of 50, as well as over 2,000 cadres from the former Securitate, according to Colonel (ret.) Viorel Roşu in his memoirs. Colonel General Victor A. Stănculescu was to announce the following in the media on 21 February 1990, one week after assuming the role of Minister of National Defence: “Units of the Department were dissolved, and their personnel were placed in reserve – the V Directorate for Guard and Order (437 cadres), the IV Directorate for Military Counterintelligence (1,037 cadres, of which 611 were placed in reserve, and some were arrested). 1,844 cadres from the Bucharest Municipality Securitate and those from the counties of Timiş, Sibiu, Braşov, and Cluj were placed in reserve. (…) In total, as of 22 December 1989, the central and territorial Security apparatus employed approximately 8,400 cadres”[63]. Referring to the atmosphere during those times and the professional and material prospects of the former DSS cadres, determined by the MApN leadership, Colonel (Ret.) Viorel Roşu writes: “Instead of assigning positions according to the former DSS structure, they were created based on the existing framework. Thus, the head of the Securitate service became the head of a section, seemingly higher but lower in remuneration. What good was it to reach the rank of Major General if the salary grade was correspondingly reduced, and the salary decreased significantly”[64].
At the beginning of 1990, a quiet battle began to manifest within the new power structure to seize the remnants of the Securitate and its secrets. In early January 1990, Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, Deputy Prime Minister of the Romanian Government, proposed an initial reform of the ministry structures. The document was submitted to President Ion Iliescu for analysis and approval. President Ion Iliescu did not implement any measures regarding the proposals submitted by Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu. Ion Iliescu did not agree with the prospect of a „National Security Council” because, as historian Marius Oprea writes, “the term «Safety» referred to the pre-war period, an era not favoured by the former CFSN president, who was reminded once again of his father’s sufferings—his communist dissident father incarcerated in the Târgu Jiu camp[65].
On 25 January 1990, Vice Admiral Ștefan Dinu took command of the counterintelligence structure of the former Securitate in the presence of Lieutenant-General Gheorghe Logofătu and approximately 400-500 officers. After introducing the new commander, it was communicated that operative actions would be suspended for a period, except for those already in progress and those requiring the leadership’s approval. Vice Admiral (Ret.) Ştefan Dinu writes in his memoirs: “Secondly, to understand the missions undertaken during the Revolution, each (security officer – editor’s note) was required to submit a detailed report with day and hour-by-hour descriptions of the activities carried out, also mentioning the individuals who could confirm the stated actions. Thirdly, officers who had reached the mandatory age and years of service were offered the opportunity to retire, requesting only a brief report expressing their desire to do so. As a result of this offer, numerous cadres chose to retire or even to be placed in reserve. Through this option, many officers were freed from the fear of having their activities during the Revolution examined, leaving us solely concerned with the status of those who remained in the unit”[66].
Creation of the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Interior
In the context of the Army strengthening its intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, including those of CIE, Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu decided to establish a new intelligence structure for Prime Minister Petre Roman. The events at the beginning of 1990, specifically on 12 January and 28–29 January, convinced the Government of the need for information and certainties[67]. On 7 February 1990[68], within the Ministry of the Interior, based on Decree No. 100 of the CFSN, an intelligence service called “Service for the Security of Objects of Political Interest” (UM 0215), directly subordinated to the Minister of the Interior. UM 0215 comprised of officers from the former Bucharest Municipal Security (SMB) and from the former 4th Directorate. Colonel (Ret.) Viorel Roșu (Colonel (Ret.) Viorel Roșu) recounts that: “Additionally, officers from former disbanded Securitate structures, revolutionaries, all kinds of civilians entered 0215 …it was a complete mess. There was no surveillance or investigations, but within the General Inspectorate of Police appeared a “Surveillance and Investigation Directorate”. (…) I tend to believe that, by dissolving the SMB, those from Militia, transformed into Police, sought to recreate their own surveillance and investigation structure. Thus, in the events following ’89, we will encounter characters involved in all sorts of actions, about whom it was generically said that they are former Securitate members, but no one produced any evidence”[69].
In his memoir (De la Securitate la Doi și un sfert, via SRI (From Securitate la Doi și un sfert, via SRI)), Colonel (Ret.) Viorel Roșu writes that the initial organisational status of UM 0215 comprised 214 positions. In the interview with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, he discusses a staff of 236 officers from SMB and approximately 40 officers from counterintelligence. In the daily newspaper Evenimentul Zilei of 16 June 2010, journalists Vlad Stoicescu and Liviana Rotaru, in the article A Quarter past Two of Truth: All of the President’s Men wrote that 178 of the 275 staff members working in the central defence apparatus of UM 0215 in June 1990 had served in the 4th Securitate Directorate[70]. In 1998, Decision no. 47 of 22 May issued by the National Defence Council mandated the Ministry of the Interior to disband Unit 0215 and, at the same time, to create a service for personnel protection under the Minister of the Interior and a directorate for major crime investigations, reflecting the structures found in consolidated democracies. Government Decision no. 302/08.06.1998 stipulated that the Ministry of the Interior Protection Service would be reorganised, establishing the General Directorate for Internal Protection, identified as Unit 0962, directly subordinate to the Minister of the Interior.
Gelu Voican-Voiculescu was supported by Nicolae Doicaru and Colonel Viorel Tache (previously part of Unit 0920 (the former Foreign Intelligence Directorate)) was supported by Nicolae Doicaru and Colonel Viorel Tache in setting up Unit 0215. Colonel Viorel Tache[71] had been transferred from the Foreign Intelligence Centre to the Bucharest Municipal Securitate, where he worked in the “Dangerous Documents Service”. At that time, he also served as the personal adviser to Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu. UM 0215 was commanded by Colonel Florin Calapod[72] and was divided into two sections: the Intelligence Division, managed by Colonel Ion Condoiu, a former Securitate officer, and the Personnel Protection Division. The Intelligence Division of UM 0215 consisted of: 1) The Anti-Hooliganism Combat and Intervention Service; 2) The Delinquency and Parasitism service and 3) The Political Party Monitoring Service. Colonel (Ret.) Viorel Roșu, a former officer of UM 0215, confirmed, alongside numerous media reports, that UM 0215 was involved, particularly in its early years, in political policing actions, intimidation of opposition figures, the “University Square” phenomenon, and the events of 13–15 June 1990. After the events of 13 – 15 June 1990, the “The Political Party Monitoring Service” of UM 0215 was disbanded. Between 1993 and 1997, under General Dan Gheorghe, Unit 0215 gained influence comparable to that of the SRI under Virgil Măgureanu.
The establishment of UM 0215, overt sympathy shown by the head of the SIE towards Prime Minister Petre Roman, intensified the muted confrontation between the power centres within Victoria Palace. According to Brigadier General (Ret.) Gheorghe Dragomir, a contemporary of those events, this led to “the premises for the first clashes between the two palaces, which, unfortunately, also involved the intelligence services, as each protagonist sought to create ‘breaches’ in the opposing camp”[73].
The Birth of the Romanian Intelligence Service
On 23 January 1990, Virgil Măgureanu formally requested Prime Minister Petre Roman to provide 40 Dacia vehicles and a series of facilities designed to assist the adviser to President Ion Iliescu in establishing an intelligence structure. “Everything that was requested was the result of a previous agreement with President Iliescu”[74], testified Virgil Măgureanu. The requirements submitted to the government by the future head of the SRI were necessitated by the fact that the former county-level Securitate branches were unable to operate, having been absorbed into the logistical framework of the Army. “The operative units of the former Securitate had been completely paralysed. (…) The units were withdrawn, held on standby, and stripped of all material resources needed to function”[75], declared Virgil Măgureanu.
After Nicolae Militaru was removed from his position as head of the Ministry of National Defence on 16 February 1990, following a revolt among General Staff officers influenced by the actions of the Committee for the Democratisation of the Army (CADA) and with the more or less discreet support of Deputy Prime Minister Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, who was backed by several former officers of the 4th Securitate Directorate and the Supreme Political Council of the Army, Minister of National Defence Victor A. Stănculescu convened the leadership of the former Securitate on 23 February 1990. Colonel Gheorghe Diaconescu, former deputy of the 3rd Counterintelligence Directorate, provided an overview of the operative situation. Virgil Măgureanu chaired the meeting. Reflecting on this meeting, Colonel (Ret.) Viorel Roșu was the first to level accusations of “political policing” against the future leadership of the SRI after 1989. Colonel Gheorghe Diaconescu’s proposal to continue intelligence surveillance of Father Gheorghe Calciu Dumitreasa, who was soon to return to Romania, took some of the participants at the 23 February 1990 meeting by surprise[76].
Meanwhile, Colonel Mihai Stan, a former officer of Unit “D” – Disinformation, and Major General (ret.) Neagu Cosma, the former head of the Third Counterintelligence Directorate until August 1973, formed a team headquartered within the Ministry of Tourism to prepare the foundation of an intelligence service modelled after the former Special Intelligence Service (SSI). Recalling those moments, Virgil Măgureanu remarked that the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) expedited efforts to address the issue of internal intelligence. “It wasn’t an operative group gathering intelligence, but a study group. Since we didn’t have space at Victoria Palace, we requested premises from the Ministry of Tourism. The necessary documents were brought together from various places so the assigned subject could be studied, and I informed Mr Ion Iliescu that the study would soon be completed and decisions would follow accordingly, including the organisational charts for the future structure,”[77] explained Virgil Măgureanu, referring to the working group preparing the foundation of the SRI.
Virgil Măgureanu makes it abundantly clear in his statements that, at that time, the Army had emerged as the main competitor in the struggle to control some part of Romania’s intelligence system. The tensions between the two institutions, which had emerged from the unforgettable turmoil of December 1989, are also evident in the memoirs of Vice Admiral (Ret.) Ștefan Dinu: “I can’t help but mention that in the years following the Revolution, some elements of the domestic and international media levelled criticisms at the army, accusing it of being subordinated to the structures of the former Securitate. Naturally, those dissatisfied and angered were none other than the profiteers from the Securitate structures, whose undeserved income and extensive privileges were significantly curtailed by the army. However, these malcontents ought to have expressed their gratitude to the army, which shielded them from the vengeance of the masses”[78].
The events that took place in Târgu-Mureș on 19–20 March 1990 posed extreme challenges for the new state authorities.[79] The need for an intelligence service became increasingly urgent[80]. On 26 March 1990, through Decree no. 181, the Romanian Intelligence Service was established as a state institution specialising in gathering intelligence on national security. Virgil Măgureanu[81] was appointed as its director. This marked the end of a key chapter in Romanian intelligence history, defined by the dismantling of the former Securitate—a hallmark of the communist regime—during the turmoil of the Romanian Revolution in December 1989 and the subsequent post-revolutionary period. This was a vital and challenging step in creating the institutions necessary for a functional democratic state.
At a press conference on 23 April 1990, Virgil Măgureanu announced that one of the roles of the SRI would be “to prevent destabilising actions of any kind”. The SRI played a role in the events of 13–15 June 1990 (Operation “Dâmbovița”)[82], and was also involved in many behind-the-scenes activities during the post-revolutionary transition. Historian Marius Oprea wrote about the SRI’s role in the early days of Romania’s democracy: “A first, somewhat vague, acknowledgment of the Romanian Intelligence Service’s involvement in the Mineriada came in June 1993, when Virgil Măgureanu presented his inaugural report to the parliamentary control committee. No clarifications were ever offered by the Ministry of the Interiors or the Ministry of Defence”.[83] When questioned about the ethics of reinstating numerous Securitate officers into the SRI, Virgil Măgureanu pointed to historical precedent, specifically the Western Allies’ intelligence agencies rehiring former German intelligence officers from the Gestapo, SD, and Abwehr. He justified this decision by asserting that “in a democratic regime, those who committed crimes are disqualified from the outset”[84].
Surprisingly, in 2009, the former director of the SRI criticised the lack of professionalism among former Securitate officers incorporated into the SRI. “It was,” confessed Virgil Măgureanu, “a professional disqualification. This was the most severe issue we encountered. In many instances, Securitate officers were inadequately trained for professional intelligence work”[85]. Publicist Mihai Pelin, a leading historian of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence services and a confidant of the former SRI director, observed that during Virgil Măgureanu’s ,leadership (26 March 1990 – 25 April 1997), Securitate officers were brought into the institution[86] but were systematically reassigned. “He didn’t allow them to establish their own system and refused to play their game,”[87] remarked Mihai Pelin. Meanwhile, officers from the MApN were “encouraged” to leave the SRI. “The methods employed were some of the most degrading—from obstructing the execution of their orders to undermining their operational initiatives,”[88], wrote Vice Admiral (Ret.) Stefan Dinu.
New Intelligence and Counterintelligence Structures
In the evolving Romanian intelligence community of the post-December era, additional institutions gradually emerged with initially limited but later expanded roles in intelligence gathering: The Protection and Security Service (SPP), the Special Telecommunications Service (STS), the Independent Protection and Anti-Corruption Service (SIPA) of the Ministry of Justice. On 26 December 1989, the MApN leadership decided to form a group of four officers tasked with physically protecting prominent members of the CFSN. This group later became the foundation of the Special Protection and Protocol Unit (USPP), established through Decree no. 204 on 7 May 1990, issued by the Provisional Council of National Unity (CPUN). Under the Ministry of National Defence (part of the Guard Brigade), the USPP was assigned to protect dignitaries. Following the enactment of Law no. 51/26 July 1991 on Romania’s national security, the USPP was renamed the Protection and Security Service (SPP), officially becoming a state institution “with responsibilities in the field of national security”. Over the years, the media reported that numerous officers from the former Fifth Directorate of the Securitate were active within the SPP.
On 18 December 1992, the Special Telecommunications Service (STS) was established by a National Defence Council decision on the foundation of the former “R” Special Unit of the Securitate. The complete separation of special telecommunications from the MApN was achieved through Government Decision no. 229 of 27 May 1993, which organised and regulated the STS as a central, specialised body for special telecommunications. Its legal framework was subsequently established through Law no. 92/1996.
The MApN retained the DIA (Defence Intelligence Directorate) until February 1991, when it was renamed the Army Intelligence Directorate, and in September 1993, it became the Military Intelligence Directorate. Simultaneously, the Counterintelligence Directorate of the MApN was established on 14 May 1990 through Order M41/1990, incorporating personnel and duties from the former 4th Military Counterintelligence Directorate. It became operational on 24 April 1990, led by Major General Victor Negulescu, who had served as Romania’s military attaché in Rome during December 1989. Order M98/1990 from the Minister of National Defence outlined that the Counterintelligence Directorate was “a specialised unit that organises, plans, executes, and coordinates operative and intelligence activities aimed at preventing, uncovering, and countering hostile actions by foreign intelligence services targeting the Romanian Army”.
______________________________________
*Article published in the magazine Deutsche internationale Zeitschrift für zeitgenössische Wissenschaft, nr. 97/2025, p. 13 – 24.
[1] Revoluţia Română din Decembrie 1989. Documente (The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Documents), vol. I, Editors: Ion Calafeteanu (coordinator), Gheorghe Neacşu, Daniela Osiac, Sebastian Rusu, Cluj-Napoca, Mega Publishing House, 2009, p. 311.
[2] Alesandru Duțu, Revoluţia din Decembrie 1989. Cronologie (The Revolution of December 1989. Timeline) (2nd edition, revised and supplemented), Craiova, Sitech Publishing House, 2010, p. 209.
[3] “The MApN authorities, which from 22 December 1989 had assumed the protection of the IJMI, failed to prepare records confirming the presence, voluntary surrender, or detention conditions of Securitate personnel. This shortcoming is also apparent in those military units where certain Interior Ministry cadres reported voluntarily or were brought in following their arrest,” the official historians of the Romanian Army point out in The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (cited in Armata Română în Revoluția din Decembrie 1989 (The Romanian Army in the December 1989 Revolution), 2nd revised and supplemented edition, Bucharest, Militară Publishing House, 1998, p. 454).
[4] Revoluţia Română din Decembrie 1989. Documente (The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Documents)…, vol. I, p. 363 – 364.
[5] Archive of the December 1989 (IRRD 1989) Romanian Revolution Institute, Fund I, File no. 51, page 1.
[6] Ibidem.
[7] Revoluţia Română din Decembrie 1989. Documente (The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Documents)…, vol. I, p. 366.
[8] IRRD Archives, Fund I, File no. 38, row 27.
[9] Ibidem, filele 28 – 29.
[10] Revoluţia Română din Decembrie 1989. Documente (The Romanian Revolution of December 1989. Documents)…, vol. I, p. 366.
[11] Trupele de Securitate (1949 – 1989) (The Securitate Troops (1949 – 1989)), Editors: Florica Dobre, Camelia Duică, Silviu B. Moldovan, Liviu Țăranu, Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 2004, p. 29.
[12] Vasile Mălureanu, Evenimentele din decembrie 1989 în percepția unui ofiţer de informaţii interne (III) (The Events of December 1989 through the Eyes of an Internal Intelligence Officer (III)), in Vitralii – Lumini și umbre, Year II, no. 5, December 2010, p. 79.
[13] Gheorghe Dragomir, Recviem pentru spioni Requiem for Spies), vol. I, Bucharest, România în Lume Publishing House, 2006, p. 324.
[14] Ibidem, p. 325.
[15] In their volume about the Romanian Army’s role in the December 1989 Revolution, the authors inserted the following commentary on relations between MApN units and those of the Interior Ministry and Securitate: “We cannot concur with the statements made in A New Year Born in Blood, published by Interior Ministry officers in 1998, which states on page 286 that from 23 December 1989, «a genuine repression campaign was unleashed against Interior Ministry personnel, even reaching the point of physical elimination». The incidents referred to in that book (the deaths of Generals Nuță and Mihalea, Colonel Trosca, the conscripts of the Securitate Troops killed at Otopeni, etc.) in no way support this claim. They were isolated incidents, unrelated among themselves, each with specific causes and occurring under its own conditions, making it impossible to arrive at such a reckless conclusion by any standard logic. As that same publication itself concedes (p. 272), «in the majority of cities across the country (Sibiu being an exception), the local military unit commanders understood the circumstances and took steps to pacify tensions, protect Interior Ministry units and personnel, maintain public order and calm, etc.»” (Apud Armata Română în Revoluţia… (The Romanian Army during the Revolution…), pp. 208–209).
[16] The audio recording is preserved in the author’s private archive and in the IRRD Archives, Fund I, file 127.
[17] Former SRI Director Virgil Măgureanu, concludes: “Based on available data in the Securitate archives for these final months, the line units that were collecting essential information about what was underway did not manage to process it or compile it into informative bulletins that were even remotely coherent, so no decisive measures were taken” (Apud Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, De la regimul comunist la regimul Iliescu (From the Communist Regime to the Iliescu Regime), Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2008, p. 181).
[18] Major General Marin Neagoe had been Nicolae Ceaușescu’s personal aide-de-camp since 1954.
[19] From 8 January 1990 onward, on the orders of the Minister of National Defence, General of the Army Nicolae Militaru, the staff of the 5th Security and Guard Directorate of the Securitate were taken under the Army’s supervision and protection, being stationed in three MApN barracks positioned along Bucharest’s outer beltway. The staff of Directorate V were provided with decent acommodation, meals, and news updates. The Military Prosecutor’s Office conducted investigations into all members of the 5th Directorate concerning the missions they had received and carried out during December 1989.
[20] Armata Română în Revoluţia… (The Romanian Army in the Revolution…), p. 208.
[21] Teodor Filip, Secretele USLA (USLA Secrets), Craiova, Obiectiv Publishing House, 1999, p. 106.
[22] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 326.
[23] Ibidem, p. 331.
[24] “Dear citizens, my Romanian brothers, this is Colonel General Iulian Vlad, commander of the security forces and the Ministry of the Interior. In these historic times, the Ministry of the Interior, the Securitate, all its units, together with the Romanian Army, are fighting side by side to save our national identity and the Romanian people. The Ministry of the Interior and all its armed forces have renounced the elements loyal to Ceaușescu. Romanian brothers, in these critical moments, let us remain united. Trust in us! Help us and we will not betray your trust!”
[25] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 348 – 349.
[26] Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Din culisele luptei pentru putere (1989 – 1990) (Behind the Scenes of the Power Struggle (1989 – 1990)). Prima guvernare Petre Roman (The first Petre Roman government)
[27] Ibidem.
[28] Ibidem.
[29] Ibidem.
[30] Ibidem, p. 106 – 107.
[31] In conversations with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Petre Roman states: “Brucan insisted very strongly on Iulian Iulian Vlad’s duplicity(…) And we were saying. “Well, but…”. I was opposing perhaps for reasons other than Iliescu. I was thinking that we didn’t need more enemies at the moment, because things were heading towards normalization” (Ibid Stoenescu, Alex Mihai, p. 109).
[32]On 10 January 1991, former security colonel Vasile Mălureanu wrote in a report regarding the conduct of former security officers from the First Directorate: “The report, with approval for establishing the ‘Art-Culture’ problem file no. 001603 opened on 17 January 1974, was destroyed by me on 22 December 1989”. (Apud CNSAS Archive, Documentary fund, file no. 120, vol. 1, f. 1).
[33] Viorel Roșu, De la Securitate la Doi și un sfert, via SRI (From Securitate to Doi și un sfert, via SRI) Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2008, p. 141 – 142.
[34] Ibidem.
[35] Revoluţia Română… (The Romanian Revolution…), vol. I, p. 371.
[36] Marius Oprea, Moștenitorii Securității (The Heirs to the Securitate), Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2004, p. 98.
[37] He was arrested on 19 February 1990.
[38] Alex Mihai Stoenescu, op. cit., p. 115.
[39] IRRD Archives, Fund I, File 38, page 25.
[40] Ibidem.
[41] Ibidem.
[42] Marius Oprea, op. cit., p. 51.
[43] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 349.
[44] Ibidem, p. 350.
[45] Virgil Măgureanu was there as national security advisor to CFSN President Ion Iliescu. Concerning his role at the time, Virgil Măgureanu testifies: “And I must admit that many of my actions at the time were under the pressure of the events that unfolded. I had to issue various directives to the various units of this Military Council and to communicate if something was happening in one part or another that had to be brought to the attention of the president. Whether in the form of daily bulletins or phone notes. I wanted to make sure it wasn’t perceived that I was a mere hireling. I operated at the necessary level and ensured all decisions and information were handled appropriately, discussing directly with the respective department heads” (Apud Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, De la regimul comunist… (From the Communist Regime…), p. 145).
[46] Regarding the presence of the former head of the External Information Directorate of Securitate (1959 – 1978), Virgil Măgureanu explains: “The person called Nicolae Doicaru I believe had a much less defined role than GVV had. Doicaru, having been removed not long before from leading this department, could act as an intermediary between the new authorities and the operational situation in the country. think Doicaru was simply appointed to give an appearance of legitimacy to that power transfer to someone representing the new authorities. And nothing more. If you will recall, Doicaru never took on any role nor was he ever called to any assignment in shaping the new service” (Ibid, p. 140 – 141).
[47] The book Direcţia de Informaţii Militare între ficţiune şi adevăr (Military Intelligence Directorate between Fiction and Truth (Bucharest, 1994, 264 p.) mentions (p. 151) that Lieutenant General Marin M. Pancea took command of the DIA on 24 January 1990 and led it until 4 January 1991, when he was appointed Secretary of the Supreme Council for the Defense of the Country (CSAT).
[48] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 351.
[49] The character can be identified as Virgil Măgureanu, the future director of the Romanian Intelligence Service (1990 – 1997). The media attacks by Ion Mihai Pacepa against the SRI regarding the institution’s takeover of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s secret accounts, while omitting the existence of the SIE—which had originated from the DIE structure (UM 0544)—strengthen the hypothesis of a “conflict” between Virgil Măgureanu and the generals from SIE. This “conflict” is related to “The Professor’s” desire to take control of Romanian foreign intelligence. Ion Mihai Pacepa
[50] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 351.
[51] Ibidem.
[52] Virgil Măgureanu believed that the DIA chief, Vice Admiral Ştefan Dinu, refused to take command of CIE when asked to provide CFSN with all available information upon assuming command. “However, even today – states Virgil Măgureanu- I still cannot shake the impression that Dinu wanted to evade responsibility, to collaborate with information in clarifying the situation” (Apud Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, op. cit., p. 141).
[53] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 355.
[54] Ibidem, p. 354.
[55] Ibidem, p. 356.
[56] In May 1992, the GRUP Association within SIE, led by the elusive ”Colonel Alexandru”, wrote to the poet Adrian Păunescu in Totuşi iubirea magazine, requesting him to become involved and advocate for the eradication of the “Caraman legacy,” which had materialised into numerous acts of corruption within SIE.
[57] This date marks the anniversary of Romania’s External Intelligence Service.
[58] On 6 January 1998, Law No.1 on the organisation, functioning and activities of SIE was passed, a normative act that is currently in force.
[59] Virgil Măgureanu asserts that Mihai Caraman established total control over the foreign services “in an overly selfish and egocentric manner, making it very difficult to push for the reform of the service” (Apud Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, op. cit., p. 253).
[60] Referring to Ioan Talpeș’s tenure as director of SIE, Virgil Măgureanu states: “For Ioan Talpeș, collaboration with the CIA originated from different premises, bringing immediate profit as early as 1992–1993, in that the mentioned individual (Ioan Talpeş – editor’s note) systematically and not always in response to American requests or pressures, handed over the entire network of covered officers, the «most discreet and intelligent» part of the entire Securitate” (Ibid , p. 10).
[61] Published in the Official Gazette, Year II, No 2, Friday, 5 January 1990.
[62] The archives of the 4th Military Counterintelligence Directorate was taken over by the Army’s intelligence structures and remains in their possession to this day. See, in this respect, the interview with the head of the SRI Archive, Florin Pintilie, in Jurnalul Naţional, Year XIII, Monday, 16 May 2005, p. 8 – 9.
[63] Domnița Ștefănescu, Cinci ani din istoria României. O cronologie a evenimentelor (decembrie 1989 – decembrie 1994) (Five Years of Romanian History. A Timeline of Events (December 1989 – December 1994), Maşina de scris Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 53.
[64] Viorel Roşu, op. cit., p. 152.
[65] Marius Oprea, op. cit., p. 99.
[66] Vice Admiral (Ret.) Stefan Dinu, Condamnat la discreție (Condemned at Will), Bucharest, Neverland Publishing House, 2009, p. 288 – 289.
[67] Colonel Vergil Andronache, former First Deputy Commander of UM 0215 and former counterintelligence officer, narrates in an interview with journalists Vlad Stoicescu and Liviana Rotaru, published in the daily newspaper Evenimentul Zilei on 17 June 2010, that he was summoned to the Government on 28 December 1989 under conditions where the new leaders “had a problem: they could not anticipate the reactions of the Romanians” and “were confused”. Petre Roman kept wondering “what mechanisms were set into motion for thousands of Romanians to take to the streets” explains the former colonel of UM 0215 (See: http://www.evz.ro/detalii/știri/adjunctul-doi-și-un-sfert-vorbește-după-20-de-ani-898342.html).
[68] All memoirs dedicated to the history of this unit, as well as the media, cite 1 February 1990 as the establishment date of the unit. On the website of the well-known unit (http://www.dgipi.mai.gov.ro) 7 February 1990 is mentioned as the founding date of UM 0215. I opted for the latter.
[69] Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Din culisele luptei… (Behind the Scenes of…).
[70] See: http://www.evz.ro/doi-si-un-sfert-din-adevar-toti-oamenii-presedintelui-898231.html, accessed on 28.10.2014, at 21.45.
[71] Gelu Voican-Voiculescu had arranged for the transfer of Colonel Viorel Tache from UM 02418 Bucharest to his office, together with Colonel Baiu Ion and Colonel Mugurel Florescu (See: http://www.evz.ro/detalii/știri/adjunctul-doi-și-un-sfert-vorbește-după-20-de-ani-898342.html).
[72] Colonel Florin Calapod previously affiliated with the 4th Securitate Directorate, was retired due to misconduct during a foreign mission. His association with Colonel Tache facilitated his appointment as head of UM 0215. He passed away in 2003.
[73] Gheorghe Dragomir, op. cit., p. 359.
[74] Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, De la regimul comunist…, (From the Communist Regime…) p. 148.
[75] Ibidem, p. 148 – 149.
[76] See: Viorel Roşu, op. cit., p. 154 – 155. In an interview with Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Viorel Roșu also referred to other acts of “political policing” carried out by officers of the former Third Counterintelligence Directorate. These included placing public and political figures under diplomatic watchlists at Western embassies in Bucharest, such as Doina Cornea, Mircea Dinescu, Ion Caramitru etc.
[77] Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, De la regimul comunist… (From the Communist Regime…), p. 150.
[78] Vice Admiral (r) Stefan Dinu, op. cit., p. 290.
[79] Virgil Măgureanu noted that the former Securitate structures, integrated into the Ministry of National Defence, were still strictly adhering to their final order, which prohibited involvement in any events or intelligence-gathering activities, thereby isolating themselves from information flows.
[80] Reflecting on the events in Târgu-Mureș in March 1990, Virgil Măgureanu emphasised that the incompetence of the military authorities, who falsely assured the state leadership of their control, contributed negatively to the unfolding of events. “They provided misinformation – declared Virgil MăgureanuMăgureanu, Virgil– and, worse, there were provocateurs who escalated tensions. That was one of the overt attempts—others were more covert—to ignite, both figuratively and literally, the situation in Transylvania as part of a plan to separate it from Romania. (…) Claims were made that the Securitate provoked these events. However, the Securitate was confined to barracks. During my visit to Târgu-Mureș, I inspected the units; they were all confined to their premises, and none of them were allowed to be visible on the streets”. (Apud Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, op. cit., p. 167).
[81] Virgil Măgureanu was considered one of Leonte Răutu’s protégés. Răutu had been under Securitate surveillance for “his influence over cadres and students, characterised by a Stalinist rejection of Romania’s independence, particularly national communism, and a personal hatred towards the Romanian leader representing this movement” (Ibid, p. 310 – 311).
[82] General (Ret.) Mircea Chelaru, former Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army (15 February – 31 October 2000) and head of the Counterintelligence Division of the SRI (1990), briought serious accusations against the SRI and its director, Virgil MăgureanuMăgureanu, Virgil, regarding their involvement in the events of 13 – 15 June 1990 (See: Caietele Revoluției (The Revolution Records), no. 4 – 5/29 – 30, 2010, p. 35 – 85). Regarding these events, Virgil Măgureanu remarked: “Despite our efforts on the night of 13–14 June 1990 to counteract the miners’ arrival, the bureaucratic apparatus within the economic ministries—and, as it turned out, some individuals within the SRI (acting without orders in this respect)—sought their assistance. I want to emphasise that no senior leader (including Iliescu) requested their intervention. Instead, a genuine complicity arose within the bureaucratic system, which was still largely composed of individuals from the former communist regime”. (ibidem, p. 9).
[83] Marius Oprea, op. cit., p. 119.
[84] Virgil Măgureanu, Alex Mihai Stoenescu, op. cit., p. 160.
[85] Ibidem, p. 161.
[86] The involvement of former Securitate officers within the SRI has consistently been a contentious issue between civil society and the institution. The 15% figure for Securitate personnel within the SRI has repeatedly surfaced in post-December official statements by SRI and state decision-makers.
[87] Mihai Pelin, Trecutul nu se prescrie. SIE&SRI (The Past Cannot Be Written Off. SIE&SRI, Bucharest, Kullusys Publishing House, 2004, p. 11.
[88] Vice Admiral (Ret.) Ştefan Dinu, op. cit., p. 291.
